Van Ness v. HyattVan Ness v. Hyatt
delivered the opinion of the Court.—
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court for the county of Washington, in a suit in equity brought by the appellant in that Court, in 'which a decree was made, dismissing the bill with costs. •
The case was this. On the 31st day of December, 1818, an agreement was entered into between William Cocklin and James Shields; by which Cocklin leased to Shields part of a lot in the city of Washington, for ten years, from the 1st of January, 1819, for the yearly rent of thirty-five dollars. The lessee was to build a two story brick house on the-lot, within twelve months from the date of the lease. And it was agreed between the parties, that if, at the expiration of the lease, Shields should pay to Cocklin three hundred and seventy-five -dollars, then the rént should cease -to be paid; or if all, or any part of the three hundred and sevénty-five dollars were paid before the expiration of the lease, then such pari
On the 23d of September, 1823, Shields, the lessee, mortgaged the premises to a certain John Franks, to secure a debt of $1127 18. On 7th May, 1825, Franks assigned all his right and title to the appellee; who also, on the 9th of May, 1825, procured from Shields a release of his interest, and from the representatives of Cocklin a conveyance of all their .title, on the 16th of April, 1826.
On the 8th of November,.1823, the appellant obtained, before a magistrate in Washington county, a judgment against Shields for $30 25, and a fieri facias issued thereon, on the 10th of June, 1824; which was levied by the constable, upon the right, title, estate,. ■ interest, and claim of Shields in the lot in question. .At the sale of the lot, under this execution, the appellant became the purchaser, at the price of $54; and the constable, by a deed dated the 19th of' August, 1825, and recorded the 9th of January, 1826, conveyed the right and title of Shields in the lot, to the appellant.
The bill was brought by the appellant against' the appellee, Shields, the representatives of Cocklin and of Franks, stating the above facts, which are all that are material to a correct understanding of the case; charging that the mortgage to Franks was fraudulent and covinous, and that all the conveyances to the appellee were made with full knowledge by all parties of the appellant’s purchase and rights; averring his readiness to pay all that Shields was bound to pay for the property in question, at the time of his purchase, to Cocklin or his heirs, Or to the representatives of Franks, then deceased; and praying that all the parties might be compelled to assign their, pretended rights and claims to the property in question, to the complainant, and deliver up quiet possession of the premises; afid for general relief.
The view which we have taken of-the case renders it unnecessary to state the grounds of defence taken in the several answers. It will be sufficient to say, that there is no proof in the cause, except the answers, as. far as they are responsive to the bill, and the several exhibits with the bill and answers: that all the facts stated above are contained in the bill itself, and proven by the exhibits; and that there is no evidence to sustain either fraud, or notice, as alleged in the bill.
Upon this state of the case the question arises, whether the appellant is entitled to the relief which he prays for. The only interest which the appellant can claim in the property in question, is derived from the levy made by the officer under his execution, and the purchase made by him at the sale under that execution, of whatever right, title, and claim Shields had' in the property. Now it must be borne in mind, that not only before the sale, but even before the levy, Shields had mortgaged the lot to Franks: and,
In the United States different views have been taken 'on this question, in the Courts of the several states. It is' said, in 4 Kent’s Commentaries, 153, 154, that Courts of law have, by a gradual and almost insensible progress, adopted the views of a Court of equity on the subject of mortgages, which are founded in justice, and accord with the true intent and inherent nature of the transaction; that except as against, the mortgagee, the mortgagor, while in possession, and before foreclosure, is regarded as .the real owner; and that, in this country, the rule has very extensively prevailed, that an equity of redemption was vendable 'as real property on an execution at law, and that it is also chargeable with the dower of the wife of the mortgagor: and cases are referred to, in New York, Connecticut, and other states, in support of the proposition. On the contrary, it has been held in Virginia, that the resulting interest of a grantor in a deed of trust made to secure debts, cannot be reached by execution.
