Lead Opinion
This appeal raises fundamental questions about the relationship between the citizens of our country and their government. Plaintiffs Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel are American citizens and civilians. Their complaint alleges in detail that they were detained and illegally tortured by U.S. military personnel in Iraq in 2006. Plaintiffs were released from military custody without ever being charged with a crime. They then filed this suit for violations of their constitutional rights against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other unknown defendants under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
Secretary Rumsfeld and the United States moved to dismiss the claims against them. The district court denied in. part Secretary Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss, allowing plaintiffs to proceed with Bivens claims for torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, which have been presented as Fifth Amendment substantive due process claims. Vance v. Rumsfeld,
We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs may proceed with their Bivens claims against Secretary Rumsfeld. Taking the issues in ascending order of breadth, we agree first, applying the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), that plaintiffs have alleged in sufficient detail facts supporting Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal responsibility for the alleged torture. Second, we agree with the district court that Secretary Rumsfeld is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings. The law was clearly established in 2006 that the treatment plaintiffs have alleged was unconstitutional. No reasonable public official could have believed otherwise.
Next, we agree with the district court that a Bivens remedy is available for the alleged torture of civilian U.S. citizens by U.S. military personnel in a war zone. We see no persuasive justification in the Bivens case law or otherwise for defendants’ most sweeping argument, which would deprive civilian U.S. citizens of a civil judicial remedy for torture or even cold-blooded murder by federal officials and soldiers, at any level, in a war zone. United States law provides a civil damages remedy for aliens who are tortured by their own governments. It would be startling and unprecedented to conclude that the United States would not provide such a remedy to its own citizens.
The defendants rely on two circuit decisions denying Bivens remedies to alien detainees alleging that U.S. officials caused them to be tortured, one case arising from war zones, Ali v. Rumsfeld,
As to the modest property claim against the United States, however, we agree with the government that the Administrative Procedure Act’s “military authority” exception precludes judicial review of military actions affecting personal property in a war zone, and we reverse the district court’s decision on that claim.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Factual Allegations
Plaintiffs Donald Vance and Nathan Er-tel have alleged sobering claims that they were tortured by U.S. military personnel while they were detained indefinitely at Camp Cropper, a U.S. military prison in Iraq in 2006, during the ongoing Iraq War.
We can only summarize here the key allegations in the detailed Complaint, with its 79 pages and 387 paragraphs, citing the pertinent paragraph numbers.
The plaintiffs were frequently in touch with their government contacts, sometimes multiple times a day. ¶ 45. At the request
Shield Group Security officials became suspicious about the plaintiffs’ loyalty to the firm. On April 14, 2006, they confiscated the credentials that allowed plaintiffs access to the Green Zone, effectively trapping them inside the firm’s compound in the Red Zone. ¶¶ 107-12, 116-19. Plaintiffs called their U.S. government contacts in Iraq for help. They were told that they should interpret Shield Group Security’s actions as taking them hostage, and should barricade themselves with weapons in a room of the compound. ¶¶ 120, 124-25. They were assured that U.S. forces would come to rescue them. ¶ 124. U.S. forces came to the compound and took Vance and Ertel to the U.S. Embassy for questioning. ¶¶ 125-31. Military personnel seized all of their personal property, including laptop computers, cell phones, and cameras. ¶ 127. The plaintiffs shared information about Shield Group Security transactions and were sent to a trailer to sleep. ¶¶ 130— 31.
After two or three hours of sleep, Vance and Ertel, who were under the impression that they had been rescued by their government, were in for a shock. They were awakened and arrested, handcuffed, blindfolded, and driven to Camp Prosperity, a U.S. military compound in Baghdad. ¶¶ 131, 138-39. There, plaintiffs allege, they were placed in a cage, strip-searched, fingerprinted, and issued jumpsuits. ¶ 140. They were instructed to keep their chins to their chests and not to speak. They were threatened that if they did speak, they would have “excessive force” inflicted on them. ¶ 141. Vance and Ertel were then taken to separate cells and held in solitary confinement for what they believe was two days. ¶¶ 142-43.
For those two days, the plaintiffs were held incommunicado in their cells, and were not permitted to contact their families or lawyers. They were fed twice a day and allowed to go to the bathroom twice a day. They each had a thin mat on concrete on which to sleep, but the lights were kept on 24 hours a day. ¶¶ 142, 161. After two days, Vance and Ertel were shackled, blindfolded, and transported to Camp Cropper, a U.S. military facility near Baghdad International Airport. ¶¶ 143 — 44.
After the plaintiffs were taken to Camp Cropper, they experienced a nightmarish scene in which they were detained incommunicado, in solitary confinement, and subjected to physical and psychological torture for the duration of their imprisonment — Vance for three months and Ertel for six weeks. ¶¶2, 20-21, 146-76, 212. They allege that all of the abuse they endured in those weeks was inflicted by Americans, some military officials and some civilian officials. ¶ 21. They allege that the torture they experienced was of the kind “supposedly reserved for terrorists and so-called enemy combatants.” ¶ 2. If the plaintiffs’ allegations are true, two young American civilians were trying to do the right thing by becoming whistleblowers to the U.S. government, but found themselves detained in prison and tortured by their own government, without notice to
Vance and Ertel allege that after they arrived at Camp Cropper they were strip-searched while still blindfolded, and issued jumpsuits. ¶ 145. They were then held in solitary confinement, in small, cold, dirty cells and subjected to torturous techniques forbidden by the Army Field Manual and the Detainee Treatment Act. ¶¶ 146, 217-18, 242-44, 265. The lights were kept on at all times in their cells, so that the plaintiffs experienced “no darkness day after day” for the entire duration of their time at Camp Cropper. ¶¶ 21, 147. Their cells were kept intolerably cold, except when the generators failed. Id. There were bugs and feces on the walls of the cells, in which they spent most of their time in complete isolation. ¶ 146. Vance and Ertel were driven to exhaustion; each had a concrete slab for a bed, but guards would wake them if they were ever caught sleeping. ¶¶ 148, 149. Heavy metal and country music was pumped into their cells at “intolerably-loud volumes,” and they were deprived of mental stimulus. ¶¶21, 146, 149. The plaintiffs each had only one shirt and a pair of overalls to wear during their confinement. ¶ 152. They were often deprived of food and water and repeatedly deprived of necessary medical care. ¶¶ 151, 153-55.
Beyond the sleep deprivation and the harsh and isolating conditions of their detention, plaintiffs allege, they were physically threatened, abused, and assaulted by the anonymous U.S. officials working as guards. ¶ 157. They allege, for example, that they experienced “hooding” and were “walled,” i.e., slammed into walls while being led blindfolded with towels placed over their heads to interrogation sessions. ¶¶ 21; 157. Plaintiffs also claim that they were continuously tormented by the guards, who would conduct shake-downs of their, cells, sometimes on the false premise that they had discovered contraband, and who seemed intent on keeping them off-balance mentally. ¶ 156.
The constant theme of the aggressive interrogations was a, haunting one — if Vance and Ertel did not “do the right thing,” they would never be allowed to leave Camp Cropper. ¶ 176. Vance and Ertel were not only interrogated but continuously threatened by guards who said they would use “excessive force” against them if they did not immediately and correctly comply with instructions. ¶ 158. The plaintiffs allege that this treatment lasted for the duration of their detention at Camp Cropper. ¶¶ 2,165,176.
