OPINION
This is a domestic relations matter in which the former wife, Goretta Van Meter, appeals from a July 8, 1997, order of the Edmonson Circuit Court. The trial court awarded the former husband, Charles Smith, a refund of nearly $11,000.00 for child support he was held to have twice paid. The court also modified in Smith’s favor the medical expense provisions of the parties’ child support arrangement. Van Meter maintains that the trial court misconstrued controlling law in arriving at both of these results. We are not persuaded that the child support reimburse *571 ment was improper. We agree with Van Meter, however, that the trial court’s findings do not establish the requisite foundation for modifying the decree’s health care provisions. To that extent, accordingly, we vacate the July 8, 1997, order and remand for additional proceedings. 1
The parties do not dispute the pertinent facts. In March 1987, their marriage of some fifteen years was dissolved by decree. The marriage had produced one child, a daughter, Keegan, who at the time of the dissolution was not yet a year old. Smith was ordered to pay child support of $100.00 per month. That order remained in effect until May 1991, when Smith’s support obligation was increased to $300.00 per month. In September 1991, the decree was further modified by the incorporation of medical expense provisions. Smith was ordered to provide medical insurance for Keegan, and with one exception the parties were ordered to divide equally any uninsured medical or dental expenses. The exception was counseling expenses for Keegen, which were assigned to the party who incurred them. In November 1995, the court again modified the decree by ordering the child and both parents to undergo psychological evaluation and counseling. The order imposing counseling does not say how the counseling expenses were to be divided, but presumably Smith would have borne at least a portion of them.
In late 1993 or early 1994, Smith became disabled. He was awarded workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to KRS Chapter 342; he also received disability benefits under his employer’s pension plan. The pension plan guaranteed Smith an income of approximately $3,000.00 per month by paying him the difference between that amount and the total of his other sources of income. The plan apparently included a coordination of benefits clause whereby Smith was required either to apply for social security disability benefits or to have his pension benefits reduced according to the plan’s estimate of what his social security benefit would be. Smith duly applied for social security, and, while he awaited a ruling, his pension benefits helped him to fulfill his child support obligation. In December 1996, the Social Security Administration approved Smith’s disability claim and awarded him benefits (SSD) effective as of January 1994. It paid him his accrued benefits in a lump sum. It also awarded dependant’s benefits to Keegan on Smith’s account (about $650.00 per month) and paid to Van Meter Keegan’s accrued benefits, which ultimately totaled about $21,000.00. Smith notified the pension plan’s administrator of his social security award, and the plan thereupon demanded that Smith repay the pension benefits to the extent of the social security back awards, including the back award to Keegan.
His social security status having been determined, Smith moved the trial court to modify his support obligation in light thereof and to order Van Meter to reimburse him for the child support he had paid during the pendency of his social security claim. An appropriate amount of Keegan’s back award was placed into escrow, and the court referred the matter to a domestic relations commissioner. The commissioner recommended, and the court agreed, that Smith was entitled to recover the nearly $11,000.00 he had paid in child support since January 1994, that he was entitled to credit Keegan’s monthly SSD benefits against his ongoing child support *572 obligation, and that Van Meter should thenceforth be responsible for “the child’s entire cost of health and psychiatric care— including expenses of court-ordered counseling[J”
It is from this order that Van Meter appeals. She does not dispute that Kee-gan’s SSD benefits may be applied prospectively toward Smith’s continuing child support liability. She maintains, however, that, by reimbursing Smith for support already paid, the trial court modified the support order retrospectively, contrary to KRS 403.213(1). She also maintains that the trial court’s modification of Smith’s liability for health care did not comply with KRS 403.211(7) and (8). We are satisfied that the trial court did not retrospectively modify the child support provisions of the order and that its awarding Smith reimbursement for twice-paid support was appropriate in the circumstances. We agree with Van Meter, however, that any modification of the order, including its provisions for health care, requires more thorough findings than those so far made. Accordingly, we must vacate that portion of the order and remand for additional proceedings.
As are most other aspects of domestic relations law, the establishment, modification, and enforcement of child support are prescribed in their general contours by statute and are largely left, within the statutory parameters, to the sound discretion of the trial court. KRS 403.211 — KRS 403.213;
Wilhoit v. Wilhoit,
Ky.,
The trial court found that
[t]he payment of $10,800 by the respondent from January of 1994 through December of 1996 constituted a double payment of child support and a windfall to the petitioner, and the respondent should recover $10,800 from the petitioner or from the account at the Bank of Edmonson County, which was created by an award for the benefit, care and support of the child duplicating payment by the respondent.
In conjunction with this finding and the reimbursement order, the court cited
Miller v. Miller,
Ky.App.,
Van Meter concedes that, under
Miller,
Keegan’s monthly SSD benefit may be credited toward Smith’s support obligation for that month.
