79 S.E. 700 | S.C. | 1913
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant in a magistrate’s Court for $14.75 damages done to a shipment of furniture, while in defendant’s possession in this State, and $4.60, overcharges in the freight collected by defendant thereon, and $50, the penalty allowed by statute (Civ. Code, 1912, section 2573), for the failure of defendant to pay plaintiff’s claim for said damages and overcharge within 40 days after the filing thereof with defendant’s agent. The initial carrier, the Southern Railway Company, received the shipment at High Point, N. C., to be transported over its
The only question made in the Courts below and brought here by the grounds of appeal is that the statute above cited, under which defendant was penalized for its failure to pay plaintiff’s claim within the time required, is void, as applied to interstate commerce, because: (a) It unlawfully regulates and unreasonably burdens the same; and (b) it deprives defendant of its property without due process of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the laws; and (c) it is in conflict with that prevision of the Federal statute regulating interstate commerce known as the Carmack amendment (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, sec. 7, pars. 11, 12, 34 Stat. 593 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1308]).
Let us inquire, then, what is meant by “the subject,” when it is said that, when Congress has legislated upon or taken possession of “the subject,”, inconsistent State laws are superseded. This question was considered in Southern Railzvay Co. v. Reid, supra, where the Court said:. “It is well settled that if the State and Congress have a concurrent power, that of the State is superseded when the power of Congress is exercised. The question occurs, to what extent and how directly must it-be exercised to have such effect? It was decided in Missouri P. R. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U. S. 612, 29, Sup. Ct. 214, 53 L. Ed. 352, that the mere .creation of the interstate commerce commission and the grant to it of a large measure of con
The same question is so clearly and fully discussed in Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 32 Sup. Ct. 715, 56 L. Ed. 1182, and that case is so directly in point, that we quote ■from the opinion at length. After stating that the statute of Indiana, which was assailed in that case, and which was adopted in 1907, after the passage of the pure food and drugs act of Congress of June 30, 1906 (Act June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 769 [U. S. Comp'. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1354]), covered the same general subject, the Court pointed out that the provisions of the State statute upon which it was attacked as being in conflict with the food and drugs act were not included in the legislation of Congress, and on
“But this (the legislation of Congress) does not cover the entire ground. It is one thing to make a false or misleading statement regarding the article or its ingredients (the thing prohibited by the act of Congress), and it may be quite another to give no information as to what the ingredients are (the thing required by the State statute). As is well known, products may be sold, and in case of .so-called proprietary articles frequently are sold, under trade-names which do not reveal the ingredients of the composition, and the proprietors refrain from revealing them. Moreover, in defining what shall be adulteration or misbranding for the purposes of the Federal act, it is provided that mixtures or compounds known as articles of food under their own distinctive names, not taking- or imitating the distinctive name of another article, which do not contain‘any added poisonous or deleterious ingredients,’ shall not be deemed to be adulterated or misbranded if the náme be accompanied on the same label or brand with a statement of the place of manufacture. * * * Congress has thus limited the scope of its prohibitions. It has not included that at which the Indiana statute aims. Can it be said that Congress, nevertheless, has denied to the State, with respect to the feeding stuffs coming from another State and sold in the original packages, the power the State otherwise would have to prevent imposition upon the public by making a reasonable and nondiscriminatory provision for the disclosure of ingredients, and for .inspection and analysis? If there be such denial, it is not to be found in any express declaration to that effect. Undoubtedly Congress, by virtue of its paramount authority over interstate commerce, might have said that such goods should be free from the incidental effect of a State law enacted for these purposes. But it did not so declare. There is a proviso in the section*72 defining misbranding for the purposes of the act, that 'nothing in this act shall be construed’ as requiring manufacturers of proprietary foods which contain no unwholesome added ingredients to disclose their trade formulas, 'except in so far as the provisions of this act may require to secure freedom from adulteration or misbranding.’ Section 8. We have already noted the limitations of the provisions referred to. And it is clear that this proviso merely relates to the interpretation of the requirements of the act, and does not enlarge its purview or establish a rule as to matters which lie outside its prohibitions.
