OPINION
Appellant Mamie Vangsness and respondent Michael Vangsness married and had three children. The 1998 judgment dissolving their marriage reserved issues, including custody. The order placing temporary custody of the children with appellant forbade the parties from criticizing *471 each other or trying to influence the children’s custodial preference. In May 1999, following a trial, the district court placed physical custody of the children with respondent. Appellant’s post-trial motion alleged that she was entitled to a new trial because the evidence did not support the custody placement and because respondent committed misconduct by criticizing her to the children, influencing their custodial preference, and rehearsing the children’s testimony. Appellant also sought a new trial based on her allegations that she had newly discovered evidence of respondent’s alleged wrongdoing. She appeals the trial court decision denying most of her requests. Alternatively, she seeks an outright reversal of the trial court’s placement of custody with respondent. Because the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and address the relevant best-interests concerns, and because no other abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion is demonstrated, we affirm.
FACTS
The parties were married in 1985 and have three children. In May 1996, appellant moved out of the family home. Shortly thereafter, appellant’s boyfriend moved in with her and the children. In August 1996, the parties had a dispute in which respondent allegedly threatened appellant. The parties dispute the details of the incident.
In January 1997, respondent was laid off, appellant went back to school, and the parties agreed the children should live with respondent. In June 1997, the parties, the children, and the police were involved in another incident. The parties dispute the details, but as a result, the youngest child moved back in with appellant. In January 1998, the older two children moved back in with appellant. In March 1998, respondent moved in with his girlfriend.
Appellant petitioned to dissolve the marriage in May 1998, seeking physical custody of the children. Respondent also sought physical custody. The trial court dissolved the parties’ marriage in August 1998 and reserved all other issues. A month later, the court placed temporary custody of the children with appellant and ordered a custody study. Also, respondent married his girlfriend. The custody study, completed in November, states that all three children told the evaluator that they wanted to live with respondent and recommends that placement of sole physical custody of the children be with him.
The custody trial started in February 1999 and ended in March 1999. During trial, the court conducted in-camera interviews of each of the children, then ages 12, 11, and 6; the older children said they wanted to live with respondent.
Appellant’s post-trial motion, following the placement of custody in May 1999, was accompanied by an affidavit by the parties’ oldest child. After a hearing, the trial court made only non-substantive alterations to the May order.
ISSUES
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not granting appellant a new trial because the evidence does not support the trial court’s findings of fact?
2. Aside from examining the sufficiency of evidence for the trial court’s findings of fact, which adequately address statutory best-interests considerations, has appellant demonstrated an error of the trial court in its determination of the best interests of the children?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not granting appellant a new trial for newly discovered evidence?
ANALYSIS
1. Findings on best-interests factors
On appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial, only the matters raised in the motion can be reviewed.
Estate of Spiess v. Schumm,
Generally, we must defer to the trial court’s broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a new trial.
See Maloney v. Ketter,
Appellant’s new trial motion questioned whether the record supported the trial' court’s findings of fact, and we must uphold these findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. A finding is “clearly erroneous” if the reviewing court is “ ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ”
Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press,
Appellant’s new trial motion also asserted the occurrence of misconduct by respondent. Where evidence is said to conflict with the trial court’s ruling on this issue, “the broadest possible discretionary power [is vested] in the trial court.”
Grorud,
Having reviewed each of appellant’s allegations and having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error in denying appellant’s new-trial motion.
a. Preferences of children; alleged misconduct
The temporary order prohibited the parties from “complaining]” about each other in the children’s presence and from trying to “influence” the children’s *473 custodial preferences. Appellant alleges that respondent committed misconduct by “downgrading” her, her family, and her fiancé in front of the children and that he tried to influence the children’s custodial preference by promising that he would quit smoking and that the oldest child could decorate his own bedroom. To support her argument, appellant submitted the affidavit of the parties’ oldest child.
The trial court rejected these allegations, finding that the oldest child’s affidavit failed to identify “specific incidents” of downgrading and that respondent’s post-trial affidavit addressed the incidents in question. The court then found that “[t]he alleged ‘downgrading’ was not downgrading” but, “at most” was “a misunderstanding.” Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, we cannot say that appellant showed these findings to be clearly erroneous. Moreover, the trial court also noted that even if respondent made “disparaging remarks, [appellant] has not shown that these few incidents prejudiced her to the extent she should be granted a new trial.” Appellant did not show this finding to be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
Appellant also alleges that respondent committed misconduct by violating the temporary order when he allegedly rehearsed the children’s testimony with them. Respondent testified that he and his attorney discussed the proceeding with the children but denied that they rehearsed the children’s testimony. Appellant raised this issue in the post-trial proceedings and the trial court’s order denying her new-trial motion showed that the court was aware of respondent’s testimony. It also stated that “[e]videnee that they were practicing testimony is lacking” and that respondent’s attorney “was simply describing the process to the children and obtaining basic information from them[.]” Because these findings are consistent with respondent’s testimony and his post-trial affidavit, the record supports the trial court’s findings on this issue and the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial based on the suggestion of rehearsal of testimony.
