Varillas Broca v. Gil Giron

Jul 18, 2013
13-1014-cv
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still “all New York City taxicab drivers, licensed by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission.” Thus, the plaintiffs having not yet incurred the alleged harms, there remains a question as to whether the plaintiffs’ injuries were sufficient at the time of filing to support standing. We need not resolve this appeal on grounds of standing, however, because the claims were properly dismissed in any event as being moot. While the standing doctrine evaluates a litigant‘s personal stake at the onset of a case, Comer, 37 F.3d at 791 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 570 n. 5, 112 S.Ct. 2130), the mootness doctrine requires that “standing persists throughout the life of a lawsuit.” Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir.2011). Thus, to the extent that the plaintiffs had standing at the time of the filing, given the subsequent actions discussed above, once the named parties lost tangible interest, their claims were rendered moot. See Bd. of Sch. Commis. of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129, 95 S.Ct. 848, 43 L.Ed.2d 74 (1975) (stating that, in general, if the claims of the named plaintiffs become moot prior to class certification, the entire action becomes moot). Having decided that the plaintiffs’ claims are moot, and there having been no class certification, prior to decision on class certification, we need not and do not consider the other arguments made in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SUMMARY ORDER

Jose Leonides Varillas Broca appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.), denying Varillas‘s petition for the repatriation of his three children under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (“Hague Convention“), implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-10. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Varillas appeals the determination that his youngest child, JV, was well settled in the United States, such that JV‘s return to Mexico was not required under Article 12 of the Hague Convention.1 Varillas primarily argues that the district court improperly considered the importance of keeping JV together with his siblings in deciding that JV was well settled. “We review the district court‘s interpretation of the Convention de novo and its factual determinations for clear error.” Souratgar v. Fair, 720 F.3d 96, 103, 2013 WL 2631375, at *3 (2d Cir. June 13, 2013).

If Hague Convention proceedings are initiated within a year of a child‘s wrongful removal, then Article 12 requires the court to order repatriation of that child, unless an exception applies. Hague Convention, art. 12. If the proceedings are commenced after the one-year period, the court “shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.” Id. (emphasis added). Respondent bears the burden of proving this exception by a preponderance of the evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B).

We have discussed the “[f]actors that courts consider” in determining whether a child is well settled, which “should generally include“:

(1) the age of the child; (2) the stability of the child‘s residence in the new environment; (3) whether the child attends school or day care consistently; (4) whether the child attends church [or participates in other community or extracurricular school activities] regularly; (5) the respondent‘s employment and financial stability; (6) whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area; and (7) the immigration status of the child and the respondent.

Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir.2012), cert. granted in part, No. 12-820, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2851, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 2013 WL 56044 (U.S. June 24, 2013).2 While useful, these factors are neither mandatory nor exclusive. “[C]ourts are permitted to consider any relevant factor surrounding the child‘s living arrangement—without limitation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The test is a “fact-specific multi-factor” test, in which no factor, including immigration status, is dispositive. Id.

Here, the district court considered the above factors in determining that JV was well settled.3 Under Lozano, the court rightly considered JV‘s relationship with his mother and siblings in reaching its conclusion. Even though the court emphasized this factor in its final balancing analysis, it was one of many considerations. In any event, our review is de novo. Reviewing the record as a whole and focusing on the Lozano factors, we agree that JV is well settled in the United States. JV‘s consistent school attendance, involvement in church, and strong relationships with friends and relatives in the area, in particular his mother and sister, all support a conclusion that he is well settled. His immigration status, lack of residential stability, and poor performance in school, as well as his mother‘s lack of financial stability, counsel against a conclusion that he is well settled. Nonetheless, in the overall balancing, we conclude that the exception applies.4

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Varillas‘s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform with the caption above.

Notes

1
Varillas‘s oldest child turned sixteen during the pendency of the proceedings, thus the Hague Convention no longer applied to him. As to the middle child, the district court denied the request for repatriation, concluding that she was well settled, and that she was sufficiently mature that her objection to returning to Mexico should be taken into account. Varillas does not appeal this determination.
2
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Lozano, but the issue to be reviewed by the Court is explicitly limited to whether the one-year period may be equitably tolled when the abducting parent has concealed the whereabouts of the child—a question not at issue in this appeal.
3
Varillas‘s argument that the district court erred in failing to consider the employment and financial stability of JV‘s mother is unpersuasive. While the court did not explicitly list this factor, it discussed it in relation to other factors. See, e.g., Special App. 43. In any event, the Lozano factors are not mandatory. 697 F.3d at 57.
4
We note that the factors here are in many ways similar to those in Lozano, where we affirmed the determination that the child was well settled. 697 F.3d at 58.
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