33 Ind. App. 516 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1904
In 1889 appellees owned certain land in Allen county, described as follows: Commencing at a point on the west line of lot four in Well’s Reserve, township thirty north, range twelve east, fifty-six feet south of the northwest corner of the lot; thence south to a point where the west line of lot four intersects the west line of Spy Run avenue; thence northeast along the avenue to a point fifty-six feet south of the north line of lot four;
As conclusions of law upon the foregoing special finding of facts, the court stated that appellee is entitled to have opened and established, and to the uninterrupted use of, the street or highway and alley; that a reasonable width of such street is thirty feet; and that appellants should be restrained from interfering with appellees’ free use of the street and alley.
The amended complaint is in two paragraphs. The action is not for specific performance, but the theory of the pleading seems to be to establish appellees’ right to use a highway or street, and also an alley on the south and west sides, respectively, of their land, which they claim to have purchased. The first paragraph contains no prayer for judgment, but, as this is a matter of form, the want of it where a cause of action is stated is not reached by a demurrer. Lowry v. Dutton, 28 Ind. 473.
As it does not appear that'the findings contain anything outside the issues presented by the pleadings, the questions presented as to the pleadings and the conclusions of law upon the findings may be considered together. It is stated in appellants’ brief that the right to the alley is not controverted. By the pleadings and by the facts found when the deeds were made and exchanged appellees became entitled to “a passable highway south of and adjoining” their lands, to intersect Spy Eun avenue. The deed recites that Bossier was to maintain such a highway, which was to be of equal grade with the street. The findings show this to have been one of the principal considerations for the transfer, that a
It is true, Bossier was to fill the way and bring it to the level of the street within a certain time. But this cannot be held to mean that appellees did not have the right to use the way upon the exchange of deeds. Neither Bossier, nor his grantee with notice, can derive any benefit from his failure to perform one of the conditions contained in his deed. The width of the highway was not specified in the deed. It was to be a “passable highway,” and for “public utility.” The parties must have contemplated that the way should be suitable to- the particular locality, and the court finds that, to be of any benefit to appellees’ property, the way would have to be thirty feet wide.
The court’s decree does not direct anyone to establish and open a highway. It is true, the conclusions of law and the decree state that.appellee is entitled to have opened and established, and to the uninterrupted use of, a highway; but the effect of the decree is that she is entitled to a highway along her land, which right accrued to her upon the exchange of deeds, and that this highway, which was of undefined width, should be thirty feet wide.
It is also argued that the finding is not sustained by sufficient evidence. Although appellants have failed to
Judgment affirmed.