VAN LAUNDRY, INC. A/K/A D/B/A VAN‘S LAUNDROMATS, INC., A/K/A D/B/A VANS LAUNDROMATS, INC. v. CORINTHIAN, LLC A/K/A 835 CORINTHIAN, LLC A/K/A D/B/A 835 CORINTHIAN STREET, LLC, FISHTOWN ROYAL DE, LLC, AND RYAN KIM
No. 1620 EDA 2024
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APRIL 9, 2025
STEVENS, P.J.E.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37; J-S05040-25
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:
FILED APRIL 9, 2025
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
The trial court sets forth the relevant procedural history of the instant case:
Plaintiff/Appellant Tenant Laundromat commenced this action [in tort and contract] by way of filing a writ of summons on February 15, 2022. Appellant Tenant then filed a complaint on July 23, 2022, [to] which Defendant/Cross-Appellant Landlord filed an answer with new matter and counterclaim [asserting breach of contract] on January 4, 2024. [During discovery, Tenant presented evidence that its laundromat equipment was damaged by heavy rains entering the interior of the business through an alleged negligently conducted roof repair by Landlord] After discovery concluded, this matter proceeded to a bench trial.
On January 8, 2024, a bench trial was held in which the trial court received testimony and documentary evidence from both parties. The trial court heard from Mark Evans, a former employee of Appellant Tenant (N.T. 01/08/24, 27-59), Jack Burkhardt, Appellant Tenant‘s mechanical engineering expert in valuation of laundromat equipment (N.T. 01/08/24, 89-103), Mao Khai Van, owner of Appellant Tenant, with interpreter (N.T. 01/08/24, 104-156), and Ryan Kim, member of Cross-Appellant Landlord (N.T. 01/08/24, 157-191).
The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after the trial. On January 22, 2024, the trial court issued its finding, which found for Appellant Tenant Laundromat on one of its claims in the amount of $25,000.00, for Cross-Appellant Landlord on one of its claims in the amount of $31,617, [and offset the awards to arrive at a remainder of $6,617 in Cross-Appellant/Landlord‘s favor].
[After denying on the merits both Appellant Tenant‘s and Cross-Appellant Landlord‘s respective post-trial motions by Order of May 23, 2024, the trial court entered judgment in the same May 23, 2024, filing.]
Appellant Tenant filed a notice of appeal on June 13, 2024, and on the same day the trial court issued, and the parties received, notice of a [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) Order onto Appellant Tenant, [who] timely responded on July 5, 2024. Cross-Appellant Landlord filed a notice of appeal on June 20, 2024, and on June 21, 2024, the trial court issued, and the parties received, notice of a 1925(b) Order onto Cross-Appellant Landlord, [who] timely responded on July 11, 2024.
Trial Court
Plaintiff/Appellant Tenant Laundromat raises the following issues in its appeal:
- Was it an abuse of discretion and error of law for the trial court (going against the weight of the evidence) to award $31,617.00 in damages in favor of the Appellees/Cross-Appellants [Landlord] per the Order dated January 22, 2024, in that the weight of the evidence was so contrary to the court‘s decision because (1) the undisputed evidence showed that any alleged damages against Appellant[/Tenant Laundromat] was capped at six (6) month‘s [sic] rent under Paragraph 10 of the Lease?
- Was it an abuse of discretion and error of law for the trial court to determine per the Order dated January 22, 2024, that the Parties stipulated at trial that the 10/18/21 Notice demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that the Appellees/Cross-Appellants [Landlord] notified Appellant/Cross-Appellee [Tenant Laundromat] when Use and Occupancy Taxes were allegedly due and/or unpaid taxes were due and/or that the [Landlord] ever demonstrated that notice was ever provided to [Tenant] regarding unpaid taxes?
Brief of Appellant Tenant Laundromat at 5.
Defendant/Cross-Appellant Landlord raises the following issue in its cross-appeal:
Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion when it found in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant in the amount of $25,000.00 on its claims against Defendant-
Appellee/Cross-Appellant for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment?
Brief of Cross-Appellant Landlord, at 1.
