—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cowan, J.), dated April 1, 1999, which, in effect, granted the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendant’s answer and (2) an order of the same court dated September 10, 1999, which denied the defendant’s motion, in effect, for reargument.
Ordered that the order dated April, 1, 1999, is reversed, and the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendant’s answer is denied; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated September 10, 1999, is dismissed as academic in light of our determination of the appeal from the order dated April 1, 1999; and it is further;
Ordered that the defendant is awarded one bill of costs.
We agree with the defendant that it was an improvident exercise of discretion for the Supreme Court to strike its answer. In order to invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion which effectively results in the striking of a pleading, the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent (see, CPLR 3126; Harris v City of New York,
The defendant’s further contention that the Supreme Court erred in characterizing its motion for renewal and/or reargument as one for reargument only is academic in light of our determination. Bracken, J. P., Joy, Thompson, Goldstein and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.
