165 Mass. 582 | Mass. | 1896
This case presents an important question of practice in proceedings for composition in insolvency. It is contended by the plaintiffs, that, when objection is made ■ to claims offered for proof which are large and appear to be doubtful, it is the duty of the judge of insolvency to postpone the consideration of them, and to appoint an assignee to examine them, who may appeal to the Superior Court if they are subsequently allowed against his objection. It is contended by the defendants that an assignee should never be appointed in composition proceedings for the sole purpose of representing creditors in the proof of claims, or of appealing from the allowance of claims, whether in the interest of the debtor or of the creditors.
The settlement of the estate of an insolvent debtor by a com
An offer of composition may be made at any stage of the proceedings. Whenever the composition is proposed, the proceedings for the disposal and distribution of the assets by an assignee may be immediately suspended, and the rights of all parties may be protected by proper orders until it can be determined whether the composition shall be confirmed. St. 1884; c. 236, § 3. If the offer is made at the time of filing the petition, it often happens that no warrant is issued, and no assignee chosen. There usually is no occasion to issue a warrant or to choose an assignee for any of the principal purposes for which such proceedings are had when no offer of composition is made. Section 32 of chapter 157 of the Pub. Sts. is as follows: “ When a claim is presented for proof before the election of an assignee, and the judge entertains doubts of its validity, or of the right of the creditor to prove it, and is of opinion that such validity or right ought to be investigated by the assignee, he may postpone the proof of the claim till after the assignee is chosen.” It is manifest that the Legislature did not intend that action under this section should be taken when the proceedings are in reference to a proposed composition. This section is not applicable to such proceedings. This is the language of the statutes : “ The provisions of sections twenty-six to thirty-one inclusive, and of sections
We have no doubt of the power of the Court of Insolvency, in the exercise of its.discretion, to appoint at any time an assignee with a view to the performance of official duties of any kind for the protection of any persons interested in the estate. It has been decided that the debtor has no right of appeal to the Superior Court from the allowance of a claim, although he deems it illegal and unjust, and although he is injured if he is obliged to pay a dividend upon it under his offer of composition. Thomson v. Poor, 163 Mass. 26. It is also clear that a creditor has no right of appeal to the Superior Court from the allowance of the claims of other creditors, because the statute gives him none. Freeland v. Mechanics’ Bank, 16 Gray, 137.
The statutes providing for a composition contemplate the possibility of appeals of some kind from the allowance or rejection of claims. Appeals to the Superior Court may be taken by an assignee in cases where an assignee has been chosen or appointed, and there is some reason for the contention that the Court of Insolvency, in the exercise of its discretion, ought sometimes to appoint an assignee, so that appeals may be taken to the Superior Court, particularly when persons interested in the estate desire that such appeals should be taken, and the claims in dispute are large, and there are reasonable grounds for contesting them, or for suspecting that there may be collusion between the debtor and the creditors who present them. But if the judge declines to appoint an assignee, we think that the Court of Insolvency should not stay or suspend the proceedings, and that it is not necessary that this court, on a petition under Pub. Sts. c. 157, § 15, should revise the decision of the Court of Insolvency refusing to appoint an assignee, if relief can be obtained in other ways. If any person is aggrieved by the allowance or rejection of claims, and the consequent confirmation of a composition, we are of opinion that there may be relief on a bill or petition under Pub. Sts. c. 157, § 15. It seems to us that the present bill or petition is properly brought under this sec
Before the passage of St. 1880, c. 246, § 9, now Pub. Sts. c. 157, § 35, an assignee could bring a bill in this court to expunge a claim under provisions of statute like those contained in Pub. Sts. c. 157, § 15. The Court of Insolvency then had no power to expunge a claim without the consent of the creditor after the meeting had been finally adjourned at which it had been allowed, although the time for taking an appeal to the Superior Court had expired before the grounds had been discovered by the assignee on which the claim should be expunged. Hill v. Hersey, 1 Gray, 584. Hall v. Marsh, 11 Allen, 563. Under Pub. Sts. c. 157, § 35, no appeal lies to the Superior Court from the order of the Court of Insolvency altering or expunging a claim, or refusing to alter or expunge it, but the remedy is under Pub. Sts. c. 157, § 15. New Bedford Institution for Savings v. Hathaway, 134 Mass. 69. Woodward v. Spurr, 138 Mass. 592. Spurr v. Dean, 139 Mass. 84.
In the present case, as there is no assignee, the remedy under this section must be at the instance of the creditors or of the debtor. In many compositions it may be that the amount of the claims in dispute which are allowed or rejected is so small that they would not affect the decision of this court upon the question whether the confirmation of the composition should be set aside or not, and that the settlement of the disputes would only affect the distribution of the property deposited in court. But in the present case, on the allegations of the bill of complaint, the amount of the claims in dispute is very large, and the debtor has not obtained the assent of the requisite number and amount of his creditors, except by including the assent of the creditors whose claims have been allowed against the objection of the complainants. It seems unnecessary to require these complainants to make an application to the Court of Insolvency to expunge the claims which have been allowed by that court, against their objection before bringing the present bill.
On the facts stated in the bill, for the reasons hereinbefore given, a majority of the court are of the opinion that this court