Miller
does not, however, Van Meter maintains, support the further conclusion that Smith is entitled to reimbursement for child support already paid and spent. She insists that “[t]he fact that the United States Government paid Keegan Smith, the parties[’] infant child, has no bearing upon the issues before this Court. That payment, from the United States taxpayers, did not come from the Appellee. Therefore, he did not ‘overpay.’” If Smith’s reimbursement is based, not on an overpayment, but, retrospectively, on a change in Keegan’s circumstances, then the trial court’s order amounts to a retroactive modification of Smith’s support obligation, a result Van
*573
Meter correctly notes would be contrary to Kentucky law.
Guthrie v. Guthrie,
Ky.,
Van Meter’s argument raises a point that merits clarification. If Keegan’s social security benefit is her income, as it plainly is, then how can Smith be given credit for it? Not so long ago, at least two courts held that he could not.
See Casper v. Casper,
Does this fact alone entitle Smith to a reimbursement? Van Meter says no because child support is owed not just in a particular amount, but also with a particular regularity. Smith owed Keegan regular support during his social security application period. To his credit he provided that support, but, in a very real sense, the social security back payment now cannot replace or substitute for the amounts due then. The back payment is simply extra now, and “extra” support payments are commonly deemed to be gifts.
Newman v. Newman,
In different circumstances, especially if an arrearage unrelated to Smith’s disability were involved, this reasoning might be compelling, but it omits a key consideration in this case. As discussed above, Smith’s income during the social security application period consisted in significant part of pension/disability benefits provided by his employer. Those benefits must be repaid. They are similar in that regard to public assistance benefits sometimes provided while social security applications are pending. Such benefits, however, are routinely recouped from social security awards before they are paid to recipients, including recipients of dependency awards.
Baez v. Bane,
They are similar as well to other “coordinated benefits.” Benefit coordination is an attempt by insurance companies and government agencies to lower the cost of benefit programs and policies by eliminating double awards. Benefits are said to be coordinated when receipt of a second award for a single claim gives rise in the payer of the first award to a right to reimbursement.
Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc.,
We noted above that the trial court did not modify Smith’s support obligation when it ordered Keegan and Van Meter to reimburse him. The order provides, by necessary implication, that Smith’s support obligation remains $300.00 per month. 2 The court did, however, modify the decree’s health care provisions: It shifted the entire burden of health insurance and other health related expenses to Van Meter. In doing so, the court cited KRS 403.211(7)(a), which mandates that the costs of health care be specifically apportioned in the child support order. As noted by Van Meter, however, KRS 403.211(8) further mandates that “[t]he cost of extraordinary medical expenses [uninsured expenses in excess of $100 per child per calendar year] shall be allocated between the parties in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes.” The modification of child support provisions, moreover, including health care provisions, is also governed by KRS 403.213(1). This statute provides in part that
[t]he provisions of any decree respecting child support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification and only upon a showing of a material change in circumstances that is substantial and continuing.
In explaining the standard of our review, we observed that this state’s domestic relations law is founded upon general statutory guidelines and presumptions within which the trial court has considerable discretion. The trial court has discretion in many instances, moreover, to deviate from the statutory parameters, but only if it makes findings clearly justifying the deviation.
Cf.
KRS 403.211(2) (providing for deviation from the Child Support Guidelines of KRS 403.212).
Rainwater v. Williams,
Ky. App.
In sum, we reject Van Meter’s assertion that the trial court retroactively modified her child support decree. In ordering Van Meter to reimburse Smith from Keegan’s back award of social security benefits, the court has only required her to acknowledge the prior receipt of that amount of support and to cooperate with Smith’s pension program in a manner the program reasonably expects. This was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Nor are we willing to say that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Van Meter to assume sole responsibility for Kee-gan’s health care. Keegan’s SSD benefits and Smith’s disability may well justify such a modification of the support decree. Because KRS 403.211(8) plainly intends, however, that the parties will, as a general rule, share extraordinary health care costs in proportion to their incomes, the trial court may not deviate from that intention without expressly justifying the deviation in its findings and conclusions. The court’s order fails to satisfy this requirement. It also fails to satisfy the more general requirement that any modification of a support decree be expressly justified in relation to substantial and lasting changes in the parties’ circumstances. For these reasons, we affirm the July 8, 1997, order of the Edmonson Circuit Court in all respects except its assignment of health care responsibilities to Van Meter. We vacate that portion of the order and remand for additional proceedings. Further, for the reasons stated in footnote 1, Smith’s motion to dismiss is denied.
ALL CONCUR.
Notes
. Smith has moved to dismiss Van Meter's appeal as untimely. He concedes that within ten days of the judgment Van Meter filed a CR 59.05 motion and that she filed her appeal within thirty days of the ruling on that motion. Her appeal would thus appear to be timely. Smith maintains, however, that Van Meter’s CR 59 motion was not filed in good faith and so should not be given the usual effect of tolling the time for appeal. As our discussion will make clear, we find Van Meter's attack upon the judgment, which is essentially the same attack she raised in her CR 59.05 motion, to be far from meritless or lacking in good faith. Smith’s motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
. In their briefs, the parties both suggest that Smith’s obligation has been increased to $657.00 per month, the amount of Keegan's monthly SSD benefit. The order does not say this, and, in the absence of adequate findings as discussed in the text, it could not.