“Is, then, a denial to the State of the exercise of its power for the purposes in question necessarily implied in the Federal statute? For when the question is whether a Federal act overrides a State law, the entire scheme of the statute must, of course, be considered, and that which needs must be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be accomplished —if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect—• the State law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (27 Sup. Ct. 350), 51 L. Ed. 553, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075; Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 32 Sup. Ct. 160 (56 L. Ed. 237); Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 436, 32 Sup. Ct. 140 (56 L. Ed. 257).
"But the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police, power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be'implied unless the act of Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the State. This principle has had abundant illustration. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 289, 42 L. Ed.*73 688; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 Sup. Ct. 488, 42 L. Ed. 878; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. 132, 48 L. Ed. 268; Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189, 24 Sup. Ct. 234, 48 L. Ed. 401; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 28 Sup. Ct. 485, 52 L. Ed. 778, 14 Ann. Cas. 1101; Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 379, 32 Sup. Ct. 160, 56 L. Ed. 237, 240; Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 442, 32 Sup. Ct. 140, 56 L. Ed. 257, 262.
“In Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 Sup. Ct. 488, 42 L. Ed. 878, the Supreme Court of Kansas had affirmed a judgment against the railway company for damages caused, by its having brought into the State certain cattle alleged to have been affected with Texas fever, which was communicated to the cattle of the plaintiff. The recovery was based .upon a statute of Kansas which made actionable the driving or transporting into' the State of cattle which were liable to communicate the fever. It was contended that act Cong. May 29, 1884, c. 60, 23 Stat. at E. 31 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 299), known as the animal industry act, together with act March '3, 1891, c. 544, 26 Stat. at E. 1044, appropriating money to carry out its provisions, and section 5258 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3564), covered substantially the whole subject of the transportation from one State to another State of live stock capable 'of imparting contagious disease, and therefore that the State of Kansas had no authority to deal in any form with that subject. The act of 1884- provided for the establishment of a bureau of animal industry, for the appointment of a staff to investigate the condition of domestic animals,- and for the report upon the means to be adopted to guard against the spread of disease. Regulations were to be prepared by the commissioner of agriculture and certified to the executive authority of each State and territory. Special investigation was to be made for*74 the protection of foreign commerce, and the secretary of the treasury was to' establish such regulations as might be required concerning exportation. It was provided that no railroad company within the United States, nor the owners or masters of any vessel, should receive for transportation, or transport, from one State to another, any live stock ■affected with any communicable disease, nor should any one deliver for such transportation, or drive on foot or transport in private conveyance from one State to another, any live stock knowing them to be so affected. It was made the duty of the commissioner of agriculture to notify the proper officials or agents of transportation companies doing business in any infected locality of the existence of contagion; and the operators of railroads, or the owners or custodians of live stock within such infected district, who should knowingly violate the provisions of the act, were to be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable, by fine or imprisonment. . ■ •
“The Court held that this Federal legislation did not override the statute of the State; that the latter created a civil liability as to which the animal industry act of Congress had not made provision. The Court said (169 U. S. 623, 624 [18 Sup. Ct. 492, 42 L. Ed. 878], supra) :cMay not these statutory provisions stand without • obstructing or embarrassing the execution of the act of Congress? This question must of course be determined with reference to the settled rule that a statute enacted in execution of a reserved power of the State is not to be regarded as inconsistent with an act of Congress passed in the execution of a clear power under the Constitution, unless the repugnance or conflict is w direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or stand together. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243, 16 L. Ed. 243, 247. * * * Whether a corporation transporting-, or the person causing to be transported, from one State to another cattle of the class specified in the Kansas statute should be liable in a civil action for an)'' damages*75 sustained by the owners of domestic cattle by reason of the introduction into their State of such diseased cattle is a subject about which the animal industry act did not make any provision. That act does not declare that the regulations established by the department of agriculture should have the effect to exempt from civil liability one who, but for such regulations, would have been liable either under the general principles of law or under some State enactment for damages arising out of the introduction into that State of cattle so affected. And, as will be seen from the regulations prescribed by the secretary of agriculture, that officer did not assume to give protection to any one against such liability.’
“In Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108, the question arose under a statute of Colorado which had been passed to prevent the introduction into the State of diseased animals. The statute made it a misdemeanor for any one to bring into the State between April 1st and November 1st any cattle or horses from a State, territory, or county south of the thirty-sixth parallel of north latitude, unless they had been held at some place north of that parallel at least 90 days prior to importation, -or unless the owner or person in charge should procure from the State veterinary sanitaty' board a certificate, or bill of health, to the effect that the cattle or horses were free from’ all infectious or contagious diseases, and had not been exposed thereto at any time within the preceding 90 days. The expense of any inspection in connection therewith wras to be paid by the owner.