Regarding both Tenant‘s second enumerated issue and Landlord‘s sole issue on appeal, our review of the record, party briefs, and the Honorable Carmella Jacquinto‘s well-reasoned and comprehensive 32-page
Similarly, the trial court aptly denied Landlord‘s sole issue assailing the trial court‘s decision to find in favor of Tenant‘s quiet enjoyment claim. As explained on pages 20 to 35, the trial court discerned no abuse of discretion shocking the conscience in its determination that Tenant‘s claim of breach of quiet enjoyment under the lease was supported by evidence of both Tenant‘s continued payments of monthly rent after the expiration of the parties’ 10-
On reviewing both issues, we find no basis under our standard and scope of review, infra, to disturb the court‘s judgment respective to them. Accordingly, as the trial court‘s opinion disposes of said issues after engaging in a comprehensive review supported by appropriate reference to the record and legal authority, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment pertaining to said issues based on the trial court‘s opinion.
We turn, then, to address Tenant‘s first issue. The scope and standard of review applicable to this weight of the evidence claim are as follows:
[O]ur scope of review on a weight of the evidence claim is very limited. We will respect the trial court‘s findings with regard to credibility and weight of the evidence unless it can be shown that the lower court‘s determination was manifestly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious or flagrantly contrary to the evidence.
Rissi v. Cappella, 918 A.2d 131, 140 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 417 (Pa. Super. 2004)). In In re M.B., 228 A.3d 555 (Pa. Super. 2020), this Court quoted the principles governing a weight of the evidence claim as stated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2013). There, the Court explained:
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. ... It has often been stated that a new trial should be
awarded when the [factfinder‘s] verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one‘s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. An appellate court‘s standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court‘s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
In re M.B., 228 A.3d at 566 (quoting Clay, 64 A.3d at 1054-55) (internal citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted). “One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court‘s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence[.]” Id. (quoting Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055).
Alkozbari v. Wanaselja, 313 A.3d 209 (Pa. Super. 2024) (emphases in bold added).
Tenant contends the trial court engaged in an erroneous weighing of the evidence relating to the extent of his liability for damages stemming from Tenant‘s purported default under the parties’ lease. Specifically, Tenant argues the damages award must be vacated and recalculated because the trial
Our review of the trial court‘s exercise of discretion in resolving this post-trial issue against Tenant leads us to find that the trial court simply denied the existence of, and thus did not consider at all, the damages cap provision present in the lease. In so doing, the trial court failed to incorporate into its exercise of discretion a most essential consideration bearing on what, if any, damages Tenant owes for default under the lease.
In the trial court‘s Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing this issue, it summarily explains that Tenant argued in its post-trial motion and again in its appeal “that paragraph 10 of the Lease capped damages but said paragraph does not contain/mention any such language[,]” and the trial court ends its discussion of the matter there. Our independent review of the record strongly suggests the trial court‘s truncated review of this issue was influenced by Tenant‘s post-trial and appellate filings inadvertently transposing the lease page and paragraph numbers relating to the damages cap provision.
Nevertheless, both the provision‘s location within the lease and its content already had been accurately conveyed multiple times throughout the litigation by counsel for Tenant, such that we cannot accept the exercise of discretion, or lack thereof, manifest in the court‘s summary rejection of this issue.
During examination of a witness at trial, counsel for Tenant correctly directed the court to the page and paragraph of the lease articulating the damages cap provision in question. N.T. at 153. In both his post-trial motion and again in the appellate brief for Tenant, however, counsel mistakenly indicated the damages cap provision is in “Paragraph” 10 of the lease when it, instead, appears in Paragraph 20 that begins on “Page” 10, as counsel for
Counsel‘s transposition of page and paragraph in what is a relatively short and easily navigated lease would have been readily discerned and overcome by the exercise of judicial review meeting the standards necessary to address properly the Tenant‘s post-trial assertion that the damages award of $31,617.00 went against the weight of the evidence showing the damages cap provision within the lease applied to the facts at hand. Therefore, we find the trial court erred when it failed to address in any meaningful way Tenant‘s post-trial motion asserting that evidence at trial proved he should have benefitted from the existence of a lease provision expressing that Landlord agrees, for good and valuable consideration, that a described cap shall apply to Tenant‘s default-related damages.
