Vasquez Rodriguez v. LaRoseVasquez Rodriguez v. LaRose
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2018, Petitioner entered the United States unlawfully as a 16-year-old unaccompanied minor. (Am. Pet. 2.) He was detained by immigration authorities and placed in a shelter for minors with ORR. (Id.) After about five months, ORR released Petitioner and permitted him to live with his uncle in Miami, Florida. (Id.)
On June 20, 2026, Petitioner was detained by state law enforcement on suspicion of driving without a license and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. (ECF No. 7-1.) On August 13, 2026, the state prosecutor filed an information charging Petitioner with felony possession of cocaine. (ECF No. 7-2.) After Petitioner posted bond, he was turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE“) and transferred to the Otay Mesa Detention Center. (Am. Pet. 3.) Petitioner seeks immediate release. (Id. 7–8.) Alternatively, he requests a bond hearing. (Id. 9–10.)
III. ANALYSIS
Individuals released from custody, even where such release is conditional, have a liberty interest in continued liberty. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parolees); Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 150 (1997) (pre-parolees); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probationers). Thus, this Court agrees with those courts that have held:
[O]nce a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk, or is now subject to a final order of removal. And if the noncitizen disputes the notion that changed circumstances justify his rearrest, he is entitled to a prompt hearing before an Immigration Judge.
Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176–77 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Kamalpreet v. Singh, No. 26-cv-1211-LL-JLB, 2026 WL 622687, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026) (“Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the government‘s discretion, the government‘s decision to release an individual from custody creates an implicit promise, upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty will be revoked only if they fail to live up to the conditions of release.” (citation modified) (quoting Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025))).
Here, the Government released Petitioner in 2018 to live with a sponsor, which reflects the Government‘s determination that he was neither dangerous nor a flight risk. See
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IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court issues the following writ:
The Court ORDERS a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge for Moises Vasquez Rodriguez (A# 215-944-664) within 14 days of this order. At that hearing, the Immigration Judge should assess whether circumstances have changed since Petitioner‘s release in 2018, and whether these changed circumstances now warrant detention instead of release.
The Clerk of Court shall close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 1, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court