424 Pa. 1 | Pa. | 1967
Opinion by
This is an appeal by defendant from an order of the court below granting plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Plaintiff had instituted an action in trespass for injuries allegedly received as the result of a railroad accident on December 21, 1958 in New Brunswick, New Jersey. Defendant’s train, on which plaintiff was a passenger, made a sudden abrupt stop when defendant’s block operator mistakenly placed a red signal on the track on which the passenger train was proceeding rather than on the adjacent track where a freight train had just passed. Plaintiff complained immediately to one of defendant’s crewmen of injury to his neck and chest resulting from the jarring stop.
After suit was instituted, plaintiff testified at depositions that he had been in an automobile accident in Florida in 1948 or 1949, had hurt only the bottom of his back and had suffered no serious personal injury in that accident. Later, plaintiff submitted as a sworn answer to a written interrogatory inquiring with respect to the injuries set forth in his complaint whether plaintiff had ever previously suffered from similar ailments, that he had suffered none. At trial, plaintiff testified on direct examination that he had been involved in a minor automobile accident in Florida in 1949 or 1953 but that any injuries sustained were “nothing.”
We are convinced that the jury’s verdict for the defendant was not capricious, but was based upon the evidence in the case and that the court improperly granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. It is well established that it is error for a trial court to direct a verdict for a plaintiff whose claim rests upon oral testimony even if that testimony is uncontradicted and unimpeached, because the credibility of the witnesses is always for the jury. Savidge v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 380 Pa. 205, 110 A. 2d 730 (1955); Nanty-Glo Boro. v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 Atl. 523 (1932). Just as it would have been improper in the instant case for the trial court to have directed a verdict for the plaintiff, it was likewise an abuse of the trial judge’s discretion to ignore the findings of the jury because, as the lower court stated in its opinion, “Any other conclusion [than that defendant was negligent and liable to plaintiff for his injuries] would amount to a capricious disregard of the testimony in this case.” It is clear to us that the lower court substituted its decision for that of the jury in an area which is solely the responsibility of the jury. The jury’s verdict for the defendant might have meant
Order reversed.