While Vance and Ertel were detained and interrogated, their loved ones did not know whether they were alive or dead. ¶¶ 1, 161. Eventually, Vance and Ertel were allowed a few telephone calls to their families but were not allowed to disclose their location or anything about the conditions of their detention or the nature of their interrogations. ¶ 162. When they were not being interrogated, they were held in almost constant solitary confinement. Vance’s requests for clergy visits were denied, and plaintiffs were forbidden to correspond with a lawyer or a court. ¶¶ 163-64.
Vance and Ertel were never charged with any crime or other wrongdoing, nor
B. Procedural History
Following their release, the plaintiffs sued former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in his individual capacity, as well as unidentified defendants.
Secretary Rumsfeld and the United States moved to dismiss all claims against them. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against Secretary Rumsfeld for denial of procedural due process (Count II) and denial of access to the courts (Count III), but declined to dismiss their claim that their treatment amounted to unconstitutional cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (Count I). The district court concluded that plaintiffs had sufficiently pled Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal responsibility for their alleged treatment and that Secretary Rumsfeld was not protected by qualified immunity. The district court also rejected the defendants’ argument that “special factors” preclude the recognition of a Bivens remedy for torture of civilian U.S. citizens in a war zone. In a separate order, the district court denied the United States’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ personal property claim.
These matters are now before us in two separate appeals. The district court’s rejection of a defendant’s qualified immunity defense is considered a final judgment subject to immediate appeal, so we have jurisdiction over Secretary Rumsfeld’s appeal, docketed as No. 10-1687, pursuant to the general appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Behrens v. Pelletier,
II. Analysis
We affirm the district court’s decision on the Bivens claims in No. 10-1687, concluding in this sequence, from the narrowest issue to the broadest: (a) that plaintiffs adequately alleged Secretary Rumsfeld’s
A. Personal Responsibility
To proceed with their Bivens claims, plaintiffs must allege facts indicating that Secretary Rumsfeld was personally involved in and responsible for the alleged constitutional violations. See Iqbal,
We conclude that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal responsibility. While it may be unusual that such a high-level official would be personally responsible for the treatment of detainees, here we are addressing an unusual situation where issues concerning harsh interrogation techniques and detention policies were decided, at least as the plaintiffs have pled, at the highest levels of the federal government. We conclude that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Secretary Rumsfeld acted deliberately in authorizing interrogation techniques that amount to torture. (Whether he actually did so remains to be seen.) We differ with the district court in one respect, though. We think that the plaintiffs’ pleadings, if true, have sufficiently alleged not only Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal responsibility in creating the policies that led to the plaintiffs’ treatment but also deliberate indifference by Secretary Rumsfeld in failing to act to stop the torture of these detainees despite actual knowledge of reports of detainee abuse.
1. Applicable Pleading Requirements
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose no special pleading requirements for Bivens claims, including those against former high-ranking government officials. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
These pleading rules are meant to “ ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross,
2. The Complaint
We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that Secretary Rumsfeld personally established the relevant policies that caused the alleged violations of their constitutional rights during detention. The detailed Complaint provided Secretary Rumsfeld sufficient notice of the claims against him and stated plausible claims that satisfy Rule 8 and Iqbal and Twombly.
The plaintiffs allege that Secretary Rumsfeld devised and authorized policies that permit the use of torture in their interrogation and detention. ¶ 217. They claim that he was “personally responsible for developing, authorizing, supervising, implementing, auditing and/or reforming the policies, patterns or practices governing the ... treatment ... [and] interrogation ... of detainees.” ¶ 26. Specifically, they allege that in 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld “personally approved a list of torturous interrogation techniques for use on detainees” at Guantanamo Bay that, “[c]ontrary to ... the then-governing Army Field Manual 34-52 ... included the use of 20-hour interrogations, isolation for up to 30 days, and sensory deprivation.” ¶ 232. In 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld allegedly “rescinded his formal authorization to use those techniques generally, but took no measures to end the practices which had by then become ingrained, nor to confirm that the practices were in fact ... terminated.” ¶ 233. Instead, he authorized the use of techniques outside of the Army Field Manual if he personally approved them. Id. The plaintiffs also allege that in 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld approved a new set of policies that included isolation for up to 30 days, dietary manipulation, and sleep deprivation (the “2003 List”). ¶234. In addition to these formal policies, Secretary Rumsfeld also authorized additional harsh techniques if he approved them in advance. ¶ 235.
The plaintiffs allege that Secretary Rumsfeld then directed that the techniques in place at Guantanamo Bay also be extended to Iraq. ¶¶ 235-39. The plaintiffs claim, for instance, that Secretary Rumsfeld sent Major General Geoffrey Miller to Iraq in August 2003 to evaluate how prisons could gain more “actionable intelligence” from detainees. ¶ 236. In September 2003, in response to General Miller’s suggestion to use more aggressive interrogation policies in Iraq, and as allegedly “directed, approved and sanctioned” by Secretary Rumsfeld, the commander of the United States-led military coalition in Iraq signed a memorandum authorizing the use of 29 interrogation techniques (the “Iraq List”), which included sensory deprivation, light control, and the use of loud music. ¶ 238.
The plaintiffs also allege that Secretary Rumsfeld was well aware of detainee abuse because of both public and internal reports documenting the abuse. ¶¶ 240-41, 252. In May 2003, the International Red Cross began reporting on the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq. ¶ 240. The plaintiffs allege that then-Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed that Secretary Rumsfeld knew of the reports of abuse and regularly reported them to President Bush ' throughout 2003. Id. They also allege that Secretary Rumsfeld also knew of other investigative reports into detainee abuse in Iraq, including a report by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. ¶ 241.
Congress took action in response to allegations of detainee abuse. ¶ 14. First, Congress passed the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, which reaffirmed the U.S. prohibition against torture techniques that violate the United States Constitution and the Geneva Conventions. PL Br. at 7. The law instructed then-Secretary Rumsfeld to take action to stop abusive interrogation techniques:
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that policies are prescribed not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment ... to ensure that members of the Armed Forces, and all persons acting ... within facilities of the Armed Forces, treat persons detained by the United States Government in a humane manner consistent with the international obligations and laws of the United States and the policies set forth in section 1091(b).
Pub.L. No. 108-375, § 1092, 118 Stat. 1811, 2069-70 (2004), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801, stat. note § 1092. The plaintiffs argue that, despite that specific direction from Congress, Secretary Rumsfeld took no action to rescind unauthorized interrogation methods before the plaintiffs were released from custody in 2006. ¶¶ 244, 252.
In 2005, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act, which limited allowable interrogation techniques to those authorized in the Army Field Manual, thus specifically outlawing the interrogation techniques
No person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.
Pub.L. 109-148, § 1002(a), 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (2005), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801, stat. note § 1002.
