171 Pa. 157 | Pa. | 1895
Opinion bx
This is an action of ejectment in which the plaintiff’s right to recover depends on the validity of the tax sale through which he acquired his title. The defendants hold the title under a regular chain of conveyances and are in possession as owners. They have a right to the verdict unless the title has been taken from them by virtue of the tax sale under which the plaintiff claims. This sale was made under the act of 1881, P. L. 45, and upon a collector’s return of the lot in controversy for the nonpayment of taxes assessed upon it as seated land. Two questions are raised, viz: the constitutionality of the act of 1881, and the sufficiency of the return made by the collector. The act of 1881 purports to be a general law, and provides that “ all taxes whether count3T, township, poor, school or municipal taxes” shall be a first lien on the real estate on which such taxes are assessed. It provides for the return of such lands upon nonpa3'rnent of the taxes and for their sale for the collection of the taxes unpaid. Cities of the first, second and fourth classes are excepted from its operations. Townships, boroughs and cities of the third class. remain under its operations. We thus have one system for the collection of taxes,
This is so clearly in the face of the constitutional provisions referred to, and so destructive to that uniformity of procedure upon subjects of general iuterest which it is the object of the constitution to bring about and to preserve, that a simple statement of the necessary consequences of the enforcement of the act of 1881 renders an argument upon the constitutional question unnecessary.
But we concur with the learned trial judge upon the second question, viz : the sufficiency of the description of the lot sold in the collector’s return. The description is as follows :
The act of 1881 requires that the return shall contain a statement “ of each kind of tax so returned, the names of the parties assessed with the same, the year when such taxes were assessed, a sufficient description by boundaries or otherwise of each separate lot or tract and about the quantity of the same and the township or borough in which it is located, that the person making such return has a warrant for the collection of such taxes, and the date thereof, and that after a proper effort at the proper time he could not find sufficient personal property, by the legal sale of which, such taxes or any portion thereof could have been collected.” The return does not state the year when the taxes were assessed nor does it give any description of the lot which it is sought to charge with their payment. It is said in reply to this position that unseated land is sufficiently described by giving the number of the part and the name of the warrantee, and may be sold without other effort to describe the land. But the number and name of the person to whom the warrant issues are matter of record, and as there can be no actual occupancy of unseated land the records afford the only means for investigating the ownership. But a sale of unseated land made in the name of a warrantee who was not such in fact, and whose name was in no way connected with the recorded title, would not ordinarily pass the title. So in this ease. The name of McGurk afforded no help in locating the lot to be sold for he was in no way connected with the recorded title. He was not in possession, and as we understand the evidence he had at no time been in the actual, visible occupancy of the lot. Any lot on Washington street, in the Second ward, might be intended, so far as anything in the description would enable an intending purchaser to judge, or a lot owner to ascertain. If therefore the act of 1881 had been unobjectionable the collector did not follow its provisions, and his return was insufficient to authorize the sale of the lot for unpaid taxes. The assignments of error are overruled and judgment appealed from is now affirmed.