VanDerStok v. GarlandVanDerStok v. Garland
Before the Court are Plaintiffs Jennifer VanDerStok, Michael G. Andren, Tactical Machining, LLC, and Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc.’s (“Original Plaintiffs”) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 140), Brief (ECF No. 141), and Appendix in support (ECF No. 142), filed December 23, 2022; Intervenor-Plaintiff BlackHawk Manufacturing Group Inc. d/b/a 80 Percent Arms’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 144), Brief (ECF No. 145), and Appendix in support (ECF No. 146), filed December 23, 2022; Intervenor-Plaintiffs Defense Distributed and The Second Amendment Foundation, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 165) and Brief in support (ECF No. 166), filed January 12, 2023; Defendants’ Combined Opposition to Original Plaintiffs’ and Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement (ECF No. 180), Brief (ECF No. 181), and Appendix in Support (ECF No. 182), filed February 13, 2023; Original Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
On January 18, 2023, the Court deferred ruling on putative intervenors’ motions to intervene until summary judgment briefing concluded. See Order, ECF No. 172. Now ripe for review are Not An LLC d/b/a JSD Supply’s Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 149) and Brief in support (ECF No. 150), filed January 5, 2023; Defendants’ Opposition (ECF No. 207), filed April 27, 2023; Original Plaintiffs’ Opposition (ECF No. 212), filed May 10, 2023; and JSD Supply’s Reply (ECF No. 213), filed May 11, 2023. Also before the Court are Polymer80’s Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 157), Brief (ECF No. 158), and Appendix (ECF No. 159) in support; filed January 9, 2023; Defendants’ Opposition (ECF No. 206), filed April 27, 2023; Original Plaintiffs’ Opposition (ECF No. 212), filed May 10, 2023; and Polymer80’s Reply (ECF No. 214), filed May 11, 2023.
Having considered the briefing and applicable law, the Court GRANTS JSD Supply’s and Polymer80’s motions to intervene on permissive grounds. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ and Intervenors’ motions for summary judgment, DENIES Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, and VACATES the Final Rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents the question of whether the federal government may lawfully regulate partially manufactured firearm components, related firearm products, and other tools and materials in keeping with the Gun Control Act of 1968. Because the Court concludes that the government cannot regulate those items without violating federal law, the Court holds that the government’s recently enacted Final Rule, Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (codified at
II. STATUTORY & REGULATORY BACKGROUND
In 1934, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act (“NFA”) to authorize federal taxation and regulation of certain firearms such as machineguns, short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled rifles. National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, Pub. L. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236, 1236. A few years later, Congress enacted the Federal Firearms Act (“FFA”), which more broadly defined
Thirty years later, Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”), which superseded the FFA’s regulation of firearms in interstate commerce. The GCA requires manufacturers and dealers of firearms to have a federal firearms license.1
The GCA also redefines “firearm” more narrowly than the earlier statute it superseded, defining the term as: “(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device.”
Congress delegated authority to administer and enforce the GCA to the Attorney General by authorizing him to “prescribe only such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”
In April 2022, ATF published the Final Rule changing, among other things, the 1978 definition of “frame or receiver.” See Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (codified at
But ATF did not stop there. Rather than merely updating the terminology, ATF decided to regulate partial frames and receivers. Under the new Final Rule, “[t]he terms ‘frame’ and ‘receiver’ shall include a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver,
Further, the Final Rule permits the ATF Director to consider extrinsic factors when determining if an object is a frame or receiver. Specifically, “[w]hen issuing a classification, the Director may consider any associated templates, jigs, molds, equipment, tools, instructions, guides, or marketing materials that are sold, distributed, or possessed with [or otherwise made available to the purchaser or recipient of] the item or kit.”
III. PARTIES & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Individual Plaintiffs Jennifer VanDerStok and Michael Andren are Texas residents who own firearm components that they intend to manufacture into firearms for personal, lawful use.4 They claim that the Final Rule prohibits them from directly purchasing products online that they want to use to manufacture their own firearms.5 Now, to purchase these products in compliance with the Final Rule, Individual Plaintiffs would have to route their purchases of the regulated products through an FFL and incur associated transfer fees ($30 in Individual Plaintiffs’ case), plus additional time and expense.
The Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. (“FPC”) is a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting the constitutional rights of American citizens through public education and legislative and legal advocacy.8 In support of its educational and advocacy efforts, FPC owns and uses several firearm parts and products that are subject to the Final Rule.9 FPC has hundreds of thousands of members, donors, and supporters nationwide, many of whom are plaintiffs in this lawsuit.10 Individuals and organizations become FPC members by making a donation via the non-profit corporation’s website.11 FPC seeks to bring this lawsuit on behalf of itself and its members.12
Shortly before the Final Rule took effect in August 2022, Original Plaintiffs sued the U.S. Attorney General, the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), and the ATF Director over the legality of the Final Rule.13 Days later, the Original Plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctive relief, which the Court granted on grounds that they were likely to succeed on their claim that ATF exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the Final Rule.14
BlackHawk Manufacturing Group, Inc. is a manufacturer and retailer that sells products newly subject to ATF’s Final Rule, with most of its revenue earned through sales of those
In the weeks after BlackHawk, Defense Distributed, and SAF were permitted to join the lawsuit, and after summary judgment briefing had begun, movants Not An LLC d/b/a JSD Supply and Polymer80, Inc. filed their pending motions to intervene.20 JSD Supply is a manufacturer and distributor that earns most of its revenue through sales of products now subject to the Final Rule.21 Likewise, Polymer80, Inc. is a designer, manufacturer, and distributor of firearms and non-firearm products.22 Through letters issued by ATF since the Final Rule’s enactment, Polymer80 learned that some of its products are considered subject to the Final Rule and, if not afforded relief, that its “corporate existence” is at stake.23
Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs claim the Final Rule violates several of the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) substantive and procedural requirements and various
Thus, based on the Court’s prior decisions in this case, Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the Final Rule against Individual Plaintiffs VanDerStok and Andren; and, with limited exception, Tactical Machining, BlackHawk, and Defense Distributed and the companies’ customers. Now ripe for the Court’s review are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on all statutory and constitutional claims, as well as JSD Supply’s and Polymer80’s motions to intervene. In part A below, the Court will resolve the motions to intervene before turning to the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment in part B.
A.
1. Legal Standard27
(1) the length of time between the would-be intervenor’s learning of his interest and his petition to intervene;
(2) the extent of prejudice to existing parties from allowing late intervention;
(3) the extent of prejudice to the would-be intervenor if the petition is denied; and
(4) any unusual circumstances [weighing in favor of or against intervention].
In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d 244, 247–48 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977)). Like permissive intervention itself, any determination of timeliness is committed to the court’s discretion. Id. at 248.
Finally, in addition to the three permissive elements above, courts may also consider factors such as “whether the intervenors’ interests are adequately represented by other parties” and whether the intervenors “will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. (“NOPSI”), 732 F.2d 452, 472 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
2. Analysis
The Court begins with timeliness, which requires consideration of four factors. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d at 247. With respect to the first factor, opponents of intervention argue that JSD Supply and Polymer80’s interventions are untimely because they “waited five months after the commencement of this action to seek intervention”28 and that they were presumably aware of the other “multiple competing lawsuits challenging the Final Rule filed before [it] took effect on August 24, 2022.”29 In other words, they waited too long. But these arguments fail because the relevant inquiry for timeliness is how soon the movant intervened in the instant lawsuit after learning its interest was at risk, which may or may not occur when the complaint is filed. Id. at 248. Moreover, a movant’s decision to forego intervention in another case is irrelevant to the issue of timeliness in the instant case. See id. (“The first timeliness factor is ‘[t]he length of time during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned for leave to intervene.”) (emphasis added). Thus, “[t]he timeliness clock runs either from the time the applicant knew or reasonably should have known of his interest [in the instant litigation] or from the time he became aware that his interest would no longer be protected by the existing parties to the lawsuit.” Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1000 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Either way, there “are no absolute measures of timeliness,” id., and any assessment of this factor is wholly committed to the court’s discretion. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d at 248.
