1 Blatchf. 187 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1846
delivered the opinion of the court, stating that NELSON, Circuit Justice, who had been obliged to leave the city, concurred in it fully. After the decisions which have been made on the Wood-worth patent in this court, in most of the other circuits, and in the supreme court, in cases in which the originality of the invention, and the validity of the patent in other respects, have been brought in question, and been thoroughly examined, it must be con
The only question on this motion which presents any difficulty is, whether the machine used by the defendants is an infringement of the Woodworth patent; and upon that point we have carefully examined all the evidence presented in the affidavits submitted on the part of the defendants, and the models exhibited to us. On a slight view of the two machines, their general appearance and form being different, they might be thought to be different in their essential parts; but on a more careful examination and comparison of them, and a consideration of the principles on which they are constructed, we are united in the opinion that the machine used by the defendants, described as a ilae-gregor machine, is, in its mechanical principles, mode of operation and combinations, substantially the same as that of Wood-worth. The planing wheel of Macgregor presents a change of form only, from a cylinder to an obtuse or flattened cone or conically shaped wheel; and the action of the knives or cutters in the Itacgregor machine, on the surface to be planed, is not essentially different from the action of Woodworth’s cutters, the change appearing to consist only in the knives passing over more of the surface to be planed, and in their cutting for a part of the distance in a measure cross-wise of the board in the process of planing. On a careful consideration of this question, in all the aspects in which it has been presented, we are satisfied that the machine used by the de-
This same point has been contested and decided in cases arising in other circuits. In the case of Woodworth v. Wilson, 4 How. [45 U. S.] 712, carried by appeal to the supreme court from the circuit court for the district of Kentucky, an attachment was applied for in the circuit court, on the ground that a party who had been enjoined from using the Woodworth machine was using the Bicknell machine, and thus violating the injunction. The court in Kentucky, on the evidence produced on the application for an attachment. dissolved the injunction. We have examined the evidence in that case, from which it appears that the Bicknell machine, especially in its planing wheel, was similar to the Maegregor machine, in the points in which it is claimed that the latter is distinguished from the Woodworth machine. The case as presented to the supreme court did not turn upon the question whether the Bicknell machine was an infringement of Woodworth's patent; but that point was so involved in the case that it is not to be supposed that the court would have reversed the decree of the court below, without expressing an opinion that the Bicknell machine might be used without violating the injunction in favor of Woodworth's, if they had so thought. The testimony taken in the court
Many affidavits have been presented on the part of the defendants to show that the Woodworth machine' and that used by the defendants are wholly unlike; but these affidavits are, for the most part, wanting in any statement of the particulars in which the machines differ, or of the reasons on which the opinions given are founded. We have examined and compared the descriptions and models of the machines, and heard the arguments of counsel, and are thus enabled to form an opinion ourselves, and we think that the two machines combine substantially the same improvements.
It is contended on the part of the defendants that an injunction ought not to be granted, on the ground that the plaintiff has acquiesced in the use of this machine by the defendants; that he has known of its use and has not interfered to prevent it. We do not think this objection can prevail. It does not satisfactorily appear that the plaintiff knew how the defendants’ machine was constructed. or how far it infringed upon his; and, if he did know, we do not hold that he forfeited his right to protection by injunction against the infringement, because he did not apply sooner. He brought other suits, one against' one of these defendants, to vindicate his rights; and he is not to be charged with acquiescence because hé proceeded first against that which was a more palpable and obvious violation of his right, or because he has not brought suit against all the machines which infringe upon it. We order an injunction against the defendants pursuant to the prayer of the bill.
At a subsequent day, the defendants, having put in their answer, moved, before NEE-SOX, Circuit Justice, and BETTS. District Judge, for a feigned issue to try the matter in controversy before a jury. The motion was argued by the same counsel as before. The opinions were given at the close of the argument.
The defendants are struggling against the judgment of the court, already formed and expressed, on tiie motion, heretofore granted, for an injunction. Most of the questions in this case were then fully considered and decided. In Woodworth v. Wilson, 4 How. [45 U. S.] 712, which was taken to the supreme court from the district of Kentucky, the question of the originality of the invention was most thoroughly enquired into, as evidence from every quarter of the country was produced, by depositions of experts, and from books of science, and it was notwithstanding held that Woodworth was the first inventor, and that the specification of the patent of 1828. in connection with the drawdng, was sufficient, and the patent valid. The questions, both as to the originality of the invention and as to the validity of the patent, were decided on the most full examination and argument. The case of Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. [45 U. S.] 646, from the Northern district of New-York, was founded on the amended specification of 1845. All the questions involving the validity of the new patent were raised in that case. It was argued at great length and the specification was held to be sufficient, and the re-issued patent valid. The new specification was but a clearing up of the criticisms which had been made on the old one in the 'course of the litigation had upon it. The supreme court having passed upon these questions and settled them, after argument, and on full consideration, how can we, on this motion, revise them? There is not a point made now which has not been made before. The questions raised have, on several occasions, in the district of Vermont, and in the Northern district of New-York, been acted upon as settled, and we so regard them. The only question we can consider as open for controversy is that of infringement. To permit litigation to be renewed as to any other, would be to encourage a struggle against the deliberate judgment of the appellate tribunal. To that the parties must submit, until they can again bring the questions into that court. They can, of course, go into proofs in this case and the court will then pass upon them.
Then, as to the question of infringement. If on the hearing on pleadings and proofs we shall entertain doubts as to the identity of the two machines, we will direct the question to be tried by a jury. But it will be as to that point alone, the question of infringement. If we do not entertain doubts on that question, it will be our duty to decide it; for we are not arvare of any principle that will justify us in sending the case to a jury, unless rve shall be brought to doubt on the question of identity.
In reply to an observation from the defendants’ counsel, NELSON, Circuit Justice,
It is not a matter of course to order a feigned issue; but the party applying must lay a foundation for it. This is not the case of a new patent, but of an old one, long in use and established by decisions. And this court must adhere to what has been passed upon by the court above, whether it is contained in the remit-titur or not. A feigned issue is not to be granted, unless the opinion of the jury on a question is found to be needed. And after a jury shall have passed upon the question, it will be for the court to say whether the verdict is right; and the court may set it aside. In the position of this ease at present, a feigned issue cannot be ordered. Motion denied.
[J. McGregor, Jr. Planing .ine. Patented Aug. 23, 1S33.
3 [From Fish. Pat. Rep. 120, from which was also taken the detailed description of this machine, published as note A, at the end of this case.]
[J. McGregor, Jr. Planing Machine. Patented Jan. 9, 1888.
[4 From Fish. Pat. Rep. 120, from which was also taken the detailed description of this lished as note B, at the end of this case.] machine, pub-