Accordingly, we vacate judgment on this basis alone and remand to the trial court, which shall determine whether the weight of the evidence adduced at trial established that the damages cap set forth in the parties’ lease applied to the damages assessed against Tenant and, if so, to what effect.
Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Murray joins the memorandum.
Judge Bowes files a concurring and dissenting memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohla
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/9/2025
parties received notice of the trial court‘s May 24, 2024 Order that denied the post-trial motions and entered the judgment on the docket. Remand to rectify the timeliness issue would be ineffective, as such deadline to take an appeal from a final order has already passed. Therefore, it is respectfully suggested that both appeals be quashed, and the trial court‘s May 24, 2024 Order, which denied Appellant‘s Post-Trial Motion, denied Cross-Appellant‘s Post-Trial Motion, and entered judgment in the aggregate in favor of Cross-Appellant and against Appellant, be affirmed.
APPELLANT‘S ISSUES
II. In the event it is determined the parties did invoke the Superior Court‘s jurisdiction by timely appealing a final order, the trial court properly denied the Appellant‘s Post-Trial Motion requesting JNOV and new trial due to the trial court‘s finding does not shock one‘s sense of justice.
In an abundance of caution, as appellate cases have discussed parties couching sufficiency of the evidence claims as claims of going against the weight of the evidence, the trial court wants to point out that any issue/argument on appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence has been waived for Appellant‘s failure
Assuming arguendo that the Appellant timely appealed from a final order, which it did not, the applicable standard of review is as follows:
“Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the [trial court‘s] exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court‘s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court‘s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. The trial court may award a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial only when the jury‘s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one‘s sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge‘s discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion. When a fact finder‘s verdict is so opposed to the demonstrative facts that looking at the verdict, the mind stands baffled, the intellect searches in vain for cause and effect, and reason rebels against the bizarre and erratic conclusion, it can be said that the verdict is shocking. However, [i]f there is any support in the record for the trial court‘s decision to deny the appellant‘s motion for a new trial based on weight of the evidence, then we must affirm. An appellant is not entitled to a new trial where the evidence presented was conflicting and the fact-finder could have decided in favor of either party.”
Spencer v. Johnson, 2021 PA Super 48, 249 A.3d 529, 566 (2021).
Furthermore, “[t]rial courts have broad discretion to grant or deny new trials and each review of a challenge to a new trial order must begin with an analysis of the underlying conduct or omission by the trial court that formed the basis for the motion.” Harman v. Borah, 562 Pa. 455, 465-66, 756 A.2d 1116, 1121-22 (2000). “There is a two-step process that a trial court
Here, Cross-Appellant filed a counterclaim against Appellant sounding in breach of contract, regarding the Lease between the parties. In the counterclaim, amongst other averments, Cross-Appellant averred that “Counterclaim Plaintiff has suffered significant damages as a direct result of the actions and inactions of Counterclaim Defendant...WHEREFORE, Counterclaim Plaintiffs 835 Corinthian, LLC, Fishtown Royal DE LLC and Ryan Kim demand judgment in its favor and against Counterclaim Defendant Van Laundry Inc. in an amount in excess of $50,000, together with punitive damages, costs, interest, and other relief.” No preliminary objections were ever made to the counterclaim‘s
“Landlord agrees to notify Tenant in writing in accordance with this Lease of any back charges due under this Lease...All parties agree and acknowledge that time is of the essence with respect to these matters. In the event that Landlord does not appropriately notify Tenant within ninety (90) days of the date upon which said charges had become due, Landlord agrees that it has waived its rights to said back charges...”
At trial, the parties stipulated to an October 18, 2021 letter from Cross-Appellant‘s former counsel, providing notice to Appellant of the unpaid real estate taxes in the amount of $31,617. The
“Q. So did you ever send Mr. Van a tax bill?
A. Isn‘t it his responsibility to pay the taxes?
Q. Are the taxes -- who are the taxes mailed to?
A. He was also supposed to pay the rent, but he didn‘t pay the rent. Why would he pay the taxes?
Q. Is it the landlord‘s job to provide notice of the taxes?
A. He also gets the same taxes, does he not?
Q. So how --
A. It‘s also public record, right?
THE COURT: Counsel. Ask the question. Go ahead.
