32 N.J. Eq. 669 | New York Court of Chancery | 1880
This ease comes before the court on exceptions to the master’s report. The report must be taken to be correct until error is shown. The burden is on the exceptant. National Bank of the Metropolis v. Sprague, 8 C. E. Gr. 82. The report must be tried by the evidence produced before the master, and, unless it appears to be.wrong when judged by that test, it must be sustained. Until error is made clear, the master’s conclusions must be regarded as correct. Clark v. Condit, 6 C. E. Gr. 322 ; Haulenbeck v. Cronkright, 8 C. E. Gr. 412.
I have carefully considered all the evidence produced by the parties, and my conclusion is in perfect accord with that of the master; indeed, the force of the evidence is so clearly in one direction that I think no other result was possible in the judgment of an impartial mind. So far as the report is made up from books, those kept by the exceptant were taken as the guide. He was the book-keeper of the partnership, and was bound to keep full and accurate accounts. If he has been derelict in his duty, so that doubt and uncertainty have arisen,' he must bear the consequences. No mistake of his should be corrected except upon the most satisfactory proof. The methods he adopted in conducting the business were those best calculated to insure mistakes and breed suspicions. The most of his purchases for the firm, he says, were made in his own name, and not in
The objection most vigorously pressed - on the argument was this: that the master, after preparing his report, did not give the exceptant an opportunity, before filing the report, to attend before him to inspect it and make suggestions concerning it. He contends that correct practice in such cases entitled him to such an opportunity. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1301. And the loss of it in this instance has deprived him
, But it was insisted that, in consequence of the imperfect condition of the accounts, there was reason to believe that the master’s conclusions were unjust to the exceptant, and the matter ought, therefore, in the interest of justice, to be sent back to a master to afford the exceptant an opportunity to have the accounts examined by a professional accountant, to see if the discovery of a mistake was not possible, and, if such discovery should be made, then that he should be giveu an opportunity to produce further proofs. Such a course, I am sure, could not be defended as an act of justice; it would be a mere capricious indulgence to the exceptant, granted at the sacrifice of the complainant’s rights, and in contempt of the truth as. established by the evidence. It certainly would be without precedent, and wear very much the appearance of an arbitrary denial of justice to the complainant.
The exceptions must be overruled, with costs.