The plaintiffs contend that, after the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act, Secretary Rumsfeld continued to condone the use of techniques from outside the Army Field Manual. ¶ 244. They allege that on the same day that Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act in December 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld added ten classified pages to the Field Manual, which included cruel, inhuman, and degrading techniques, such as those allegedly used on the plaintiffs (the plaintiffs refer to this as “the December Field Manual”). Id. The defendants describe this allegation as speculative and untrue, but we must accept these well-pled allegations as true at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of the proceedings.
The plaintiffs also claim that Secretary Rumsfeld, in the face of both internal reports and well-publicized accusations of detainee mistreatment and torture by U.S. forces in Iraq, did not investigate or correct the abuses, despite his actual knowledge that U.S. citizens were being and would be detained and interrogated using the unconstitutional abusive practices that he had earlier authorized. ¶ 252. The plaintiffs allege that reports of the abusive treatment of detainees by the U.S. military were widely reported by Amnesty International, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. ¶¶ 245-51. The plaintiffs contend that Secretary Rumsfeld was the “official responsible for terminating this pattern of abuse and reforming the policies causing it.” ¶ 252. Instead, the plaintiffs allege, Secretary Rumsfeld took no action because “this conduct was being carried out pursuant to the interrogation and detention policies [he] himself created and implemented.” Id.
3. Secretary Rumsfeld’s Personal Responsibility is Pled Sufficiently
We see no deficiency in the Complaint that would warrant dismissal on the issue of personal responsibility. Taking the factual allegations in the complaint as true, as we must, the plaintiffs have pled facts showing that it is plausible, and not merely
The plaintiffs have adequately pled the “kind of active and intentional disregard for their treatment” that the defendants suggest “would be necessary to establish liability.” First, while Secretary Rumsfeld did not personally carry out the alleged violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, the plaintiffs have alleged that he personally created the policies that authorized and led to their torture. If adequately pled, that is sufficient at this stage to allege personal involvement. See, e.g., Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc.,
Second, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Secretary Rumsfeld acted with deliberate indifference by not ensuring that the detainees were treated in a humane manner despite his knowledge of widespread detainee mistreatment. See Farmer,
Finally, we reject the defendants’ argument that plaintiffs’ claims rest on “naked assertions” of illegal conduct without factual development. The defendants seek to poke holes in a number of the plaintiffs’ allegations, but we do not find their arguments convincing, at least at the pleading stage under Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ only “concrete allegations” about detention and interrogation policies relate to policies that did not even apply to U.S. citizens in Iraq,' and were, in any case, rescinded before the plaintiffs were detained. We are not persuaded by this argument. The plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Secretary Rumsfeld was responsible for creating policies that governed the treatment of the detainees in Iraq and for not conforming the treatment of the detainees in Iraq to the Detainee Treatment Act.
We also are not persuaded by the defendants’ argument that the Detainee Treatment Act superseded the policies described in the Complaint. This argument misunderstands the plaintiffs’ point — that Secretary Rumsfeld’s policies continued to condone the unconstitutional practices he had allegedly created even after Congress mandated otherwise. The plaintiffs’ allegation that Secretary Rumsfeld secretly sought to add permissible techniques to the Army Field Manual after Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act is plausible and supports their broader allegation that Secretary Rumsfeld continued to promote and condone unconstitutional treatment of detainees. It remains to be seen whether plaintiffs can prove this, but they need not have done so yet.
The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs offer nothing to link the guards’ threats of excessive force or the denial of medical care to a particular policy issued by Secretary Rumsfeld. Examining these particular allegations as part of the totality of allegations and the program for dealing so harshly with detainees, however, we think they are sufficiently pled to survive the motion to dismiss. With discovery of the identities of the individuals involved, we expect plaintiffs to refine their theories and their allegations concerning the defendants’ individual responsibilities.
Finally, while a supervisor’s mere “knowledge and acquiescence” is not sufficient to impose liability under Iqbal,
B. Qualified Immunity
We now turn to whether qualified ■ immunity protects Secretary Rumsfeld from liability. The qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not .violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
To resolve the qualified immunity defense, we use the two-step sequence that the Supreme Court articulated in Saucier v. Katz,
We agree with the district court that plaintiffs have articulated facts that, if true, would show the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. In fact, the defendants’ argument to the contrary evaporates upon review. The plaintiffs have pled that they were subjected to treatment that constituted torture by U.S. officials while in U.S. custody. On what conceivable basis could a U.S. public official possibly conclude that it was constitutional to torture U.S. citizens? See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (statute criminalizing overseas torture); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113 (1984), at Art. 2 (“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
The wrongdoing alleged here violates the most basic terms of the constitutional compact between our government and the citizens of this country. The defendants seem to agree, and go so far as to state:
We do not argue that well-pled, factually-supported and concrete allegations of, for instance, persistent exposure to extreme cold, sustained failure to supply food and water, sustained sleep deprivation, and the failure to furnish essential medical care, if of sufficient severity and duration, would not state a violation of substantive due process in the context of military detention in a war zone.
Def. Br. 50. We concur with that view. Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as we must at this stage, this is exactly what the plaintiffs have pled. There can be no doubt that the deliberate infliction of such treat
1. The Alleged Abuse Violated a Constitutional Right
If the plaintiffs’ allegations of torture are true, there was a violation of their constitutional right to substantive due process.
The defendants instead argue that plaintiffs have not alleged more than “vague, cursory, and conclusory references to [their] conditions of confinement, without sufficient factual information from which to evaluate their constitutional claim.” This argument, which is more of a pleading argument to extend Iqbal and Twombly than an argument about qualified immunity, is not persuasive. The defendants argue, for example, that while the plaintiffs allege that their cells were extremely cold, they provide no “factual context, no elaboration, no comparisons.” At this stage of the case, we are satisfied with the description of the cells as “extremely cold.” Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 84 and Forms 10-15 (sample complaints that “illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate”).
As the defendants acknowledge, a substantive due process inquiry requires “an appraisal of the totality of the circumstances rather than a formalistic examination of fixed elements.” See Armstrong v. Squadrito,
Though Vance and Ertel were never charged with, let alone convicted of, any crime, our precedents concerning the abuse of convicted criminals help guide our thinking about whether the alleged abuse violated a constitutional right. As the Supreme Court concluded recently, “[p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.” Brown v. Plata, — U.S. —,
Examining the plaintiffs’ claims against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions on prison conditions of confinement and prison treatment cases, we remember that abuse in American prisons was once authorized and even thought of as part of the punishment of prisoners. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer,
Today, the idea that a prisoner in a U.S. prison might be abused in such a manner and not have judicial recourse is unthinkable. While the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons, ... neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Farmer,
If a prisoner was kept awake as much as possible, kept in insufferably cold conditions, and not given sufficient bedding or clothing, we would likewise believe that there could well have been a violation of his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter,
2. The Rights Were Clearly Established
To decide qualified immunity, we turn next to whether the alleged rights were clearly established. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen,
This is not a case where the precise violation must have been previously held unlawful. Where the constitutional violation is patently obvious and the contours of the right sufficiently clear, a controlling case on point is not needed to defeat a defense of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Hope,
The defendants offer a final argument that the law was not sufficiently developed with respect to the treatment of detainees in the context of military detention for the plaintiffs to allege adequately the violation of a clearly established constitutional right by Secretary Rumsfeld. The defendants argue that the Supreme Court and appellate courts “have struggled, and continue to struggle, with the precise constitutional contours applicable to the detention of individuals- — citizen and non-citizen alike— seized in a foreign war zone.” On this point, however, the defendants cite only cases involving procedural due process claims: Munaf v. Geren,
C. Bivens Claims by Civilian U.S. Citizens in a War Zone
There can be no doubt that if a federal official, even a military officer, tortured a prisoner in the United States, the tortured prisoner could sue for damages under Bivens. See Carlson v. Green,
The unprecedented breadth of defendants’ argument should not be overlooked. The defendants contend that a Bivens remedy should not be available to U.S. citizens for any constitutional wrong, including torture and even cold-blooded murder, if the wrong occurs in a war zone. The defendants’ theory would apply to any soldier or federal official, from the very top of the chain of command to the very bottom. We disagree and conclude that the plaintiffs may proceed with their Bivens claims.