Q. How do you expect him to pay a bill he may not have? Did you ever send him?
A. I directed it to my attorney.
Q. So did your attorney send a writing asking him to pay the tax bill?
A. Yes.
Q. When I say attorney, Mr. Kashkashian?
A. Yes.
Q. You have that communication?
MR. ADLER: P-8. It‘s already stipulated.
MR. TAYLOR: That would be, the first communication would be --
MR. ADLER: The first communication was P-7. P-8, you asked about taxes.
BY MR. TAYLOR: Q. Not until October 18, 2021, that you made your first request for taxes?
A. Does that mean it‘s not due? He didn‘t pay it.”
(N.T. 01/08/24, 176-177).
Based on the record and after a review of the previously-mentioned evidence, the trial court properly denied Appellant‘s
Appellant argued in its Post-Trial Motion and in its sole issue on appeal that paragraph 10 of the Lease capped damages but said paragraph does not contain/mention any such language.
CROSS-APPELLANT‘S ISSUES
III. In the event it is determined the parties did invoke the Superior Court‘s jurisdiction by timely appealing a final order, the trial court properly denied the Cross-Appellant‘s Post-Trial Motion requesting JNOV due to the trial court‘s finding not being an abuse of discretion, but rather, supported by the evidence.
As stated previously, the trial court wants to point out that any issue/argument on appeal as to the sufficiency of the
Assuming arguendo that the Appellant timely appealed from a final order, which it did not, the applicable standard of review is as follows:
“Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the [trial court‘s] exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court‘s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court‘s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court may award a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial only when the jury‘s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one‘s sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge‘s discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion. When a fact finder‘s verdict is so opposed to the demonstrative facts that looking at the verdict, the mind stands baffled, the intellect searches in vain for cause and effect, and reason rebels against the bizarre and erratic conclusion, it can be said that the verdict is shocking. However, [i]f there is any support in the record for the trial court‘s decision to deny the appellant‘s motion for a new trial based on weight of the evidence, then we must affirm. An appellant is not entitled to a new trial where the evidence presented was conflicting and the fact-finder could have decided in favor of either party.”
Spencer v. Johnson, 2021 PA Super 48, 249 A.3d 529, 566 (2021).
Under Pennsylvania law, holdover tenancies are created “[w]hen a tenant remains in possession after the termination of a lease, the landlord has the choice of treating such a tenant[...]as a tenant holding over.” Reading Terminal Merchants Ass‘n by
“[f]or a tenancy to result from a holding over, the landlord must exercise his election, indicating his consent to the tenancy. Usually this consent will be manifest by accepting rent... The law is clear that when a tenant is possession under a lease continues as a hold over tenant, the law implies a new lease on the same terms and subject to the same covenants and conditions as those contained in the original lease.”
Here, Paragraph 3 of the Lease states, in part,
“Landlord covenants, warrants, and represents that upon commencement of the Lease term, Landlord has full right and power to exeute and perform this Lease, and to grant the estate demised herein; and that Tenant, upon payment of the rent herein reserved and performance of the covenants and agreements hereof, shall peaceable and quietly have, hold and enjoy the Premises and all rights, easements, covenants, and privileges belonging or in any way appertaining thereto, during the Term of this Lease...Should Landlord fail to uphold and perform the aforementioned covenants, Landlord and Tenant agree that Tenant‘s damages will be significant and difficult to fully ascertain, and therefore it is agreed that Tenant‘s damages shall be agreed to be in the amount of $25,000. This payment is not to be construed as a penalty, but as liquidated damages.”
Paragraph 2 of the Lease states, in part, “The initial term of this Lease is ten (10) years from the Commencement Date of this
At trial, Appellant‘s former employee, Mark Evans, testified the following on direct examination,
“Q. Good afternoon. My name is Jon Taylor. I am counsel for Van Laundry LLC Incorporated. Were you ever employed by Van Laundry?
A. Yes.
Q. What was -- when were you employed?
A. The first time or?
Q. When did your appointment start?
A. When I first got hired not at that shop, at the other shop, 2019.
Q. And when did you start working at the location at Corinthian Avenue?
A. Couple months later.
Q. What was your job at the Corinthian Avenue location?
A. My job was to make sure the people doing the laundry, making, selling the stuff like detergents and everything, and helping anybody who needed help.