The trial court also rejected appellant’s allegations that respondent attempted to bribe the children. It found that respondent “had no reason” to try to influence the children’s testimony regarding their custodial choice because the children had already told the evaluator that they wanted to live with respondent. It also found that “[n]o bribes were made by [respondent] * * * [the oldest child] simply misunderstood [respondent’s] conduct.” Viewed in the light most favorable to the findings, the record supports these findings.
The trial court does not specifically state whether respondent’s statement that he would stop smoking was an attempt to bribe the children. But at trial, respondent testified that he told the children he would try tó stop smoking and that his attempt to do so was for the children, himself, and his wife. As a result, the trial court was aware of respondent’s statements about smoking and its finding that respondent made no bribes is an implicit determination that he did not intend the statement to be a bribe. Intent is a credibility question on which we defer to the trial court.
Lien v. Loraus,
Absent clear error on related findings, there was no demonstration that the trial court abused its discretion in its refusal to award a new trial based on assertions that respondent wrongfully influenced the preferences of the children.
b. Other findings on best-interests factors
In addition to its findings related to the preferences of the children, appellant challenges findings that suggest the neutral effect of various best-interests considerations.
*474 One of these assertions of appellant directly disputes the existence of evidence to support a specific trial court finding. Appellant alleges that “there is no evidence” to support the finding that her fiancé and the children have not adjusted well to each other. But the record contains the youngest child’s statements to the judge that appellant’s fiancé is “kind of mean” and the custody report’s statement that the older two children “do not like” appellant’s fiancé.
Appellant’s other assertions about findings on best-interests factors mistakenly rests on her citation of evidence that may contradict the trial court’s findings. When a party challenges a trial court’s findings, the evidence “tending directly or by reasonable inference to sustain the * * * findings * * * shall be summarized” by the party challenging the findings. Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 128.02, subd. 1(c);
cf.
Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (1998) (stating, in context of statutory interpretation, “ ‘[s]hall’ is mandatory”). When summarizing the evidence supporting a trial court’s findings, the party challenging the findings must cite the portions of the record containing those findings.
See
Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 128.02, subd. 1(c) (stating each statement of material fact in appellant’s brief “shall” be accompanied by cite to record); Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 128.02, subd. 2 (requiring respondent’s brief to conform to same requirements as appellant’s brief);
Hecker v. Hecker,
That the record might support findings other than those made by the trial court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.
See, e.g., Elliott v. Mitchell,
To challenge the trial court’s findings of fact successfully, the party challenging the findings must show that despite viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings (and accounting for an appellate court’s deference to a trial court’s credibility determinations and its inability to resolve conflicts in the evidence), the record still requires the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Only if these conditions are met, that is, only if the findings are “clearly erroneous,” does it become relevant that the record might support findings other than those that the trial court made.
There is sufficient evidence of record to support the trial court’s findings that numerous best-interests factors favor neither party. Because the court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, it is unnecessary for us to further address appellant’s discussion of evidence.
See Wilson v. Moline,
Appellant argues that she “should have been given more credit” in the balancing of the best-interests factor addressing the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community and the factor addressing the health of the persons relevant to the custody decision. We cannot reweigh the evidence presented to the trial court.
See, e.g., Sefkow v. Sefkow,
Contending that the trial court should have recognized a predominant intimacy of the mother-child relationship, appellant points out that many of the children’s teachers testified to the affection between appellant and the children while only respondent’s family testified to the strength of the father-child relationship. There is no dispute that both parents love the children. Significantly, appellant works at the children’s school, giving her a great opportunity to show her affection for the children.
Appellant alleges that her constancy in the community has allowed the children to stay in a stable environment for most of their fives. But the trial court found the “stable environment” factor of “limited significance” because (a) the oldest child is entering high school and will attend the same school regardless of the placement of his custody; (b) the second child has only one year of elementary school remaining; and (c) the youngest child has only been in school for a year and established only limited connections to that school.
Appellant’s allegation that the trial court’s findings do not address respondent’s ability to give the children love, affection, and guidance is inconsistent with the court’s finding that “[e]ach parent has demonstrated the capacity to give love, guidance, and affection, and to educate the children.”