We address first the nature of the Bivens remedy and then apply the two-step process the Supreme Court has applied for deciding when a Bivens remedy should be available. The first step is to consider whether there is a sufficient “alternative remedy” for the alleged constitutional wrong indicating that Congress has intended to supplant Bivens. Here there is no meaningful alternative, and the defendants do not argue otherwise. The second step is to consider whether “special factors” weigh against recognition of a Bivens remedy under the circumstances. In taking this second step, we explain that the key elements of plaintiffs’ claims are well established under Bivens: (a) that civilian claims against military personnel are permissible; (b) that claims based on abuse of prisoners are permissible; (c) that the Constitution governs the relationship between U.S. citizens and their government overseas; and (d) that claims against current and former cabinet officials are permitted. We then conclude that Congress has not indicated any bar to claims under these circumstances. In fact, Congress has acted to provide civil remedies to aliens who are tortured by their governments. It would be extraordinary to find that there is no such remedy for U.S. citizens tortured by their own government. In taking the second step, we then weigh and reject the defendants’ arguments and authorities offered to support a special rule that would immunize government officials from Bivens liability for the torture, or worse, of a civilian U.S. citizen in a war zone.
The Supreme Court’s more recent Bivens decisions direct us to exercise caution in recognizing Bivens remedies in new contexts. Bivens does not provide an “automatic entitlement” to a remedy for a constitutional violation by a federal official, and “any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional guarantee.” Wilkie v. Robbins,
If there is no sufficient alternative, the courts must proceed to the second step of the Bivens test, as described in Bush: “the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.” Bush,
1. Step One — Alternative Remedies
The first step of the inquiry is to consider “whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.” Wilkie,
Although the defendants do not argue that there is an “alternative remedy” for the plaintiffs, an amicus brief by former Secretaries of Defense and Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff addresses the issue. They argue, as defendants do not, that Congress has created an elaborate and well-structured scheme for remedies and an administrative system that encourages detainees to make complaints. These amici suggest that Vance and Ertel enjoyed the protections of, among others, the Geneva Conventions, the Coalition of Provisional Authority Memorandum # 3, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. They argue that the plaintiffs are not entitled to pursue Bivens claims because they could have taken advantage of these protections by complaining about their treatment at the time of their detention.
We respect these amici and their distinguished public service. For three reasons, however, we are not persuaded by the argument that a Bivens remedy should be barred because detainees who are being tortured may submit a complaint about their treatment to the very people who are responsible for torturing them. First, if, as plaintiffs allege here, there was a problem stretching to the very top of the chain of command, it would make little sense to
The administrative remedy of inviting detainees to complain about their treatment is also nothing like the alternative remedies that the Supreme Court has found to preclude Bivens remedies in Schweiker and Bush. Those elaborate and comprehensive remedial systems provided meaningful safeguards and remedies established by Congress for victims of official wrongdoing. See Schweiker,
2. Step Two — “Special Factors”
The second step of the Bivens inquiry is to make “the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.” Bush,
a. The Scope of the Defense and, the Claim
The defendants’ principal Bivens argument is that, because this case arose in a foreign war zone, no Bivens claim should be recognized. This sweeping defense is proposed against a fairly narrow claim. The defendants are arguing for a truly unprecedented degree of immunity from liability for grave constitutional wrongs committed against U.S. citizens. The defense theory would immunize not only the Secretary of Defense but all personnel who actually carried out orders to torture a civilian U.S. citizen. The theory would immunize every enlisted soldier in the war zone and every officer in between. The defense theory would immunize them from civil liability for deliberate torture and even cold-blooded murder of civilian U.S. citizens. The United States courts, and the entire United States government, have never before thought that such immunity is needed for the military to carry out its missions.
In asserting this broad defense, defendants have also sought to broaden plaintiffs’ claims beyond those they are actually asserting. Contrary to the defense arguments, plaintiffs are not asserting a broad challenge to the detention or interrogation policies of the United States military. Plaintiffs assert that their treatment was actually contrary to explicit statutory law and stated military policy, because they claim they were subjected to interrogation techniques that were not authorized by the applicable Army Field Manual. This case, in other words, does not invite a broad debate over appropriate detention and interrogation techniques in time of war. It presents factual issues over whether there was a deliberate decision to violate the U.S. Constitution and other applicable laws and, if so, who was responsible for that decision. With the broad scope of the proposed defense and the narrow focus of the asserted claim, we turn to precedent for guidance.
b. Precedents Supporting Plaintiffs’ Claims
The key elements of plaintiffs’ claims for constitutional wrongs committed by military officials are all familiar in Bivens jurisprudence, and nothing about their claims would extend Bivens beyond its “core premise,” which is “the deterrence of individual officers who commit unconstitutional acts.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,
First, of course, it is well established that Bivens is available to prisoners who assert that they have been abused or
Second, it is also well established under Bivens that civilians may sue military personnel who violate their constitutional rights. For example, Saucier v. Katz,
Third, when civilian U.S. citizens leave the United States, they take with them their constitutional rights that protect them from their own government. In Reid v. Covert,
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land. This is not a novel concept. To the contrary, it is as old as government.
Id. at 5-6,
Fourth, defendant Rumsfeld is being sued for actions taken and decisions made while serving at the highest levels of the United States government. We express no view at this stage as to whether plaintiffs can prove their factual allegations. The former rank of the defendant, however, is not a basis for rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims. The Supreme Court has repeatedly entertained Bivens actions against other cabinet members. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth,
c. The Defense Arguments and Precedents for Special Factors
Although the principal elements of plaintiffs’ claims are familiar aspects of Bivens jurisprudence, the claims are challenging because they arose in a U.S. military prison in Iraq during a time of war. As the defendants acknowledged at, oral argument; however, neither the Supreme Court nor any other federal circuit court has ever denied civilian U.S. citizens a civil remedy
i. Military Affairs and National Security
The defendants’ argument that the courts should stay out of military affairs rests on the assumption that the plaintiffs are mounting a broad challenge to U.S. military and detention policy, raising issues of national security and even foreign relations. If plaintiffs were actually seeking a general review of “military actions and policies,” as the defense suggests, this case would present different issues. That is not what plaintiffs seek. They are not challenging military policymaking and procedure generally, nor an ongoing military action. They challenge only their particular torture at the hands and direction of U.S. military officials, contrary to statutory provisions and stated military policy, as well as the Constitution. Allowing Bivens liability in these unusual circumstances would not make courts, as defendants suggest, “the ultimate arbiters of U.S. military or foreign policy.”