“The plaintiff in error had been convicted of bringing cattle into the State in violation of the statute. There was no proof in the case that the particular cattle had any infectious or contagious disease, but it did appear that they were brought from Texas, south of the thirty-sixth parallel, without being held or inspected as the statute required. Its provisions were ignored altogether as invalid legislation.*76 When the plaintiff in error refused to assent to the State inspection he showed to the authorities a certificate signed by an assistant inspector of the Federal bureau of animal industry, who certified that he had carefully inspected the cattle in Texas and found them free from communicable disease. It was insisted that the statute of Colorado was in conflict with the animal industry act of Congress, but the Court sustained, the State law for the reason that, although the two statutes related to the same general subject, they did not cover the sanie ground, and were not inconsistent with each other.
“The Court thus emphasized the general principle involved (187 U. S. 148, 23 Sup. Ct. 96, 47 T. Ed. 108, supra) : ‘It should never be held that Congress intends, to supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police power of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose io effect that result is clearly manifested. This Court has said—and the principle has often been reaffirmed —that “in the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the State law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be so direct and positive, so that the two acts should not be reconciled or consistently stand together.” ’ ” (Italics added.)
In each of the cases hereinbefore cited, the Court holds that the police power of the State still exists unimpaired, except in so far as laws adopted thereunder may conflict with the legislation of Congress upon the same subject. Therefore we cannot accept as sound the contention of appellant’s counsel that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the act to regulate commerce “was intended to cover and regulate the entire subject of interstate commerce, leaving nothing to the State, either by way of legislation, policy, or regulation.” To sustain that contention, he cites the following from the Croninger case: “Almost ei^ery detail of the subject is covered so completely
Having seen what the subject of the Carmack amendment is, let us examine the State statute to see what subject is dealt with by it, and thereby determine whether they cover the same subject, and whether there is any conflict between them. The State statute merely penalizes the failure of carriers to perform a common-law duty—namely, the duty to make reasonably prompt settlement of the claims of ship
We look in vain through the legislation of Congress to find any rule or regulation on the subject of th¿ prompt settlement of such claims. By no sort of implication can that subject be brought within the provisions of the Carmack amendment. That it is one proper for the exertion of the State- authority, in the absence of congressional actjon, is settled by the Mazursky case. The reason for the statute and the grounds upon,which it should be sustained are set forth in that case and in the Seegers case, 73 S. C. 71, 52 S. E. 797, 121 Am. St. Rep. 921, and 207 U. S. 73, 28 Sup. Ct. 28, 52 R. Ed. 108. The annulling of it would leave shippers at the mercy of interstate carriers, and allow them to practically confiscate small claims for loss of or damage to property while in their possession; because, in the great
We shall next consider the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which are relied upon by appellant to show that the State statute' conflicts with the legislation of Congress, and attempt to show that they cannot be so interpreted. The Carmack amendment reads as follows: “That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation, shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Provided, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or rig-ht of action which he has under existing law. That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof.”
This legislation was construed and applied in the case of Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra, in which the company was held liable in the State Court for the full value of a diamond ring, and interest thereon, to wit, $137.53, notwithstanding a limitation of the company’s liability, by stip
In Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391, 57 L. Ed. 683 (decided March 10, 1913), the principle of the Croninger case was reiterated, and, in addition, it was held that any valid limitation of liability stipulated for in the bill of lading for the benefit of the initial carrier and its connecting carriers inured h> the benefit of each succeeding carrier in the route.
