33 Ga. App. 627 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1925
1. The demurrer raising the objections that the petition in trover did not set forth the place of residence of the plaintiff, and that it did not allege that the property sued for belonged to plaintiff, but only that it “claimed title” thereto, was properly overruled.
2. The question as to the sufficiency of description of property in a reservation-of-title contract is one of law for the court; that of the actual identity of the property is one of fact. First Nat. Bank v. Spicer, 10 Ga. App. 503 (73 S. E. 753). In the instant case the latter proposition was not in dispute. The properly recorded reservation-of-title contract was not void on aceormt of uncertainty in the description, where by the fcrms of the instrument the property was referred to as a “truck,” “received of the White Company of Cleveland, Ohio, and having a usual place of business at Atlanta,” and more particularly identified as “Model 15 Chassis No. 70477.” While it is true that the principle of law to the effect that parol evidence may be employed even by persons at interest other than parties to the contract, to aid in identifying the property covered by the lien (Thomas Furniture Co. v. T. & C. Co., 120
Judgment affirmed.