We are sensitive to the defendants’ concerns that the judiciary should not interfere with military decision-making. The “Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking” rest with the Executive. Hamdi,
The defendants raise the concern that litigation of the plaintiffs’ claims “would inevitably require judicial intrusion into matters of national security.” See Wilson,
Courts reviewing claims of torture in violation of statutes such as the Detainee Treatment Act or in violation of the Fifth Amendment do not endanger the separation of powers, but instead reinforce the
Our dissenting colleague suggests that “given the significant pitfalls of judicial entanglement in military decisionmaking, it must be Congress, not the courts, that extends the remedy and defines its limits.” Dissent at 630. We respectfully disagree. As the Supreme Court said in Hamdi: “Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive ... in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”
Recent habeas corpus cases reinforce our understanding that federal courts have a role to play in safeguarding citizens’ rights, even in times of war. The Hamdi Court, examining a claim by an American citizen detained on U.S. soil as an enemy combatant, held that the detainee was entitled to contest the basis for his detention. “What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.” Hamdi
The Munaf Court later made clear that the habeas statute “extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces.” Munaf,
Most recently, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that aliens detained as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to seek a writ of habeas corpus to challenge their detention and that the Detainee Treatment Act review procedures were an inadequate alternative to habeas corpus.
The fact that the plaintiffs are U.S. citizens is a key consideration here as we weigh whether a Bivens action may pro
The defendants cite a number of eases, both habeas corpus and Bivens cases, for the proposition that the judiciary should not create damages remedies in the context of foreign affairs. Almost all of these were suits by aliens, not U.S. citizens, detained and suspected of terrorism ties. For example, the defendants cite Arar v. Ashcroft, where the sharply divided Second Circuit declined to recognize an alien’s Bivens claim for “extraordinary rendition” because several related “special factors” counseled hesitation.
We are fully aware that prohibitions against torture are matters of international law as well as United States law, and that those prohibitions reflect basic and universal human rights. The question of remedies, however, has more room for nuance, and the Second Circuit majority in Arar was concerned in large part about the diplomatic and foreign policy consequences of hearing Arar’s claims.
In a series of cases, the D.C. Circuit has rejected efforts by aliens to use Bivens to seek relief from U.S. foreign policy and
The D.C. Circuit followed that reasoning in Rasul v. Myers,
Treatment of detainees is inexorably linked to our effort to prevail in the terrorists’ war against us, including our ability to work with foreign governments in capturing and detaining known and potential terrorists. Judicial involvement in this delicate area could undermine these military and diplomatic efforts and lead to embarrassment of our government abroad.
Most recently, in Ali v. Rumsfeld, the D.C. Circuit followed Rasul II and Sanchez-Espinoza to hold that Iraqi and Afghan citizens detained abroad in U.S. military custody could not sue under Bivens for claims of torture. The court’s analysis of “special factors” under Bivens emphasized the plaintiffs’ status as aliens.
As our dissenting colleague points out, there is some overlap in the special factors analysis that applied in the cases brought by aliens in Ali and Arar, all of whom alleged they were tortured, either directly by the U.S. government or as a result of a U.S. practice of extraordinary rendition. Those cases presented very disturbing allegations about our government, especially in view of our nation’s long commitment to comply with international law and our leadership in opposing torture worldwide. We acknowledge that those cases present
Whether one agrees or disagrees with Ali and Arar, however, we should not let the difficulty of those eases lead us to lose sight of the fundamentally different situation posed by the claims of civilian U.S. citizens in this case. These plaintiffs have alleged a grave breach of our most basic social compact — between “We the People” and the government we created in our Constitution. As difficult as torture claims by aliens may be, we repeat that nothing in Ali or Arar, or in the opinions in Rasul II or Sanchez-E spinoza, indicates that those courts were willing to extend the unprecedented immunity that defendants and the dissent advocate here, for claims that our government tortured its own citizens.
ii. Congressional Intent
The defendants do not argue that Congress has created an “alternative remedy” that forecloses a Bivens remedy. They argue, though, that because Congress has passed numerous pieces of legislation regarding detainee treatment, none of which provide detainees with a statutory private right of action, the courts should not recognize a Bivens remedy for civilian U.S. citizens tortured in military custody in a war zone. See, e.g., Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 10 U.S.C. § 801, stat. note § 1092; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2). Congress has also addressed detention standards in a criminal statute without providing for a private civil right of action. See 10 U.S.C. § 893 (a person guilty of cruelty and maltreatment of person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct). Congress has even gone so far as to criminalize overseas torture, see 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, but explicitly provided that it was not creating a new civil right of action. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340B (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed ... as creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any civil proceeding.”). From Congress’ close attention to detainee treatment without creating a civil right of action, defendants infer that a Bivens remedy is not appropriate here.
We disagree. Bivens is a well-known part of the legal landscape, so it is significant that Congress has taken no steps to foreclose a citizen’s use of Bivens. We can assume that Congress was aware that Bivens might apply when it enacted legislation relevant to detainee treatment. In fact, when Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act, it opted to regulate — not prohibit — civil damages claims against military officials accused of torturing aliens suspected of terrorism. Congress created a good faith defense in civil and criminal cases for officials who believed that their actions were legal and authorized by the U.S. government:
In any civil action or criminal prosecution against an officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States Government [for engaging in practices involving detention and interrogation of alien detainees suspected of terrorism] it shall be a defense that such officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not know that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practices were unlawful.... Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or extinguish any defense or protection otherwise available to any person or entity from suit, civil or criminal liability, or damages, or to provide immunity from prosecution for any criminal offense by the proper authorities.
Accepting defendants’ invitation to consider other indications of Congressional intent, we find other powerful evidence that weighs heavily in favor of recognizing a judicial remedy here. Congress has enacted laws that provide civil remedies under U.S. law for foreign citizens who are tortured by their governments. The plaintiffs cite the Torture Victim Protection Act and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to show that “Congress and the American people have always stood against torture, and Congress has seen litigation against officials of other nations as an important tool to implement America’s foreign policy against torture.” PI. Br. at 30. Where Congress has authorized such claims by non-citizen victims of torture by foreign governments, it would be startling if United States law did not provide a judicial remedy for U.S. citizens alleging torture by their own government.
It would be difficult to reconcile the law of nations’ prohibition against torture and the remedies United States law provides to aliens tortured by their governments with a decision not to provide these citizen-plaintiffs a civil remedy if they can prove their allegations. The defendants have not attempted to do so. As the Second Circuit held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, “deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties.”
Most relevant, though, is the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-256, codified as a note to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Section 2(a) of that Act provides a cause of action for civil damages against a person who, “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation,” subjects another person to torture or extrajudicial killing. Section 2(b) requires U.S. courts to decline to hear such claims “if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place” where the conduct occurred. Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, if an alien has been tortured by her own government, and if that foreign government has denied her a civil remedy, then a U.S. court could hear the case against a defendant found in the U.S. It would be extraordinary — one might even say hypocritical — for the United States to refuse to hear similar claims by a U.S. citizen against officials of his own government. And Bivens provides the only available remedy.
