Plаintiffs and appellants, in cases consolidated below and on appeal, were passengers in а car struck from the rear by defendant-appellee’s car.
After jury verdict of no cause for actiоn, plaintiffs made a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Plaintiffs now appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion.
*528 The accident ont of which these cases arise, occurred on the aftеrnoon of March 24, 1961, at approximately 1:30 p.m. as plaintiffs, passengers in a car driven by Mrs. G-errit Yan Oordt, were proceeding in an easterly direction on M-50 in Ottawa county.
Shortly after passing through the intersection of M-50 and 104th avenue, defendant’s car struck Mrs. Yan Oordt’s car, causing the latter to catch on fire which resulted in personal injuries to appellants.
Mrs. Yan Oordt testified that she did not drive off the pavement and that defendant struck her from thе rear as she was proceeding east on the southerly part of the highway.
Defendant testified that he was рroceeding east on M-50 at a speed of 60 to 65 miles per hour; that he first saw the Yan Oordt car when it was approximately 100 feet in front of him, and that it appeared to be coming from off the shoulder onto the highway. Under close cross-examination, defendant refused to change or vary his testimony.
"When defendant’s testimony is cоnsidered along with that of plaintiff Loren Yan Oordt, who stated in his pretrial deposition, that “We were on the shouldеr of the road and then we were just starting to get back on,” (describing what he first recalled about the accident) we cannot hold on this appeal that the conclusion of the jury trier of fact was against the great weight of the evidence. 1
Plaintiffs did not object to the instructions that were given at the trial. Plaintiffs do not claim in this appeal that the instructions were in any way erroneous and our review of same discloses that the court clearly, accurately, and thoroughly instructed the jury.
*529 Appellants, however, claim:
“In the ease at bar before the court long sections on the doctrine of sudden emergency were suddenly introduced into the case, although not argued by counsel for the defendant in his argument and not pleaded. The only knowledge that the plaintiff attorney had that such a defense was going to be invoked was after the court was obviously reading from some instructions which had never been furnished thе plaintiff and apparently prepared by the defendant.”
Defendant-appellee filed an affidаvit that he tendered his proposed instructions by leaving a copy of same on opposing counsel’s dеsk.
An examination of the answer defendant filed to plaintiff Jennie Wabeke’s declaration discloses that defendant contended “that plaintiff’s driver either slowed her car suddenly to make a turn or pull onto the shoulder оf said highway at some point past the intersection.”
In his opinion denying new trial, the trial court properly dispоsed of plaintiffs’ claim in re instructions by stating: „
“The requests to charge revealed defendant’s theory even though defendant’s counsel chose not to emphasize them in his final argument. In fact it was apparent to all who heard the case that the defendant claimed that plaintiff’s car appeared before' him under such conditions that he was confronted with a sudden emergency, not of his own making, and that plaintiff’s driver was solely responsible for the collision.
“The court denies any undue emphasis of defendant’s claims. The plaintiff made no cоmplaint to the court at the conclusion of the court’s charge of overemphasis or of failure tо state the claims properly.”
*530 Appellants claim that the trial court erred in not fulfilling a “duty to dismiss or nonsuit a cаuse of action when both parties desire it.”
Plaintiffs’ counsel during voir dire examination asked a prospective juror: “What firm are you with?” and when he received the answer, “With Nationwide Insurance,” counsel repeated the answer, stating: “Nationwide Insurance?”.
After the trial court denied defendant’s motion for mistrial, because of this rеference to insurance, plaintiffs’ counsel advised the court that “the way I feel, and that is physically,” and bеcause of a fair possibility of appeal if a vérdict is obtained, plaintiffs would prefer the court grant dеfendant’s motion and asked “the court to voluntarily nonsuit the defandant [sic?~\ and we will start it over again.”
On this claimed error, the court in its opinion denying defendant’s motion for new trial stated:
“Plaintiff now claims that the court should have granted defendant’s motion for a mistrial and that failure to do so is cause for a new trial. Since the court is of the opinion that plaintiff is responsible for the existence of whatever grounds there may have been for a mistrial he cannot now complain if the jury was not mislead or influenced by his alleged misconduct.
“While plaintiff’s counsel may have been operating-under a handicap physically this matter was never presented to the court as ground for an adjоurnment. It is now too late to urge the court to adopt this complaint as grounds for a new trial. Counsel prosecuted his claim with vigor even though unsuccessfully.”
We have held that the conduct of a trial is to a large extent undеr the control of the presiding judge and to constitute reversible error there must be proof of prejudice. See
Murchie
v.
Standard Oil Company
(1959),
*531 The court did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss or nonsuit.
"We find no reversible error and, therefore, we affirm. Costs to appellee.
Notes
See
Kalamazoo County Road Commissioners
v.
Bera,