119 Ga. 830 | Ga. | 1904
An equitable petition was brought by Mary J. Van Dyke against Alice M. Yan Dyke, to establish the plaintiff’s
1. “ The great question in this case,” as Nisbet, J., said in the opinion delivered by him in Ingram v. Little, 14 Ga. 182, “ is upon the validity of the deed. It was duly signed, sealed, attested, and written out, except as to the name of the feoffee.” This instrument, “ before its completion and delivery, was inoperative, because made to no person.” Ibid. 183 (2). Judge Nisbet also'said,in that case: “We put our decision upon authority, conceding that the books in England and in this country are in ‘distressing’ conflict, and with some misgiving whether reason and common sense do not condemn it. This is, however, just the kind of a case in which it is safest to be guided by the weight of authority. The rule, although a technical one, is single, clear and easy of observance. If abrogated, the title to property might be left too much to the mistakes of memory, or to the corruptions of humanity.” Chief Justice Marshall and Lord Mansfield both seem to have entertained this view, though they intimated doubts and difficulties on the subject. Whether or not the precedent established by the case in 14 Ga., just referred to, has been practically overruled by later decisions of this court in Brown v. Colquitt, 73 Ga. 59, Weaver v. Carter, 101 Ga. 213, and Smith v. Ins. Assn., 111 Ga. 737, suffice it to say that in the present case, which was decided on demurrer, it does not appear from the plaintiff’s petition that she ever in fact delivered the incomplete deed to her son, or authorized him or any one else to perfect it. She distinctly
Judgment reversed.