Next, the Court considers “the extent of prejudice to existing parties from allowing late intervention.” In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d at 247. The opponents claim permitting intervention will prejudice the existing parties by delaying ultimate resolution of the case.37 But here the proper inquiry is the extent to which the existing parties were prejudiced by the
Third, the Court considers the “extent of prejudice to the would-be intervenor if the petition is denied.” In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d at 247–48. Denying intervention would prejudice the would-be intervenors by delaying a favorable judgment, without which their declining revenues would be prolonged, potentially forcing their dissolution.39 Polymer80
Fourth, the Court finds no “unusual circumstances” that weigh heavily for or against intervention. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d at 248. Defendants contend that permitting Polymer80’s intervention in this case while the company’s independent and duplicative suit is pending would violate the rule against claim-splitting.41 That rule permits—but does not require—a court to dismiss a second complaint that “alleg[es] the same cause of action as a prior, pending, related action.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 362 (5th Cir. 1996) (authorizing courts to dismiss a second complaint whether it is duplicative of a previously filed and still active suit). The claim-splitting rule is permissive, however, and does not require the Court to take any action at all. Id. In any event, if the rule were applied here, the appropriate course would be to dismiss Polymer80’s independent suit, which it filed after attempting its initial intervention here.
Nor are the other permissible timeliness factors—“whether the intervenors’ interests are adequately represented by other parties” and whether the intervenors “will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit”—particularly compelling. NOPSI, 732 F.2d at 472. Defendants argue intervention will not “significantly contribute to the full
Finally, the opponents also argue that JSD Supply and Polymer80 have other means of asserting their interests.45 Indeed, Polymer80 has a separate suit currently pending before this Court.46 But whether an intervenor has other adequate means of protecting its interests is not a dispositive or necessary factor for the Court’s decision to grant permissive intervention. Though the Court could require the parties to initiate or maintain their own lawsuits, the purpose of
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In sum, the Court holds that all requisite elements for permissive intervention—timeliness, shared causes of action, and prejudice—weigh in favor of allowing the intervenors to join the lawsuit. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS JSD Supply’s and Polymer80’s motions to intervene on permissive grounds. Because JSD Supply and Polymer80 have agreed to adopt the current Plaintiffs’ summary judgment briefing with respect to their shared claims, and because those express intentions inform the Court’s discretionary decision to permit intervention here, the intervenors are barred from separately moving for summary judgment or filing supplemental briefing on any of the existing claims. However, Polymer80 may move for summary judgment on its unique claims to the extent those claims are not mooted by the Court’s decision today.
B.
1. Legal Standards
Disputes arising under the APA are commonly resolved on summary judgment, where district courts sit as an appellate tribunal to decide legal questions on the basis of the administrative record. See Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is proper where the Court finds that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Among other procedural requirements, the APA requires agencies to provide “legislative” rules (i.e., substantive regulations) for public notice and comment,
Once a court determines the contested agency action falls short of the APA’s substantive or procedural requirements, the reviewing court “shall” set aside the unlawful agency action.
2. Article III Standing
As a preliminary defense, Defendants argue that some of the plaintiffs, the Individual Plaintiffs and the non-profit organizations, are not entitled to entry of summary judgment because they lack standing to challenge the Final Rule. Because “standing is not dispensed in gross,” the general rule is that each plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the case or controversy at bar. Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017). This means
Here, among other requested forms of relief, all plaintiffs and intervenors—including those litigants whose standing is not in question—ask this Court to declare unlawful and set aside the Final Rule.47 Accordingly, the Court could address the legality of the Final Rule regardless of whether the Individual Plaintiffs and the non-profit organizations have standing. Nevertheless, because these parties will not be entitled to unique forms of relief (e.g., party-specific injunctive relief or attorneys’ fees) without independently demonstrating standing, the Court addresses the individuals’ and the organizations’ standing before turning the merits of their claims.48
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show it has suffered (1) an injury-in-fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. at 1650. As the parties invoking federal jurisdiction, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving each element of standing. Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
i. Individual Plaintiffs
First, Defendants argue that Individual Plaintiffs VanDerStok and Andren cannot demonstrate standing because “the only purported injury they plausibly invoke—a $30 transfer fee that certain FFLs purportedly would charge them to facilitate a firearm purchase—is not fairly
While the Supreme Court has declined to endorse theories of standing “that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors,” where a plaintiff can make a showing of de facto causality, standing’s traceability element is satisfied. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019) (emphasis added). Here, Individual Plaintiffs’ theory of standing is not speculative. Instead, it relies “on the predictable effect of Government action on the decisions of third parties.” Id. Individual Plaintiffs have confirmed that the FFLs they would use to facilitate their purchases will in fact charge a transfer fee.51 And it is highly predictable that FFLs would charge for this service, particularly when faced with the prospect of an influx of customers who need to make purchases of certain products through an FFL as a result of a recent government mandate. Absent the requirements of the Final Rule, the Individual Plaintiffs would not purchase the regulated products through an FFL and would therefore not incur an associated transfer fee. This is sufficient to show de facto causality. Thus, the Court is satisfied that Individual Plaintiffs’ purported injury is fairly traceable to Defendants’ actions.