To illustrate the anomalous result the defendants seek, consider the possibility that another country has enacted its own law identical to the U.S. Torture Victim
In sum, we are not convinced by the defendants’ argument that “special factors” preclude recognition of a Bivens remedy in this case. A couple of final concerns remain in our Bivens analysis. The defendants argue that, under the plaintiffs’ approach, any military action could result in a Bivens claim if the action were characterized as a violation of some government policy. The defendants argue, for example, that this could include a plaintiff seeking damages from the Secretary of Defense for an air strike in a location beyond the bounds of congressional authorization to wage war. The argument is not convincing. Today we decide only the narrow question presented by the extraordinary allegations now before us. The Bivens case law weighs in favor of allowing plaintiffs, U.S. citizens, to proceed with their claims that while they were in U.S. military custody, they were tortured by U.S. government officials. Our decision today opens up the courts to other claims like this, but we hope and expect that allegations of this nature will be exceedingly rare. We make no broader holding about whether other future claims about violations of government policy would be cognizable under Bivens.
A difficult related question is whether recognizing the plaintiffs’ Bivens claim in this instance creates a special category of constitutional rights that would still be enforceable in a war zone and, if so, what the limits are of such a category. While the plaintiffs are arguing, for example, that Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights apply to U.S. citizens detained by the U.S. military in a war zone, this appeal presents no issue regarding the fact of plaintiffs’ detention or some aspects of that detention that would not have passed constitutional muster if the detention had been subject to civilian processes in the United States.
The amicus brief by the Society of Professional Journalists, the Project on Government Oversight, and the Government Accountability Project in support of the plaintiffs also raises important questions
As weak as the government’s authority is, Kar has provided none at all — no precedent that clearly establishes the right of a U.S. citizen to a prompt probable cause hearing when detained in a war zone. Any attempt to apply the two-day requirement from [County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,500 U.S. 44 ,111 S.Ct. 1661 ,114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) ] or the seven-day requirement from the Patriot Act to Kar’s circumstances ignores the differences between detention on U.S. soil and detention in hostile territory.
Id. at 85. We are inclined to agree with that observation, and indeed, many broader questions remain about the application in a war zone of constitutional safeguards we have developed over time to protect U.S. citizens’ rights.
In rejecting the defendants’ “special factors” arguments for a complete and unprecedented civil immunity for torture of U.S. citizens, we have tried to apply the caution required in applying Bivens. But caution is also required from the opposing perspective. Our courts have a long history — more than 200 years — of providing damages remedies for those whose rights are violated by our government, including our military. See Iqbal,
If we were to accept the defendants’ invitation to recognize the broad and unprecedented immunity they seek, then the judicial branch — which is charged with enforcing constitutional rights — would be leaving our citizens defenseless to serious abuse or worse by another branch of their own government. We . recognize that wrongdoers in the military would still be subject to criminal prosecution within the military itself. Relying solely on the military to police its own treatment of civilians, however, would amount to an extraor
D. Military Authority Exception to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
Finally, we turn to the plaintiffs’ claim against the United States to recover personal property seized from them by the U.S. military when they were detained.
The “military authority” exception to the Administrative Procedure Act provides that the right of judicial review for persons aggrieved by government actions does not extend to the exercise of military authority “in the field in time of war.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(G). The plain language of the statutory exception prevents the court from reviewing military decisions regarding these plaintiffs’ personal property. First, there is no question that the seizure of plaintiffs’ property was an exercise of “military authority” by U.S. military personnel stationed in Iraq. Vance and Ertel acknowledge that their property was taken by members of the military in connection with a military investigation. Second, the confiscation of property occurred “in time of war.” The alleged seizure of the property occurred in 2006 in the midst of a congressionally-authorized war in Iraq. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002); In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation,
The district court relied on Jaffee v. United States,
The district judge denied the motion to dismiss based on the possibility that the plaintiffs’ property might no longer be held “in the field,” and allowed the claim to proceed to permit discovery to inquire into its present location. We do not find this reasoning persuasive. The cases cited by the district court to support this reasoning are all readily distinguishable. See, e.g., Doe v. Rumsfeld,
Regardless of the current location of the property — whether in Fort Hood, Texas, or in Rock Island, Illinois, as plaintiffs suggest, or in Baghdad — it was seized by and remains in the custody of military engaged in ongoing hostilities in Iraq. While in some cases it may be appropriate for the district court to order discovery to determine whether the “military authority” exception applies, no additional discovery is necessary on this issue here where the exception clearly applies as the claims have been pled.
III. Conclusion
The decision of the district court in No. 10-1687 denying in part Secretary Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss is Affirmed. The decision in No. 10-2442 denying dismissal of the personal property claims under the Administrative Procedure Act is Reversed.
Notes
. The amicus brief filed by former Secretaries of Defense and former Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of Secretary Rumsfeld and the government points out that the United States technically operated in Iraq through 2008 as part of the Multinational Force — Iraq ("MNF-I”). We assume that the forces holding Vance and Ertel were under the authority of the United States. Like the amici, we refer to the forces who detained the plaintiffs as the "U.S. military,” not the "MNF-I.”
. All references to the Complaint are to the operative pleading, the Second Amended Complaint.
. The plaintiffs were informed that they were being held as "security internees” because they worked for a business that possessed large weapons caches and that might be involved in distributing weapons to insurgent and terrorist groups. ¶¶ 179-80. The plaintiffs adamantly deny any wrongdoing and allege that the U.S. government officials in Iraq fabricated these allegations, for which they were never charged, in retaliation for .their whistleblowing of "high-value information” that could reflect poorly on U.S. officials in Iraq. ¶¶ 1, 4, 132.
. Plaintiffs explained in oral argument that they were limited in identifying other defendants given the nature of their detention in a "sterilized system.” No name tags were worn by Camp Cropper officials, and the American guards had code names for each other. The magistrate judge ordered some discovery so the plaintiffs could identify other defendants. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Dkt. No. 89 (Dec. 21, 2007) (ordering limited discovery for plaintiffs to learn identities of unknown defendants responsible for their detention and alleged mistreatment); Minute Entry (Order on Motion to Compel), Dkt. No. 267 (Jun. 14, 2010) (granting plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery). But the district court later granted the government’s motion to stay proceedings, including pending discovery requests to identify unknown defendants, during this appeal. See Minute Entry (Order on Motion to Stay), Dkt. No. 285 (Nov. 17, 2010).
