254 F. 28 | 9th Cir. | 1918
This is a writ of error to review the conviction of Vane, plaintiff in error, upon an indictment for a violation of section 37 of the Penal Code (Act March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat.
The indictment charged that Vane and certain others, on or about September 6, 1914, in Bonner county, Idaho, and within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire, combine, and agree by force and violence -to—
“rob one Hugo De Witz of certain mail matter which mail matter constituted a part of the United States mails under the control of the post office establishment of the United States, and in the lawful charge and custody of him, the said Hugo De Witz, and which said robbery of the aforesaid mail matter was then and there agreed among them, the said William Vane and Joe Bossio, S: * * to he effected by force and violence, and by placing the life of him, the said Hugo De Witz, in jeopardy by the use of certain dangerous weapons, to wit, certain pistols and certain rifles loaded with gunpowder and leaden bullets, with which said dangerous weapons it was then and there agreed by the said William Vane and Joe Bossio * * * to threaten him, the said Hugo De Witz, and to put his life in peril and thereby to take, steal, and carry away from the possession of said Hugo De Witz, and against his will, the aforesaid mail matter.”
It is charged that in pursuance of the conspiracy the defendants did “by force and violence” rob the said Hugo De Witz of the said mail matter, and “did threaten him, the said Hugo De Witz, and put his life in peril.” There was no demurrer to the indictment, no motion in arrest of judgment, and there is no bill of exceptions in the record. The scope of our examination is therefore limited.
In our opinion it was not necessary to set forth with technical accuracy the relationship of De Witz to the mail. The allegation that the conspiracy was by force and violence to rob him of certain mail, which constituted part of the United States mails under the control of the post office establishment and in his lawful custody, was sufficient to inform him fairly what he had to meet. It would not be a reasonable understanding of words to gather any meaning from the language referred to other than that the mail was part of the United Stales mail under the control of the postal. authorities and by law in the custody of De Witz. The indictment being for conspiracy to commit an offense, it is to be kept in mind that the gist of the crime is the conspiracy, and therefore, as was held by the Supreme Court in Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 28 Sup. Ct. 163, 52 L. Ed. 278, a “certainty to a common intent, sufficient to identify the offense which the defendants conspired to commit, is all that is requisite in stating the object of the conspiracy.”
The contention that it was necessary to allege that the defendants knew that the mail was part of the United States mail is not sound, because such knowledge was not an essential element of the particular offense charged. The most material averment was that defendants willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspired violently to rob the person in custody of the mail, by stealing and taking the same from his person. In substance, however, persons charged with having willfully and feloniously combined to carry out such an act as the object of the combination are sufficiently charged with knowledge that the conspiracy, the gist of the crime, is to rob as set forth, and are charged with guilty intent in the general purpose of the combination. Felton v. United States, 96 U. S. 699, 24 L. Ed. 875; Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344, 26 Sup. Ct. 688, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 6 Ann. Cas. 392; Dunbar v. United States, 156 U. S. 195, 15 Sup. Ct. 325, 39 L. Ed. 390; Tapack v. United States, 220 Fed. 445, 137 C. C. A. 39; Bowers v. United States, 148 Fed. 379, 78 C. C. A. 193.
We have carefully considered all the points made in the argument and brief of plaintiff in error, and our judgment is that the record fails to show that any substantial rights have been denied him.
The judgment is affirmed.