Whatsoever may have been the decisions upon this subject, in the .Courts of some of the states, in which the Courts of law have,
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by a gradual and almost insensible progress, adopted the equitable views of the subject,” we must be governed, in deciding- this case, by that law which Congress enacted for-the District of Columbia, on assuming jurisdiction over it. They adopted the laws of Maryland then in force, as far as regards that part of the District in which this question arises. Amongst those laws was the common law. ■ Now we have already seen, that by the common law, an equitable interest, such as an equity of ’ redemption, is not liable to execution. This would be decisive of the case, unless there should be. found to be some legislation, or some course of authoritative judicial decision, which had so far modified the common law, by engrafting upon it the principles' of the Court of equity, in relation to mortgages, as to change the rule in this respect. It is not pretended that any legislative act has produced this effect, Is there any course of
But without examining thése cases in detail, or undertaking to say that they would leave the question, entirely free from doubt, we think that there is enough, both in the legislation and judicial decisions of Maryland, and in a decision of this Court, to show how the law is understood there.
As to legislation. By the act of Assembly of 1810, sheriffs, under a fieri facias, are authorized to seize and expose to sale any equitable estate or interest which the debtor may have in any lands, tenements, or hereditaments. Now, why was this act passed ? If such had been considered the principle at common law, the act would have been mere supererogation. It is, therefore, in our opinion, decisive evidence to prove, that the contrary was considered to be the law.before its passage, as it does not profess to be a declaratory act.
But let us for a moment examine the judicial decisions of Maryland, and one in this Court.
In 6 Gill and John. 72, it is decided that a mortgagor cannot maintain trespass against a mortgagee. On the contrary, in
But there is a case decided at the lqst December term of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which, we think, puts an end to all question in .this case. From a.manuscript record of that case, which has been laid before us, we extract the-following language: “ The last point raised by the appellants is, that .the property taken under the execution was not legally the property of Brady, and thatequitable interests in personal property are not the subjects'of an execution. With the appellant’s premises on this point, as legal propositions, we see no reaspn to find fault. It cannot be.denied as a legal principle, that a debtor’s equitable estate in personal property cannot, at law, be seized and sold under a fieri facias.” Now, this was the case of personal estate; but it proves, clearly, that.,but for the act of 1-810, before referred to, the same principle wouldhave applied to real estate; for the difficulty does not grow out of the kind of property, but out of the kind of interest in the property, to wit, that it .is equitable, and not legal.
Upon thése grounds,, we think that Shield’s interest in the,lot was not subject to execution, on account of its being an equity of redemption.
There is one ground' stated, in the manuscript opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, before referred to, in relation to this subject, which it may be proper to notice.
It is there said, that, .as in case of equitable interests, a Court- of equity would, after an execution issued, and a return showing that there was no available remedy at law, assist the party, by charging the.equitable interest; so the Court, if -applied to for that purpose, would decree a ratification of a sale of such interest, where it had been made by the officer under the execution. Whatever might be the authority of .a .Court of equity on this subject as'against Shields himself, it could not be done in .this case; because here there are third parties, who have, for a valuable consideration, without notice, acquired a previous equitable right, and gotten in, also, the legal estate.. So that they stand upon the great principle that they, have the prior equity, and that equity fortified by the legal title.
But there is another view of this case, which we will present very briefly, which also brings us to the conclusion that Shields’ interest in the- lot in question would not have been liable to execution; even if it had not been encumbered by a previous mortgagé. And it is this: beyond the mere lease for years, Shields had- no interest. whatsoever in the lot, but the right to purchase, in case he, by a given time, complied with the particular conditions. Now,
But even if this could be done, no one could derive a greater benefit under that contract than the party himself; and Shields could not have claimed the benefit of the election given to hirn to purchase, because it depended, in its very terms, on particular condition's to be performed by him, at a particular time;' which were not performed. Upon these grounds, we think that Shields had not such an interest -in the lot in question as was liable to execution; that, consequently, the appellant acquired no right by his purchase, which gives him a stand in a Court of equity to ask for the right of redemption, of any other relief. The decree of the Circuit Court is therefore right, and is affirmed, with costs.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is adjudged and decreed by this Court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed with costs.