Q. Can you briefly describe what the condition of the exterior of the property on December 25, 2020, was?
A. It was water was coming down.
Q. I am asking, the question I asked was about the condition of the property. What was the condition like?
A. It was fine.
Q. Was any work being done on the property?
A. Yes. Upstairs on the second, third floor.
Q. Any roof work being done on the property?
A. I guess it was.
Q. Why do you believe there was roof work done on the property?
A. Guy kept saying he needed a tarp.
Q. What do you mean by tarp? A. He needed a tarp to cover the roof.
Q. What was the tarp that was covering the roof? What did it look like?
A. It was blue.
Q. And was the blue tarp tightly fastened to the roof? Loosely?
A. I don‘t -- sounded like it was loose when it was blowing in the wind. You can hear it.
Q. Were you working at the premises on December 25, 2020?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you describe what happened on that day?
A. The water was coming down from the ceiling fans, from the lights, the walls, the panel, the electrical panel. Like the whole place was leaking all over the place, behind the dryers and everything.
Q. Was it raining outside?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it raining a lot? A little?
A. Raining a lot. It was raining inside too.
Q. So what did you do to -- can you give an idea of how much water was coming through?
A. I put the buckets, I put the trashcans first near the washers to try to catch the water, but it was filling up too fast. And then I had the little trashcans, but they were filling up pretty fast. So I, like, dumped them, like, six times. It was a lot of water.
Q. Do you recall how many washers were in the laundromat?
A. Give me a second on that. I can‘t.
Q. Do you recall how many dryers were in the laundromat?
A. I think 29.
Q. Were there roughly the same amount of washers and dryers or were the numbers different?
A. They were different. I am used to --
Q. Wait. Well, I am not going to stop you. My question is roughly more dryers or more washers or less dryers? A. I think more washers.
Q. Did you call the owner of Van Laundromat?
A. Mr. Van, yes.
Q. Did he come to the premises?
A. He told me to lock up and get out of there.
Q. Was there any concern about the electrical box during the rain?
A. When I said to the contractors, you know, you got water coming out the electrical box, they said we‘ll look at it.
MR. ADLER: Objection. Hearsay.
THE COURT: Sir, you can‘t say what anybody told you. I will sustain that. You can say what you observed, you know, what you learned, not what anybody said to you, okay?
BY MR. TAYLOR:
Q. Did you observe the electrical box?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you see?
A. There was leaking out of it.
Q. Did business resume at that laundromat after the rain?
A. No.
Q. So was the business closed down after that?
A. Yes.”
(N.T. 01/08/24, 27-31).
Appellant‘s owner testified the following on direct examination,
“Q. I will ask another question. On December 25, 2020, did the premises have water damage?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that water damage described earlier by Mr. Evans who testified earlier?
A. That‘s before.
Q. Okay. Did you stop paying rent after the laundromat got damaged by the rain? A. So the check I submitted for December 20 supposed to cover up until January the 20th.
THE COURT: What year? January 2021?
THE WITNESS: Twenty-one, yes.
BY MR. TAYLOR: Q. Did you pay rent for February 2021?
A. No.
Q. Why?
A. Because I asked him to make the repair, but he couldn‘t repair for me to reopen the place.
Q. Why couldn‘t you reopen?
A. Because the ceiling fell down. Okay. So the electrical, I could not turn it back on. I was afraid it was going to start a fire.
Q. Why were you afraid to use the electrical?
A. Because I know around Christmas time the rain came down from the third floor down. It came down to my office and the whole electric panel was wet.
Q. Can you use the laundry machines?
A. I was afraid to open.
Q. Could you open the business to the public?
A. No, I cannot do.”
(N.T. 01/08/24, 117-118).
Appellant‘s owner further testified on cross-examination,
“Q. Is there a written notice showing that the lease has been extended? Anything in writing?
A. So I remember that I reminded every time I make the payment at Maria house, and I remember 7 or 8 months’ prior to expiration that I told her and I tell her that she need to remember that I have an option for that 5-year extension.
Q. But did she ever give you a written option for the 5-year extension?
A. (In English) Don‘t worry. I make sure – MR. ADLER: Objection.
THE COURT: That‘s the answer to your question.