2. Ultimate best-interests determination
Appellant contends that the trial court findings, especially if they are corrected, but even if they are not, do not permit the ultimate finding that it serves the best interests of the children to place their physical custody with respondent.
The trial court’s determination of the ultimate best-interests issue will be affirmed unless it constitutes an abuse of the trial court’s discretion or the trial court rationale suggests an erroneous application of law.
Maxfield v. Maxfield,
Citing no decisions since
Maxfield,
appellant seeks identical relief in this case. She alleges that she is the primary caretaker for the youngest child and that
Sef-kow
disfavors split custody placements.
Sefkow,
Custody placements are to be based on a child’s “best interests.” , Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(a)(3) (1998).- A child’s best interests are the fundamental focus of custody decisions.
E.g., Frauenshuh v. Giese,
In
Pikula,
the supreme court held that, absent a showing of unfitness, custody of a child too young to express a custodial preference should be placed with the child’s primary caretaker. In reaching its primary-parent presumption,
Pikula
noted that the best predictor of a young child’s well being was continuity of care of the child by his or her primary caretaker.
Pikula,
Maxfield
acknowledged that after the trial court made its decision, the legislature amended the custody statute (a) to require that courts, when placing custody, consider both which party was the child’s primary parent and the intimacy of the child’s relationship with each parent; and (b) to forbid the courts from making custody placements by considering one statutory best-interests factor to the exclusion of the others.
Maxfield,
Thus, under current Minnesota law on placing custody of children in disso
*477
lution matters, the legislature requires that the decision be based on an undifferentiated balancing of the child’s best interests, and the “golden thread” analysis has been abandoned in practice. This is notwithstanding recognition by the supreme court that the analysis required by Minn. Stat. § 518.17 lacks “objective standards” and makes the outcome of disputes unpredictable.
Pikula,
Finally, we note that
Maxfield
itself states that “the fact that one parent may be the primary caretaker does not necessarily control who gets custody. All relevant factors must be weighed!.]”
3. Newly discovered evidence
Rule 59.01 allows a new trial for “[m]a-terial evidence newly discovered” which, with reasonable diligence, could not have been found and entered at trial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(d). 'Appellant alleges that she did not learn “the majority” of the information in the oldest child’s affidavit until after the children testified. Therefore, she argues, she is entitled to a new trial under rule 59.01(d). The oldest child’s affidavit makes a number of allegations, but appellant has pointed only to one subject in her claim of newly discovered evidence. Seeking a new trial on these grounds, appellant alleged to the trial court that respondent tried to influence the children and that this influence could not be discovered “because Respondent and his attorney told the children not to tell [appellant] about meeting with the Respondent’s attorney.” Although appellant’s argument on appeal refers to all of the allegations in the oldest child’s affidavit, the only theory properly before this court on the new-evidence issue is the claim involving respondent’s attempt to in
*478
fluence the children.
See Thiele v. Stich,
Regarding respondent’s alleged attempt to influence the children, the trial court noted that it addressed these allegations in its rejection of appellant’s motion for a new trial based, on respondent’s misconduct. This trial court decision, as we have said, did not involve reversible error. The court also found that “the events complained of were not an attempt by either [respondent] or his attorney to influence the children’s testimony” and that the meeting between the children and respondent and his attorney is not newly discovered evidence because that meeting was addressed at trial. Evidence addressed at trial is not newly discovered evidence under the rules. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(d) (allowing new trial for newly discovered evidence that “could not have been found and produced at trial”). The trial court’s refusal to order a new trial for newly discovered evidence is consistent with the rules.
DECISION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the portion of appellant’s new trial motion premised on the assertion that the record does not support the custody placement; because the record supports the trial court’s custody-related findings and because those findings address the relevant best-interests factors, we affirm the court’s ultimate determination on the placement of physical custody of the children. There also was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in rejecting parts of the new-trial motion alleging that respondent committed misconduct or that appellant had newly discovered evidence.
Affirmed.
Notes
.
Wilson
is one of a series of cases in which the supreme court has held that when a party
*475
alleges that a number of the trial court’s findings are unsupported by the record, the appellate court need not individually address whether each challenged finding is supported by the record.
See, e.g., Pagett v. Northern Elec. Supply Co.,
. As of the issuance of this opinion, Minnesota has only two published opinions, other than
Maxfield
itself, mentioning the "golden thread" analysis. And both mention the analysis only in passing and neither is a dissolution case.
See In re Welfare of M.M.,
. Appellant has not disputed the fact that the trial court’s findings address all statutory best-interests factors.
See Weatherly v. Weatherly,