Even if the FFLs’ independent decision to charge a transfer fee broke the chain of causation, Individual Plaintiffs have an alternative basis for standing that Defendants largely ignore. In a footnote, Defendants dismiss Individual Plaintiffs’ other alleged injury—the threat of criminal prosecution should they violate the Rule—as simply “not credible.”52 They say the risk
Here, however, Defendants conflate the injury analysis required for Article III standing with the irreparable harm analysis required for a preliminary injunction.54 It is true that, for purposes of injunctive relief, a plaintiff must allege an irreparable injury that is more than merely de minimis. See Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2012). But Defendants offer no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff’s alleged injury must pass a certain threshold to be cognizable for purposes of Article III. Nor is the Court aware of any such requirement.
It is well established that a credible threat of government action, on its own, provides a plaintiff with a sufficient basis for bringing suit. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–29 (2007). This remains true even if a plaintiff takes steps to protect themselves from prosecution. As the Supreme Court has made clear, a “plaintiff‘s own action (or inaction) in failing to violate the law eliminates the imminent threat of prosecution, but nonetheless does not eliminate Article III jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, even if Individual Plaintiffs in this case ameliorated the threat of government enforcement by making their purchases through an FFL and paying the associated fee (action), or by simply refraining from purchasing the regulated products they want to buy
ii. Non-profit Organizations
Second, Defendants claim the organizations—Firearms Policy Coalition and the Second Amendment Foundation—have failed to demonstrate associational (or organizational) standing. The associational standing doctrine permits a traditional membership organization “to invoke the court‘s [injunctive or declaratory] remedial powers on behalf of its members.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975). To do so, the organization must satisfy a three-prong test showing that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization‘s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, No. 20-1199, --- S.Ct. ---, 2023 WL 4239254, at *8 (U.S. June 29, 2023) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm‘n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
Defendants do not meaningfully contend that FPC and SAF cannot satisfy the three-prong Hunt test.56 Instead, they challenge the non-profits’ statuses as “traditional membership
As Defendants concede, the Court has already recognized that SAF satisfies the Hunt test.58 Based on its summary judgment briefing, so does FPC. First, several of FPC‘s members—Individual Plaintiffs, Tactical Machining, and BlackHawk, who are all parties to this suit—have standing to sue in their own right. Second, FPC‘s organizational purpose to advocate for their members’ individual liberties, separation of powers, and limited government are clearly germane to this suit challenging Defendants’ asserted authority to regulate the manufacture of personal firearms.59 Third, because FPC seeks equitable remedies of declaratory relief and vacatur of the Final Rule, there is no need for FPC‘s individual members to participate in the lawsuit.
In sum, the Court holds that Individual Plaintiffs and FPC—in its own right—have standing to pursue their claims for relief. Furthermore, FPC and SAF have demonstrated associational standing and may pursue relief on their members’ behalf. Because Defendants do not contest the standing of Tactical Machining, BlackHawk, or Defense Distributed, these parties are similarly entitled to pursue their respective claims for relief.
3. Statutory Claims
The Original Plaintiffs and Intervenors (collectively “Plaintiffs” going forward) attack the Final Rule on a host of statutory and constitutional grounds. However, there exists an ordinary rule “that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 (1974); see also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582 (1979) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable. Before deciding the constitutional question, it was incumbent on [the lower] courts to consider whether the statutory grounds might be dispositive.“) (cleaned up). Thus, “if a case raises both statutory and constitutional questions, the inquiry should focus initially on the statutory question[s]. . . . If the lower court finds that statutory ground dispositive, resolution of the constitutional issue will be obviated.” Jordan v. City of Greenwood, Miss., 711 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the Court concludes that the ATF has clearly and without question acted in excess of its statutory authority, and that this claim is dispositive, the Court declines to address the constitutional questions presented.
Basic principles of statutory interpretation decide this case. “In statutory interpretation disputes, a court‘s proper starting point lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019). “Statutory language ‘cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.‘” Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U.S. 424, 438 (2016) (quoting Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 556 U.S. 93, 101 (2012)). If the disputed statutory language is unambiguous, as it is here, “the sole function of the courts is to enforce [the law] according to its terms.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (cleaned up). The Court
i. Parts that may become receivers are not receivers.