THE WITNESS: (Through interpreter) Every time I say that, she keep saying don‘t worry, don‘t worry –
MR. ADLER: But it‘s hearsay.
THE COURT: That‘s his answer to your question.
THE WITNESS: -- you will get your 5 years.
MR. ADLER: Move to strike.
THE COURT: Overruled. I want to know what happened. Overruled.
THE WITNESS: She said don‘t worry, I will make sure you have the 5 years.
THE COURT: Nothing was in writing, correct, sir?
THE WITNESS: Correct.”
(N.T. 01/08/24, 135-136).
Ryan Kim, member of Cross-Appellant, testified as follows,
“Q. So when you say “contractor,” who was the contractor?
A. Level Up.
Q. Who hired Level Up? Was it the corporation 835 Corinthian Street LLC or was it Fishtown Royal DE? Is that an LLC? Which corporation hired them?
A. Fishtown Royal.
Q. A roof did leak in December 2020; is that correct?
A. During repairs it may have leaked one day and then got repaired the next day as we were constructing the roof.
Q. Why do you think the roof was leaking?
A. We were in the middle of construction.”
(N.T. 01/08/24, 158; 162).
Cross-Appellant also argues that the trial court‘s finding went against a balancing of the equities, but as previously
Cross-Appellant also argues on appeal that the trial court violated the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case doctrine “...refers to a family of rules which embody the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.” True R.R. Assocs., L.P. v. Ames True Temper, Inc., 2016 PA Super 282, 152 A.3d 324, 336-37 (2016). “To determine whether the law of the case doctrine applies, a court must examine the rulings at issue in the context of the procedural posture of the case.” Mariner Chestnut Partners, L.P. v. Lenfest, 2016 PA Super 277, 152 A.3d 265, 282-83 (2016). “[It] prevents a court from addressing an issue that previously was resolved by a court of concurrent jurisdiction.” Ramsay v. Pierre, 822 A.2d 85, 92 (2003).
“Petitioner seeks repossession of premises it rented to operate a laundromat, but it has not yet produced written evidence of an alleged renewal of the expired Lease‘s term. Petitioner has not, at this point, shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim for restoration of possession, although it may have a claim for money damages.”
(July 8, 2022 Order, case number 220201468, Exhibit P-& in the trial court case below) (emphasis added).
The trial court‘s finding, discussed more above, does not run afoul of violating the law of the case doctrine because the finding has nothing to do with Appellant regaining possession of the leased premises, but rather, Cross-Appellant‘s conduct causing
Lastly, the Cross-Appellant argued that the bankruptcy proceedings Appellant was involved in dismissed all claims pertaining to the Lease. The Bankruptcy Court Order reads as follows, “The estate of the above-named debtor has been fully administered. IT IS ORDERED on this 28th day of December 2020
Therefore, it is respectfully suggested that the Cross-Appellant‘s relief sought be denied, and the trial court‘s May 24, 2024 Order, which denied Appellant‘s Post-Trial Motion, denied Cross-Appellant‘s Post-Trial Motion, and entered judgment in the aggregate in favor of Cross-Appellant and against Appellant, be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, it is respectfully suggested that the Appellant‘s relief sought, and Cross-Appellant‘s relief sought, be denied, and the trial court‘s May 24, 2024 Order, which denied
BY THE COURT:
CARMELLA JACQUINTO, J.
I, Todd Marvin, Jr., Law Clerk to the Honorable Carmella Jacquinto, hereby certify that on the 25th day of July, 2024, by first-class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached opinion was served upon the following:
TAYLOR, WILLIAM JON
1900 JFK BLVD., APT. 709, SUITE 1888
PHILADELPHIA PA 19103
HAMILTON, JOHN ALEXANDER
NOCHUMSON, ALAN
KLYASHTORNY, NATALIE
KLEIN, JARED N
NOCHUMSON PC
1 S BROAD ST., SUITE 1000
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107
Notes
Parties’ Lease Agreement, at Paragraph 20, pages 10-11.For good and valuable consideration, Landlord agrees to the following provision: Notwithstanding any provision in this Lease to the contrary, Landlord and Tenant agree that Tenant‘s liability upon default shall not exceed 6 months base rent or base rent for the remainder of the term, whichever is less.