90 So. 735 | La. | 1922
Plaintiff institutes this suit through his alleged curator, S. W. Vance,
Defendant then answered, admitting that plaintiff had once owned an interest in the property under the title alleged, but averring that it amounted to only one-eighth. She further denied the invalidity of the partition proceedings, and averred,' that she and her ancestors in title had been in possession of the property for many years, and had placed valuable improvements thereon,, for which she was entitled to recover, if plaintiff should be held to have an interest therein, and also prayed that her right to claim reimbursement therefor - be reserved. , ,
Subsequently defendant pleaded the prescription of 10 years acquirendi causa, and, in a lengthy opinion, the lower court held the partition proceedings void, but sustained the plea of prescription and rejected plaintiff’s demand. Plaintiff has appealed, and defendant has answered, praying that the said partition proceedings be held valid.
Opinion.
Defendant’s counsel concede in their brief that James Washington Vance was notoriously insane when the partition proceedings were had in 1891, but contend:
(lj That the judgment therein was valid;
(2) That, if not valid, it was only voidable, and not void; and,
(8) That the plea of jxrescription acqui-rendi' causa should be sustained.
We shall dispose of these issues in the order mentioned.
As to .the Validity of the Partition Proceedings.
It is clearly shown that James W. Vance became insane at about the age of 18 years, and was confined in a private hospital in the city of New Orleans, and that his mental condition was generally known in the community in which he lived in Bossier Parish. With this condition existing, certain of the beneficiaries under the will of' William Haynes, residing in the state of Texas, instituted a partition suit against the other co-owners, including the present plaintiff; he being sued therein as a person sui juris. The return on the citation addressed to him reads as follows:
There was judgment recognizing plaintiff and defendants, including J. W. Vance, as owners of the property in indivisión, the latter to the extent of one-eighth; the property was regularly sold thereunder, and bought in by S. J. Zeigler, husband of one of the' sisters and co-owners of plaintiff. Nothing had been done looking to the interdiction of plaintiff up to that time, notwithstanding his notorious insanity, nor was any action taken to that end until 1895, some four years later.
Counsel for plaintiff say that it was the duty of the petitioners in said partition suit to have first provoked the interdiction of plaintiff and the appointment of a curator; while defendant contends that it is only persons who have been formally interdicted who must be sued through their curators, and, until this is done, they may be sued as persons sui juris.
In support of her contention, defendant cites the first article of the Code of Practice to the point that every person has the “right to claim judicially what is due or belongs to him,” except those whom the law has specifically declared incapable of appearing in court. She further quotes the following articles of the said Code of Practice, emphasizing those words which we have italicized, to wit:
“Art. 108. Minors, persons interdicted or absent, cannot sue, except through the intervention or with the assistance of their tutors or curators.
“Art. 109. Tutors act themselves in all judicial proceedings in the name of their minors, and in all suits which may be brought for them, without making them parties to said suits.
"The curators of persons, interdicted, or absent, act judicially in the name of those they represent, in the same manner as tutors of minors.”
“Art. 115. Actions against interdicted persons or minors must be brought directly against the tutor of the minor or the curator of the interdicted person.”
“Art. 194. If the suit be brought against minors not emancipated, interdicted or absent persons, whose property is administered by a curator, then the petition and citation must be served either by delivery in person to the tutor or curator of .such minors, interdicted or absent persons, or by leaving them at the usual place of domicile * * * of such tutor or curator.”
The argument is that the law writer has advisedly used the words “interdict” and “interdicted persons” in a technical sense, as distinguished from a person of unsound mind and not formally interdicted, for the reason that, where there has been a lawful interdiction, all persons - are legally charged with knowledge of the incapacity, whereas, in cases of insanity or unsound mind not judicially declared, with the consequent restriction of civil rights, the validity of judicial proceedings had with such persons would depend upon the finding of the court as to mental status in each particular case.
Defendant further contends that it was not required that a curator ad hoc be appointed for J. W. Vance, for the reason that at the time of the suit he had npt been “committed to an insane asylum,” as provided in article 964 of the Code of Practice. The provision in this article, permitting the appointment of a curator ad hoc in suits brought against “insane persons not interdicted, but committed to an insane asylum,” was added tq the old Code of 1870 by an amendment embraced in Act No. 308 of 1910, and hence could have no application to a suit brought in 1891, unless it be to illustrate the purpose of the Legislature to require, as con
However defendant appears to have overlooked article 102 of the Code of Practice, which reads:
“Those who are disqualified from contracting are generally disqualified from suing.
“The exceptions to this rule are provided in the following articles.”