. The defendants rely heavily on Iqbal, but the case is clearly distinguishable because of the nature of the alleged constitutional violations. The issue in Iqbal was not what the defendants (Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller) actually did, but their subjective purposes — whether they acted on the basis of religious or ethnic bias or instead acted to fight terrorism. The plaintiff alleged that the Attorney General and the FBI Director had established and implemented policies following the attacks of September 11, 2001 that led to the detention of the plaintiff under harsh conditions separate from the general prison population, allegedly because of a policy that kept prisoners separate because of their race, religion, or national origin. Because there was a legitimate explanation for the policy — the “nondiscriminatoiy intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who committed terrorist attacks” — the Court held that personal responsibility was not pled sufficiently where the complaint provided no plausible basis for rejecting that legitimate explanation. Iqbal,
A similar distinction applies to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. —,
. The plaintiffs elaborate on the September 2003 policy in their brief, noting that the Senate Armed Services Committee reported that this list “drew heavily” on Secretary Rumsfeld’s guidance for Guantanamo Bay. See Inquiry Into The Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, Committee on Armed Services (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www. armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/
Detainee Report FinaLApril 22 2009.pdf (last accessed Aug. 4, 2011). “According to LTG
. The plaintiffs elaborate on this point in their brief, citing the Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (Aug. 24, 2004), available at http://www. defense.gov/news/Aug2004/d20040824
finalreport.pdf (last accessed Aug. 4, 2011). This report, addressed from former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to Secretary Rumsfeld, noted that “the changes in DoD interrogation policies ... were an element contributing to uncertainties in the field as to which techniques were authorized” and that "the augmented techniques for Guantanamo migrated to ... Iraq where they were neither limited nor safeguarded.” Id. at 14.
. On appeal, the plaintiffs cite a newspaper article reporting on the development of this classified set of interrogation methods. See Eric Schmitt, "New Army Rules May Snarl Talks with McCain on Detainee Issue,” New York Times (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/14/politics/ 14detain.html (last accessed Aug. 4, 2011) ("The Army has approved a new, classified set of interrogation methods ... The techniques are included in a 10-page classified addendum to a new Army field manual ..."). The plaintiffs contend that Secretary Rumsfeld eventually abandoned efforts to classify the Field Manual, but that the "December Field Manual” was in operation during their detention and was not replaced until September 2006, after plaintiffs had been released, when a new field manual (Field Manual 2-22.3) was instituted. ¶ 244; PL Br. at 11. The dissent criticizes plaintiffs' reliance on the newspaper report, but plaintiffs' case for personal responsibility rests on allegations that are far more extensive. In any event, these are disputes of fact that cannot be resolved by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
. To be clear, we read the Complaint as asserting claims arising under the United States Constitution, not the Detainee Treatment Act, which does not provide for a private right of action. The Detainee Treatment Act and the Secretary’s responsibilities in executing it are relevant in evaluating the Secretary's knowledge of and responsibility for the treatment of detainees.
. The plaintiffs have presented and briefed their claim as a substantive due process claim under the Fifth Amendment. As the Supreme Court has held: "Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished. A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that punishment may not be 'cruel and unusual’ under the Eighth Amendment.” Bell v. Wolfish,
. The district court thought the Complaint was sufficient, and so do we. But even if we found some inadequacy in the details of the already detailed pleading, through an unusually vigorous extension of the Iqbal pleading standard, for example, plaintiffs would be entitled to an opportunity to amend their Complaint to remedy any perceived defects. Basic fairness and the liberal amendment policy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)(2) would require that plaintiffs be given an opportunity to cure the defects, if they could, at least absent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or undue prejudice. See, e.g., Bausch v. Stryker Corp.,
. Long before Bivens, federal courts provided remedies for federal officials’ violations of federal law, and individuals sought post-deprivation remedies against federal officials in federal court. See Iqbal,
. Some members of the Supreme Court have said that Bivens is outdated. Wilkie,
. The panel invited this elaboration on the plaintiffs' complaint, as permitted on appeal of a Rule 12(b)(6) decision as long as the elaboration is not inconsistent with the complaint. See supra n. 6. The friends of the court refer to the applicable Army Regulation 190-8, which states that if civilian detainees are "not satisfied with the way the commander handles a complaint or request, they may submit it in writing.” AR 190-8, § 6-9. The matter must be reported up the chain of command, investigated, and remedied under DoD Directive 5100.77 (Dec. 9, 1998). Def. Sec. Amicus Br. at 11. The amici note that at the time the plaintiffs' were detained, there had been more than 800 investigations by military law enforcement officials of alleged detainee abuse. Id. at 13 n. 8. We do not believe that this is the kind of comprehensive remedial system that would preclude a Bivens remedy. Apparently, neither does the government; its brief does not rely on this internal administrative complaint system.
. Our dissenting colleague argues that we should leave the question of remedies entirely to Congress. Although we disagree, for reasons explained at length in the text, nothing in our reasoning would prevent Congress from addressing the problems posed here with a statutory solution. The Bivens line of cases shows that when Congress has acted to address the relevant context, as in Social Security and civil service cases, courts have been more than willing to defer to congressional solutions.
. We hope that the serious claims before us are truly unusual, but the defense theory is of particular concern because of our nation’s increased reliance on civilian contractors in modem war zones. A majority of our nation's wartime presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has been made up of private contractors. The Congressional Research Service reported that, as of March 2011, the Department of Defense had more contractor personnel (155,-000) than uniformed personnel (145,000) in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, as of March 2011, there were 64,253 Defense Department contractors and 45,660 uniformed personnel in the country. See "Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis,” Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, Congressional Research Service (May 13, 2011).
. We are not persuaded by the defendants’ reliance on Chappell v. Wallace,
. The defendants suggest that "it is telling" that the plaintiffs rely on habeas corpus cases rather than cases permitting Bivens claims in the context of reviewing military actions and policies, because habeas is a remedy authorized by statute and the Constitution while Bivens is merely a judicially-created remedy for damages, with what the defense argues is a presumption against recognizing claims in new contexts. The argument is not persuasive. Those cases also involve some judicial inquiry into matters affecting national security and military activity. Hamdi, Munaf, and Boumediene thus weigh against the argument that the courts must simply defer to executive authorities in a case involving alleged torture of a U.S. citizen in U.S. military custody.
. This is not to say that we think that citizenship should be a dispositive factor in all Bivens cases implicating national security. But as we explain, in the context of this particular set of facts and allegations, U.S. citizenship or permanent resident alien status counsels in favor of recognizing a judicial remedy against federal officials even if the result might be different for an alien’s similar claim. Such an alien could have his own government intervene to protect his rights, and such claims could implicate foreign affairs and diplomacy in a way that this case does not.
. Our dissenting colleague contends that recognizing a Bivens claim here "vaults over this consensus” and "too-casually sidesteps the weight of precedent from other circuits.” Dissent at 628, 630. There is in fact no such consensus to vault over, nor a "casual sidestep.” There is no circuit court decision with which we disagree. The two circuits we have cited addressed the very different situation of alien detainees. The plaintiffs here are U.S. citizens entitled to the full protection of our Constitution.
. The defendants emphasize the last sentence in the quoted passage, but it indicates only that Congress did not intend to make any other change in law that would otherwise apply.
. Other parts of our government seem to agree, as Judge Parker pointed out in Arar,
. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Counts II and III. In Count II, plaintiffs claimed that they were denied procedural due process, specifically through the denial of a factual basis for their detention, access to exculpatory evidence, and the opportunity to appear before an impartial adjudicator. In Count III, the plaintiffs contended that they were denied access to a court of law to challenge their detention. These claims are not before us.
