Donna Van Riper appeals the failure by the trial court to award interest on a lump sum of money payable in installments as part of the property division in a decree of dissolution. Thе sole issues are:
(1) whether the gross unpaid sum bears interest by law, and
(2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order interest on the gross unрaid sum.
We affirm.
The trial court entered its final decree of dissolution of marriage on February 25, 1981. As part оf the property division, Wife received $82,000, payable as follows:
1. The amount of Two Thousand Dоllars ($2,000) on or before December 15, 1980;
2. Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) on or before January 5, 1981;
3. Fifteen Thousаnd Dollars ($15,000) on or before February 5, 1981; and
4. Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,000) payable in one hundred twenty-one (121) equal monthly installments designed to be deductible to husband and taxable to wife, commencing March 1, 1981.
Interest was not awarded.
I
Wife asserts the $82,000 constituted a disposition of property governed by I.C. 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns Code Ed., Repl.1980) enforceаble pursuant to I.C. 31-l-11.5-17(a) (Burns Code Ed., Repl.1980) and that the award is a “present charge” to pay her $82,000, although in installments. We agree. However, we disagree with her conclusion that the sum is presently due her, although paid in installments, and, consequently, the unpaid amount bears interest as a matter of lаw under the provisions of *132 I.C. 24-4.6-1-101 (Burns Code Ed., Supp. 1979) which provides:
“Interest on judgments for money whenever rendered shall be from the date of the return of the verdict or finding of the court until the same is satisfied at the rate agreed upon on the original contract sued upon but shall not exceed eight рercent (8%) per annum . . . and if there be no contract by the parties, then at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum.”
Winemiller v. Winemiller,
(1888)
White v. White,
(1975)
White involved the question of whether a lump sum money award payаble in installments in a dissolution decree constituted a claim against the ex-husband’s estate. The dissolution decree did not award interest on the gross sum. However, when it was reduced to a judgment agаinst the estate the trial court awarded interest on the judgment which became immediately due аnd payable. The propriety of interest on the judgment against the estate was not an issue, nоr was the absence of interest on the lump sum award in the dissolution decree.
Hasty
also accords with
Winemiller.
In
Hasty,
the trial court awarded interest at the rate of 11%% on the lump sum payable in installments. This court struck down any award оf interest in excess of the interest allowed by I.C. 24-4.6-1-101. However, in so doing the
Hasty
decision only approved the trial court’s award of interest. It did not hold I.C. 24-4.6-1-101
required
the deferred installments to bear interest. In fact, the
Hasty
decision relied upon
Hatfield v. Higgins,
(1941)
Therefore, we conclude a lump sum division of property, payable in installments, dоes not bear interest on the unpaid balance, unless, and until, an installment is delinquent or unless the deсree specifically orders that the sum bear interest.
II
Wife also argues the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property by its failure to award her interest on the unpaid balance of her lump sum award. We disagree.
In reviewing property divisions in dissolutions of marriage, we examinе the division only to see if the trial court abused its discretion. We reverse if the result reached is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, including reasonable inferences. We do not weigh the evidence, but consider the evidence in the light most favоrable to the judgment. Just and reasonable division of property does not necessarily mean an equal division. To find a property division unjust or unreasonable, there must be no rational basis for the division.
Cunningham v. Cunningham,
(1982) Ind.App.,
In applying the above principles, we find the property division to be just and reasonable and the result reached not to be clearly against the logic and effect of thе facts and circumstances. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not awarding *133 Wife interest. An awаrd of interest is a decision well within the trial court’s discretion. It can be assumed trial courts are аware of the time value of money and take it into account in making property divisions and in dеciding whether to award interest.
We find the trial court’s decision here to be in accord with applicable statutory and case law and the property division to be just and reasonable.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Alimony in gross is a sum certain, payable in one or more installments that generally constitutes a divisiоn of property as opposed to peri-odie alimony which are payments of support, subject to modification or termination
(Hicks v. Fielman,
[1981] Ind.App.,