Congress carefully defined its terms in the Gun Control Act. The primary definition of “firearm” in the GCA contains three parts: “any weapon (including a starter gun) which [1] will or [2] is designed to or [3] may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.”
Because Congress did not define “frame or receiver,” the words receive their ordinary meaning. See
Plaintiffs do not take issue with ATF‘s 1978 definition of “frame or receiver.” This is because, as Defendants themselves acknowledge, ATF‘s prior regulatory definitions have been “consistent with common and technical dictionary definitions.”64 Statutory construction entails “follow[ing] the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language, [and] interpreting undefined terms according to their ordinary and natural meaning and the overall policies and objectives of the statute. In determining the ordinary meaning of terms, dictionaries are often a principal source.” NPR Invs., L.L.C. ex rel. Roach v. United States, 740 F.3d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Near the time of the GCA‘s enactment in 1968, Webster‘s Dictionary defined “frame” as “the basic unit of a handgun which serves as a mounting for the barrel and operating parts of the arm” and “receiver” as “the metal frame in which the action of a firearm is fitted and which the breech end of the barrel is attached.” Webster‘s Third International Dictionary 902, 1894 (1971).65 ATF‘s prior regulatory definition, which defined “frame or receiver” as “[t]hat part of a firearm which provides housing for the hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing mechanism, and which is usually threaded at its forward portion to receive the barrel,” tracks that common definition.66 Title and Definition Changes, 43 Fed. Reg. at 13,537.
As this Court has previously discussed, the definition of “firearm” in the Gun Control Act does not cover all firearm parts. It covers specifically “the frame or receiver of any such weapon” that Congress defined as a firearm.
Congress excluded other adjectives that ATF adds to its definition. Specifically, the Final Rule covers “disassembled” and “nonfunctional” frames and receivers.
In sum, ATF‘s new definition of “frame or receiver” in
The Court‘s earlier acknowledgement that ATF does indeed have discretion to decide “whether a particular component is a frame or receiver” based upon that component‘s “degree of completeness” does not alter this analysis.67 Relying on the Court‘s acknowledgement, Defendants claim that is all the Final Rule purports to do: “provide[] more specific guidance about the criteria ATF uses in making th[e] determination” whether a component is a frame or receiver.68 But that is not all the regulation does. Rather, the Final Rule sets outs the criteria ATF will use to determine whether a component “may readily be . . . converted to function” as a frame or receiver.
Predictably, Defendants disagree with the Court‘s interpretation of how the regulation operates and argue that “the Final Rule‘s amended definition treats a component as a frame or receiver only when ATF has determined that the component is a frame or receiver.”70 Again, a plain reading of the Final Rule‘s text belies this objection.71 A part that has yet to be completed or converted to function as frame or receiver is not a frame or receiver. ATF‘s declaration that a component is a “frame or receiver” does not make it so if, at the time of evaluation, the component does not yet accord with the ordinary public meaning of those terms.
Thus, the Court‘s prior acknowledgment that “[a]n incomplete receiver may still be a receiver within the meaning of the statute, depending on the degree of completeness” is not a contradiction.72 To be a receiver “within the meaning of the statute” requires that the particular component possess all the attributes of a receiver as commonly understood (i.e., the component must “provide[] housing for the hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing mechanism, and which is usually threaded at its forward portion to receive the barrel“) at the point of evaluation, not “readily” in the near term.
Nevertheless, Defendants continue to press their case with reference to historical agency action. Defendants offer several classification letters in which ATF previously determined that a particular component was (or was not) a “firearm” for purposes of the GCA based on the item‘s
Finally, Defendants argue that the Final Rule‘s redefinition of the “frame or receiver” is appropriate because it better achieves the goals Congress intended to accomplish in enacting the federal firearms laws.76 They warn that “[u]nder any other approach, persons could easily circumvent the requirements of the GCA and NFA by producing or purchasing almost-complete [purported] frames or receivers that could easily be altered to produce a functional frame or receiver.”77 But “the best evidence of Congress‘s intent is the statutory text.” NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012). And the text of
The Gun Control Act defines a “firearm” as “(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm.”
As this Court previously concluded, ATF has no general authority to regulate weapon parts.78 When Congress enacted the GCA, it replaced the FFA that authorized regulation of “any part or parts of” a firearm. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Ch. 850, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250, 1250 (1938) (repealed 1968). In proposing the new regulation, Defendants even acknowledged as much.79 Instead, under the GCA, the only firearm parts that fall under ATF‘s purview are “the frame or receiver of any such weapon” that Congress defined as a firearm.