. For a thoughtful discussion of some of these issues, see José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 Yale L.J. 1660 (2009).
. Vance has been able to recover his laptop computer from military officials, who recovered it from a search of an Army Criminal Investigative Command evidence facility at Camp Victory in Iraq, but plaintiffs are still missing other personal items seized when they were detained.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Much attention will be focused on the fact that the court has sustained a complaint alleging that former-Secretary Rumsfeld was personally responsible for the torture of United States citizens. However, the most significant impact of the court’s holding is its extension of Bivens v. Six Unknoum Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
For starters, this case is not about constitutional rights, against torture or otherwise — the defendants readily acknowledge that the type of abuse alleged by the plaintiffs would raise serious constitutional issues. Rather, this case centers on the appropriate remedies for that abuse and who must decide what those remedies will be. Confronted by allegations as horrible as those described in this case, it is understandable that the court concludes that there must be a remedy for these plaintiffs. But that concern should not enable this court to create new law. For decades, the Supreme Court has cautioned that such decisions should be left to Congress, especially where there are “special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Wilkie v. Robbins,
Before explaining the particulars of my disagreement with the court, it is important to stress the proper questions before the court. Otherwise, given the severity of the allegations and the controversy surrounding the military policies underlying this case, we risk getting sidetracked. What we are asked to decide is simply who — the courts or Congress — should decide whether the courts will review constitutional claims against military personnel that arise in an active war zone, under what conditions and parameters that review should take place, and to what extent members of the military, whether high or low, should have immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court refined its cautious approach to this question in Wilkie v. Robbins,
The resolution of the special factors analysis is straightforward. If anything qualifies as a “special factor[] counseling hesitation,” it is the risk of the judiciary prying into matters of national security or disrupting the military’s efficient execution of a war. National security matters are “rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention,” Haig v. Agee,
The court’s citations seem to acknowledge this lack of precedent. All of the cases it cites in its favor addresses different contexts and different special factors. It approaches the “special factors” analysis in this case by arguing that the military detainee context is not that much different from other contexts in which Bivens actions have been allowed. But these cases
Second, the court understates the - difficulties that inhere in judicial review of military activity in a time of war. While it does acknowledge the issue, the court does not appear to appreciate just how much judicial review might intrude on difficult and sensitive matters. The court argues— as did Judge Calabresi in his dissenting opinion in Arar — that the state secret privilege is all the protection we need to safeguard confidential matters of national security from compromise in open court. See Arar,
Third, the court too-casually sidesteps the weight of precedent from other circuits that Bivens should not be extended to suits against military officials for wartime actions. See Ali,
Fourth, the court cites recent Supreme Court habeas corpus cases approving limited judicial oversight over military detention decisions, but these are clearly inapposite. The defendants cogently object that the fact that Congress has permitted the limited relief of habeas corpus actions — essentially equitable relief — says next to nothing about whether the courts should give the green light to a much broader implied cause of action for money damages. To this, the court responds that “those [habeas] cases also involve some judicial inquiry into matters affecting national security and military activity,” and therefore “weigh against the argument that the courts must simply defer to executive authorities in a case involving alleged torture of a U.S. citizen in U.S. military custody.” (Opn. at 619 n. 18) This rejoinder misses the point entirely, however. I emphasize once again that it is not a question of deferring to executive authority, but to Congress. And the question is not whether the courts are competent to review military decisions, nor even whether such review would be necessary or wise. The only question before us is whether these complex questions of military efficiency, national security, and separation of powers constitute “special factors counseling hesitation.” Clearly they do, and therefore Supreme Court precedent dictates that these sensitive questions be left for Congress to resolve through the creation (or not) of a cause of action for civil remedies.
Finally, the court does not recognize the far-reaching implications of its holding. It stresses that its holding is limited to “the narrow question presented by the extraordinary allegations now before us.” (Opn. at 624) That is, the remedy extends (at least for now) only to U.S. citizens who are tortured — and perhaps to other, nebulous “core constitutional rights” — while in U.S. military custody in a war zone. The court offers no logical reason why its unprecedented holding that a Bivens remedy is available for allegations of torture by military personnel in an active war zone should not extend to other constitutional violations. Instead, the court labels such concerns “not convincing.” (Opn. at 624) But claims similar to those before us could certainly proliferate based on this precedent. Given the enormous numbers of civilian contractors working in the current foreign war zones (a fact to which the court itself alludes), the potential scope of the court’s Bivens remedy is itself a special factor that should cause us to hesitate
For these reasons, I dissent from the court’s decision to allow the plaintiffs constitutional claims to proceed.
. I concur, however, in the court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs' property claims pursuant to the military authority exception to the Administrative Procedure Act.
. The court's rhetorical dissection of "immunity” obscures, rather than clarifies, an already complex and confusing issue. Whether a Bivens remedy is available and whether particular federal officials are entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity are entirely distinct questions. “Immunity” is indeed an issue elsewhere in this suit, see infra note 5, but primarily the issue before us is whether or not there is an implied Bivens cause of action directly under the Constitution.
. A distinguished collection of fourteen former Secretaries of Defense and Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff filed an amicus brief urging us to wait for Congress to decide how to handle alleged constitutional violations by military personnel. They make a strong case that there are adequate alternative remedies that the plaintiffs have not pursued, contrary to the court’s conclusion.
. The court also correctly notes that United States citizens do not lose their constitutional rights when they venture abroad. I stress again that the lack of an implied cause. of action under Bivens does not strip plaintiffs here of their constitutional rights (against torture or anything else) in a war zone; it merely forces Congress to sort out a difficult issue. Moreover, the court’s citations involve military trials for civilians and habeas corpus rights for citizens, and have nothing to do with liability under Bivens (or any other cause of action). (Opn. at 616-17)
. The court also distinguishes Rasul II because it involved detainees who were known or potential terrorists, whereas here the plaintiffs "have not been charged with, let alone convicted of, any terrorist activity.” (Opn. at 621) But the plaintiffs were obviously considered a security threat when they were first apprehended; why should the fact that the military eventually concluded otherwise be relevant to the Bivens special factor analysis? Instead, it highlights why the court should not be picking and choosing between various constitutional tort claims based on "countervailing factors that might counsel alacrity or activism,” which have never been a part of the Bivens special factors analysis. Arar,
. I also have serious reservations about other aspects of the court's opinion, especially its holding that Secretary Rumsfeld may be held personally liable for the alleged actions of his subordinates under the plaintiffs’ allegations. The court identifies two alleged bases for Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility — his actual authorization of abusive interrogation techniques at the time plaintiffs allege they were tortured, and his deliberate indifference in the face of knowledge of ongoing abusive treatment of detainees, including Americans. The first set of allegations is entirely speculative. The purported basis is a single article in the New York Times that does not actually support the plaintiffs' claims that Secretary Rumsfeld approved the continued use of the techniques in question via confidential addendum to the Army Field Manual. The article states neither that the confidential addendum approved the techniques, nor that the addendum was ever approved. The second set of allegations may have greater plausibility, but the court's opinion does not explain why the predicates for deliberate indifference in the military context (far removed from the usual prison context) are sufficiently clearly established as to defeat qualified immunity.