The very articles of the Code of Practice which counsel for defendant cite, and which we have quoted above, would appear to be the exceptions referred to in the second paragraph of this last-quoted article — that is, among persons disqualified from contracting, who may be sued, are those of unsound mind who have been formally interdicted and are represented by curators. This article is the very first under chapter 5, dealing with “What Persons are Entitled to Bring Actions,” and when construed in connection with article 1782 of the Revised Civil Code, to wit:
“All persons have the capacity to contract except those whose incapacity is ex, ,-essly declared by law. These are persons of insane mind, those who are interdicted, minors and married women”
—we think it clear that the lawmaker has, by express provision, declared persons of unsound mind, though not interdicted, incapable of suing.
But this incapacity is not, in our' opinion, absolute, as in the case of minors and married women (formerly), for, as demonstrated by the succeeding articles of the Civil Code, a person of unsound mind, not interdicted, may, under the circumstances therein set forth, make binding contracts. The first paragraph of article 1788, R. C. C., provides:
“The contract entered into by a person of insane mind, is void as to him, for the want of that consent, which none but persons in possession of their mental faculties can give. It is not the judgment of interdiction, therefore, that creates the incapacity; .it is evidence only of its existence, but it is conclusive evidence, and from these principles result the following rules. * * * ”
Then follow 13 consecutively numbered sections or paragraphs, detailing-the circumstances and conditions under which the insane person and his heirs are or are not bound by his acts. Section No. 1 declares:
“That, after the judgment of interdiction, no other evidence than the interdiction itself is necessary to prove the incapacity of the person, and to invalidate any contract he may have made after the day the petition for interdiction was presented, and that no evidence to show that the act was made during a lucid interval, or to contradict the judgment of interdiction, can be admitted.”
Section No. 2 provides that as to contracts made—
“prior to the application for the interdiction, they can only be invalidated by proving the incapacity to have existed at the time the contracts were made.”
No. 3 says that it is not sufficient, as to contracts made under the circumstances mentioned in section 2, to prove the insanity, but that it must also be shown that the fact was generally known, or that the person who contracted with the insane person knew of his insanity. Section No. 4 reads:
“That, except in the case of death hereafter provided for, no suit can be brought, nor any exception made, to invalidate a contract on account of insanity, unless judgment of interdiction be pronounced before bringing the suit, or at least applied for before making the exception.”
No. 5 declares that if the party dies within 30 days after making the contract, the insanity may be shown without first having made the application for interdiction; but, if a longer time elapse before the death, the insanity cannot be shown where the application has not been made, except that, as provided in section 6, where the act itself shows evidence of insanity, in which case (No. 7) other proof of insanity may be offered by the party alleging it or required by the judge.
“That, while the judgment of interdiction is in force, it is conclusive evidence of incapacity; but that it may be annulled, whenever the insanity ceases, but.it can only be annulled by a judgment.”
We also quote article 17S9, as follows:
“A temporary derangement of intellect, whether arising from disease, accident or other cause, also creates an incapacity pending its duration, provided the situation of the party and his incapacity were apparent.”
Plea of Prescription Acquirendi Causa.
Plaintiff contends that the running of prescription was suspended or prevented by certain proceedings which' were had with regard to the sanity of James W. Yance in 1895. On March 5th of that year the district attorney for Bossier parish addressed to the district court for that parish a petition, with accompanying affidavit, and upon which a decree was entered as follows;
“To the Hon. Judge of the 2d Dist. Court of La. Holding- Sessions in and for Bossier Parish:
“The petition of A. J. Murff, Dist. Atty. 2d Dist. of La., with respect represents: That J. W. Yance, a resident o’f Bossier parish, La., is a person of .unsound mind, insane, and dangerous to be at large.
“That his mother, Mrs. S. E. Vance, and his brother, S. W. Yance, are able and willing to pay for his treatment, etc., in the Louisiana State Asylum, at Jackson, where it is necessary that he be placed as a patient for treatment and care.
' “Therefore, the premises considered, petitioner prays that he be interdicted, after examination, and declared to be insane and dangerous to be at large, and ordered placed in the State Asylum at Jackson, La., as a pay patient, for all orders, and general relief.
“[Signed] A. J. Murff,
“Dist. Atty., for State.”
“State of Louisiana, Parish of Bossier:
“Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority, W. C. Vance, S. N. Arnold, and J. G. Ogden, who, after being duly sworn, depose and say that they know J. W. Vance, and that he is an insane person who is danger-out to be at large, and requires the medical treatment and attention of an insane asylum, and recommend the interdiction of said J. W. Vance, and that he be sent to the state asylum
“[Signed] W. C. Vance.