The case of Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U. S. 657, 33 Sup. Ct. 397, 57 L. Ed. 690 (decided March 10, 1913), came within the principle of the Cronin
The case of Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426, 33 Sup. Ct. 174, 57, L. Ed. 284 (decided January 6, 1913), does not come under the Car-mack amendment, but under section 1 of the Hepburn act, amending the original act to regulate commerce. In the Hardwick case, the State Court imposed upon a carrier a penalty provided by a statute of Minnesota for delay in furnishing cars to initiate an interstate shipment. The original act to regulate commerce declared that the term “transportation” should embrace all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage, and the Hepburn act declared that it “shall include cars and other vehicles and all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment or carriage, irrespective of ownership or of any contract, express or implied, for the use thereof and all services in connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit, ventilation, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of property transported] and it shall be the duty of every carrier subject to the provisions of this act to provide and furnish such transportation upon reasonable requests therefor, and to ■establish through routes and reasonable rates applicable thereto.” (Italics added.) The Supreme Court reversed the State Court, and held that “Congress has legislated concerning the deliveries of cars in interstate commerce by carriers subject to the act.” Not only had the act of Congress
In the case of St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Edwards, 227 U. S. 265, 33 Sup. Ct. 262, 56 L. Ed. 506 (decided February 2d, 1913), the Court of Arkansas imposed upon an interstate carrier the penalty provided by what was called “the demurrage statute” of that State, because of a failure to make prompt delivery of freight on arrival at destination. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, and held under the principle announced in the Flardwick case, that the subject of the delivery of interstate shipments is so' far embraced in the provisions of the Flepburn act, above quoted, as to supersede the Arkansas statute, which dealt with the same subject. We fail to see wherein this State statute has anything whatever.to do with contracts made by the initial carrier relative to its liability or that of its successors in the route for loss or damage to tire property caused by it or them so as to bring it within the principles of the Croninger, Carl, and Harriman cases, or with the receipt or delivery of interstate shipments so as to bring it within the principles of the Hardwick and Edwards cases.
In this connection, we notice the statement in the argument of appellant’s counsel that this Court held in the Charles case, 78 S. C. 36, 58 S. E. 927, 125 Am. St. Rep. 762, that “prompt delivery of goods” is the legal equivalent of “prompt settlement of proper claims for damages,” and that the Supreme Court of the United States held the same in the Mazursky case. Counsel has evidently misunderstood the Court. The language used was: “The penalty imposed is for a delict of duty appertaining to the business of a common carrier, and in so far as it may affect interstate commerce, it is an aid thereto by its tendency to pro'mote safe and prompt delivery of goods, or its legal equiv
It is argued, however, that in the Croninger case, the Supreme Court construed the proviso above quoted as preserving to the holder of the bill of lading only the rights or
Equally untenable is the construction put upon the State statute by the appellant—that it requires all actions to be brought against the terminal carrier. This Court has expressly held that the terms of the statute limit “the loss and damage which a carrier is required to adjust and pay for to that which befalls while the goods are in the possession of such carrier, and excludes the idea of liability for loss or damage to the goods while in the possession of another carrier.” Venning v. A. C. L. R. Co., 78 S. C. 56, 58 S. E. 983, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1217, 125 Am. St. Rep. 768.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. This action- was brought in the magistrate’s Court to recover $14:17 6 damages to a shipment of furniture, in transit, from High Point, N. C., to Varnville, S. C., and for $5.25 overcharge in freight, and for $50 penalty for failure to pay the claim in 40 days.
The evidence shows: That the furniture was damaged in transit, but whether on defendant’s line or not it does not appear. At the trial the defendant asked the magistrate to hold that the claim for $50 as a penalty as applied to an interstate shipment was a -burden on interstate commerce. That the penalty act as applied to- an interstate shipment was unconstitutional, null, and void. The magistrate refused to so hold, and gave judgment for plaintiff, for full amount claimed, and $50 penalty. The defendant appealed to Circuit Court, and his Honor, Judge Memminger, affirmed the judgment of the magistrate’s Court. The defendant appeals,- and questions the correctness of his Honor’s ruling. These exceptions question the validity of the penalty act of February 23, 1903 (24 St. at Large, pi. 81), a’s- amended February 19, 1910 (26 St. at Large, p. 719), on the ground that said act as applied to- ■ an inter
Transportation is declared by the Federal statutes to embrace all instrumentalities of shipment and carriage, including “all services in connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation and transfer in transit, ventilation and refrigeration, icing, storing and handling of property transported.” The words italicized indicate the reason for holding that this case falls within the rule above set out, laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the following cases: Chicago etc. Railroad Co. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 427, 33 Sup. Ct. 174, 57 L. Ed. 284; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314; Kansas City, etc., Railroad Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391, 57 L. Ed. 683;
Note : This case has been carried on writ of error to the United States Supreme Court.