Opinion
Thе petitioner, Anthony Varchetta, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corрus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion when it denied his petition for certification to appeal and that he is entitled to habeas relief because the habeas court erred by using the wrong standard to conclude that he was afforded the effective assistance of both trial and habeas counsel.
“On May 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that his attorney failеd to investigate his case or to adequately advise him and, as such, his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” (Footnotes omitted.) Varchetta v. Commissioner of Correction,
Approximately one week before the petitioner’s first habeas trial, the petitioner’s counsel, Kenneth Fox, filed a motion to amend the second amended petition for a
On January 2, 2009, the petitioner filed a third amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the present action, alleging ineffective assistance of his prior habeas counsel.
In his petition for certification to appeal, the рetitioner claimed that the habeas court erred by denying
Our standard of review is well established. “[I]f either the petitioner or the respondent is denied a timely request for certification to appeal from a habeas court’s judgment, such review may subsequently be obtained only if the appellant can demonstrate that the denial constituted an abuse of discretion. . . . We recognizе that [i]n enacting [General Statutes] § 62-470 (b), the legislature intended to discourage frivolous habeas appeals. ... A habeas appeal that satisfies one of the criteria set forth in Lozada v. Deeds,
“In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of
“As to [a review] on the merits, [t]he standard of review of a habeas court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner generally must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington,
The petitioner claims on appeal that the habeas court erred by using the incorrect standard to determine
Both of the petitioner’s arguments challenge the habeas court’s application of the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The petitioner, however, has failed to challenge the habeas court’s findings regarding his failure to prove any deficient performance of his trial and habeas counsel. Even if the petitioner were to prevail on his claim that the habeas court used the improper standard to determine prejudice, the habeas court’s unchallenged findings that he failed to prove deficient performance would stand. This court, therefore, would not be able to afford him any practical relief because the petitioner must prove both deficient performance and prejudice in ordеr to establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Kearney v. Commissioner of Correction,
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
In his brief, the petitioner also claims that, in his first habeas action, the habeas court, T. Santos, J., used the wrong standard to conclude that the petitioner was afforded the effective assistance of trial counsel. The petitioner has already litigated in this court the first habeas court’s ruling regarding his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, and we affirmed the habeas court’s decision in Varchetta v. Commissioner of Correction,
See North Carolina v. Alford,
The petitioner had two prior sexual assault convictions and a total of approximately nineteen other convictions.
The petitioner claimed that his habeas counsel failed to (1) prepare adequately for thе habeas trial; (2) meet with the petitioner; (3) conduct adequate legal research; (4) timely amend the petition for a writ of habeas corpus; (5) adequately investigate the petitioner’s claims; (6) present information in suрport of the petitioner’s Cronie claim; and (7) present certain information in support of the petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective.
The petitioner also claimed in his petition for certification thаt the habeas court abused its discretion by finding that his claim of constructive ineffective assistance of counsel did not warrant review. The petitioner, however, did not advance this claim on appeal.
The respоndent, the Commissioner of Correction, argues that we should dismiss the petitioner’s claim because it is unpreserved, as the petitioner did not raise it in his petition for certification to appeal. In response, the pеtitioner argues that he is nonetheless entitled to review pursuant to State v. Golding,