“S. N. Arnold.
“J. G. Ogden.
“Subscribed to and sworn before me this 6th March, 1896.
“[Signed] R. O. Stinson,
“J. P. 2d Ward, Bossier Parish, La.
“We, Mrs. S. W. Vance, mother of J. W. Vance, and S. W. Vance, brother of J. W. Vance, recommend his interdiction, and are willing to meet all expenses necessary for care and treatment in the La. State Asylum as a pay patient.
“[Signed] S. W. Vance.
“S. E. Vance.”
Accompanying this petition was the certificate of two physicians, as follows;
“In the Matter of the Interdiction of J. W. Vance.
“We, the undersigned, hereby certify that we know J. W. Vance of unsound mind, and that it is dangerous for him to be at large, and recommend that he be incarcerated in the insane asylum at Jackson, La.
“Done and signed this 11th March, A. D. 1895.
“[Signed] G. A. Wise, M. D.
, “J. W. Allen, M. D.”
“Upon the examination by two physicians in regular practice, and upon certificate filed with the papers in this case that' J. W. Vance is insane, and upon the evidence above offered, it is ordered that J. W. Vance be interdicted on account of insanity, and be sent to the insane asylum at Jackson, La., for treatment as a pay patient.
“Thus done, read and signed at chambers March 7, 1895.
“[Signed] J. T. Watkins,'
“Judge 2d D. 0.”
Thereafter, on October 21,1895, Samuel W. Vance, brother of the present plaintiff, filed a petition alleging that the latter had been interdicted by the proceeding quoted above, and praying that the petitioner be appointed curator for the alleged interdict. This application was duly published, and on December 30, 1895, the said applicant was, by an order of the clerk of court, appointed curator for the said J. W. Vance. Inventory was taken, but which did not include the interest in the property now in controversy. -S. W. Vance took the oath of office and letters were issued to him as curator for his brother.
“Minors and persons under interdiction cannot be prescribed against; except in the .cases provided by law.”
There is no exception in favor of actions of the character now before us; but we think the Code uses the term “persons under interdiction” advisedly, and in the sense of a judgment rendered contradictorily, ' as required elsewhere in its provisions heretofore referred to and discussed.
We have already referred in detail to the requirements of the Code (articles 389 to 426,
Before parish courts were abolished, the judges thereof were ex officio judges of the probate courts, anil the latter, under express provision of the Code of Practice, had exclusive jurisdiction of suits for interdiction and the appointment of curators. C. P. arts. 128, 923, and article 924, subds. 2 and 10:
“Art. 923. The parish judges are ox officio judges of the courts of probate in their respective parishes.
“Art. 924! Courts of probate have the exclusive power:
& ¡1: * :;¡ *
“2. To appoint tutors and curators for minors, interdicted and absent persons.
“10. To interdict persons who fall into a state of.madness, and to restore them to the enjoyment of their rights when they regain their reason.”
And it was held, during the existence of these courts, that the parish judge, as such, could not entertain an interdiction proceeding, but that he could act alone in his capacity as ex officio judge of the probate court, and that it had to affirmatively appear that he had so acted throughout the entire proceeding. Segur v. Pellerin, supra. Yet the very , same session of the Legislature (1870) which adopted the Code of Practice also enacted the Revised Statutes of 1870, section 1768 of which reads as follows:
“Whenever it shall be made known to the judge of the district or parish court by the petition and oath of any individual that any lunatic or insane person within his district ought to be sent to or confined in the insane asylum of this state, it shall be the duty of the said district or parish judge to issue a warrant to bring before him, in chambers, said lunatic or insane person, and after proper inquiry into all the facts and circumstances of the case:
“If, in his opinion, he ought to be sent to or confined in said insane asylum, he shall make out his warrant to the sheriff of the parish, commanding him to convey the hinat’c or insane person to the insane asylum, for which duty the sheriff shall have the right to demand the same fees as are now allowed by law for the conveyance of convicts to the penitentiary of the State, which shall be paid out of the parish treasury, upon the order of the district or parish judge, and likewise all other expenses previously incurred in bringing said insane person before the district or parish judge.”
Subsequent sections provide the conditions of admission, and if the patient is financially able, for the payment of a mimimum rate per month for his upkeep ; and sections 1770, 1777, require examination by tbe physicians of the asylum of all persons sent there under section 176S, and, if found not, to be insane, the asylum board is authorized to return them to the parish from which they came.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, at the cost .of the appellant.