The statutory context repeatedly confirms that Congress intentionally chose not to regulate “weapon” parts generally. As further evidence, look to
In sum, the Gun Control Act‘s precise wording demands precise application. Congress could have described a firearm as “any combination of parts” that would produce a weapon that could fire a projectile. It used that language elsewhere in the definition.
As the Court has previously discussed, Defendants’ arguments that the Final Rule‘s regulation of weapon parts kits is consistent with existing judicial interpretations of the Gun Control Act are unavailing.84 Defendants’ cited cases demonstrate that courts understand the constraints of the Gun Control Act‘s definitions. The only Fifth Circuit case Defendants cite held that a disassembled shotgun was still a “firearm” under the Gun Control Act‘s definition. See United States v. Ryles, 988 F.2d 13, 16 (5th Cir. 1993). There, the government argued the shotgun “was only ‘disassembled’ in that the barrel was removed from the stock and that it could have been assembled in thirty seconds or less.” Id. But the Fifth Circuit only agreed after surveying other cases in which courts held that inoperable weapons were still firearms “so long as those weapons ‘at the time of the offense did not appear clearly inoperable.’ ” Id. No weapon parts kit would pass that test, and Defendants do not claim they would.85
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Because the Final Rule purports to regulate both firearm components that are not yet a “frame or receiver” and aggregations of weapon parts not otherwise subject to its statutory authority, the Court holds that the ATF has acted in excess of its statutory jurisdiction by promulgating it.
4. Remedy
The proper remedy for a finding that an agency has exceeded its statutory jurisdiction is vacatur of the unlawful agency action. While Defendants claim the APA does not allow for such
Vacatur is appropriate given the Court‘s conclusion that the ATF has exceeded its statutory authority. An illegitimate agency action is void ab initio and therefore cannot be remanded as there is nothing for the agency to justify. Defendants tacitly acknowledge this, noting that “if vacatur is authorized under the APA, it is not warranted here in the event that Plaintiffs succeed on the merits of any procedural claim, because the agency can likely correct any such error on remand.”88
Defendants argue that any vacatur should only be applied to the parties before the Court while citing no binding authority in support.89 But such a remedy is more akin to an injunction that would prohibit the agencies from enforcing their unlawful Final Rule against only certain individuals. And indeed, “[t]here are meaningful differences between an injunction, which is a ‘drastic and extraordinary remedy,’ and vacatur, which is ‘a less drastic remedy.’ ” Id. at 219 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010)) (assuming the availability of vacatur under the APA)). “[A] vacatur does nothing but re-establish the status quo absent the unlawful agency action. Apart from the . . . statutory basis on which the court invalidated an agency action, vacatur neither compels nor restrains further agency decision-making.” Id. at 220. Thus, the Court applies the default remedy and VACATES the Final Rule on grounds that the agency acted beyond the scope of its legitimate statutory authority in promulgating it.
Finally, because vacatur provides Plaintiffs full relief, the Court will not address the parties’ remaining statutory claims, all of which raise procedural defects that might properly result in remand of the Final Rule that the Court has already deemed vacated.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court GRANTS Original Plaintiffs’ unopposed Motion for Leave to Provide Supplemental Authority, and the Court DENIES JSD Supply‘s proposed Motion for Injunction as prematurely filed. The Court GRANTS Intervenor-Plaintiffs JSD Supply‘s and Polymer80‘s Motions to Intervene. Further, for the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ and
SO ORDERED this 30th day of June, 2023.
Reed O‘Connor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
Here are the two definitions, in full:
- The term “frame” means the part of a handgun, or variants thereof, that provides housing or a structure for the component (i.e., sear or equivalent) designed to hold back the hammer, striker, bolt, or similar primary energized component prior to initiation of the firing sequence, even if pins or other attachments are required to connect such component (i.e., sear or equivalent) to the housing or structure.
- The term “receiver” means the part of a rifle, shotgun, or projectile weapon other than a handgun, or variants thereof, that provides housing or a structure for the primary component designed to block or seal the breech prior to initiation of the firing sequence (i.e., bolt, breechblock, or equivalent), even if pins or other attachments are required to connect such component to the housing or structure.
The term “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.