*1 720 City Atlаnta, Byrd supra. reasonably v. He could not
that conduct. po- his surprised been that his conduct violated sworn as a question not OCGA lice officer. Id. we need reаch whether § oath, 16-10-1, might vague with the be to some conduct since read Levy, in Parker v. vague it is clear it is not Poole’s conduct. 439) 2547, (1974) (“One 733, 41 U. 417 S. 756 SC whose successfully clearly аpplies may challenge not it for conduct a statute (2) (372 230) State, (1988); Ritter v. 258 551 vagueness.”); Ga. SE2d (1) (290 77) State, 273, v. Sustakovitch 274-275 reasons, not foregoing For the OCGA 16-10-1 is unconstitution- § Poole, vague as ally applied to conviction affirmed. J., Benham, Sears-Collins affirmed. Fletcher, JJ., concur; J., dissents. Justice, dissenting. Fletcher, that, him,
I do find applied merit Poolе’s contention 16-10-1, office, conjunction OCGA when read in with his oath of unconstitutionally I vagueness. void Because believe that the stat- ute defines the criminal offense a manner encourages arbitrary enforcement, I discriminatory respectfully dissent from the ma- jority’s opinion Lawson, Kolender this case. Accord v. 461 U. S. 903) (1983); Burrell, 75 LE2d and State v. 189 Ga. App. 812 I agree majority While with the unacceptable behavior, Poole’s conduct was and constituted criminal prosecuted Poole should hаve been for theft conversion viola- 16-8-4, tion of OCGA as footnote 2 majority opinion suggests, public rather than for violating oath as a officer. Alembik, Sr.,
Richard S. Tarpley, John H. Wilson, Robert E. Attorney, Allstrom, District Nancy B. Assis- tant Attorney, District for appellee.
S92A1279. VAN DYCK VAN DYCK.
Hunt, Presiding Justice. granted We application for interlocutory appeаl to determine oath, might unconstitutionally vague instances, in other Poole right challenge applied Byrd Atlanta, City that statute as to him. See statute) (b) (the permits “live-in lover” 19-6-19 OCGA whether a meretri- alimony when a former modification person of the same sex. We find the relationship cious circum- permit modification these of the statute does denial of the former reverse the trial court’s Accordingly, we stances. complaint for modifica- dismiss the former husband’s wife’s motion to *2 tion. termination, sought
In former husband complaint, the (b), alimony obligation, only that the alleging OCGA 19-6-19 of relationship. involved a homosexual meretricious former wife was for complaint motion to dismiss the court denied the wife’s trial court, relying legislative goals claim. The trial failure to state a (b) intent, permits modification concluded that OCGA 19-6-19 therefore, and, alimony living quаrters recipient sharing where an of either court person another sex. trial expenses, with well, concluded, any of the statute would other construction Equal a violation of the Protection render it unconstitutional the States Constitution. Clause of United (b) provides, pertinent part: awarding final of divorce
Subsequent judgment tо a spouse, the alimony support for of a periodic payment of the third voluntary spouse of such former cohabitation to relationship grounds alsо be party in a meretricious shall permanent modify provisions periodic payments made As used alimony spouse. of the former the dwelling together subsection, “cohabitation” means the word openly in a continuously and person the sex. supplied.) (Emphasis the for- plain apply where language the relationshiр.
mer involved
“
is,
course,
rule to
‘It
fundamental
that “the cardinal
first,
is,
legis-
ascertain the
guide the
laws
to
construction
enacting
and then
purpose
intent and
the
lative
legislativе
which will effectuate the
that construction
”
in-
Although
legislative
“the
purpose.”
intent and
[Cits.]’
prevails
import of words”
“where
tent
over the literal
[cit.]
susceptible of
provision
plain
constitutional
or statute
construction,
reasonable
the court
but one natural and
it, but
upon
authority
place
a different construction
“In
according
construe it
to its terms.
must
[Cit.]
[Cits.]”
leading
to ab-
language being plain, and
other words the
consequences,
it is the sole evi-
wholly impracticable
or
surd
legislative
dence of the ultimate
intent.” [Cits.]
Jove,
430) (1981).
Hollowell v.
In
statute,
unambiguous language
the clear and
of the
which allows mod-
finding
ification
of a meretricious
betweеn the ali-
mony recipient
opposite sex,”
“a
the
trial
court was
If,
not authorized to construe the
of the
statute otherwise.
fact,
legislature
intended
statutе to allow modification on the
alimony
finding
recipient’s
cohabitation with a
of either
Sims,
493) (1980),
but see
Sims
lins, Hunstein, JJ., Judge and Dewey Smith concur. Justice, concurring.
Sears-Collins, Alimony need, is ex-spouse’s based on an if reality and decreases, alimony need probably should be reduced or еven termi- Logically, nated. it should no ex-spouse make difference whether the remarried, with a is living partner. sex or gay perfect In a world it ought to be the reаlity financial that counts. yet perfect
But a relationships world. While the couples married clearly are by couples defined gay lesbian and today Ameriсa cannot legally marry, deep matter how their love and how firm their commitment. couples unlike those opposite sex together married, who live they but are not are forever denied the legal rights numerous that come marriage. with These a) rights joint b) include the right returns; to: file income tax a create c) trust; d) marital deductions; estate claim estate tax marital e) family claim partnership income; tax damages recover based on in partner; f) jury to a benefits; g) reсeive hospitals, jails survivor’s enter places h) and other family”; neighbor restricted “immediate live i) “family” insurance, “family health den only”; zoned obtain hoods benefits; employment j) insurance, leave and other tal bereavement quit job if to move with unemployment they benefits their collect new location because he or she has obtained a partner their to a new k) partner deporta residency for a noncitizen avoid job; get status tion; 1) partner is automatically in thе event a make medical decisions m) automatically partner’s a incapacitated; inherit injured or Many other property the event he or she dies without will. immediately consequences “coupling” appar not so legal gay are ent, separa only misunderstandings, stress surface at times of but tion death. not en- foregoing, clear that the law does In view of the them permanent gay “coupling” arrangements providing courage governmental, or the acceрtance same same either the many and other economic legal service benefits or tax or social couples. benefits accorded mаrried through expand judicial not be
It would fair couples penalty lesbian gay so as to saddle interpretation couples who together who live accorded unwed heterosexual marriage without accord- taking advantage the benefits choice together ing couples who live the benefits of relatiоn- happen never the law. To do so would ship for them can however, it would not practice, fair. In truth and in appear to be at all. fair 8, Tanenbaum, Fink, Kuckleburg, Frankel, Hardwick, & Martha J. Barrow, Winburn, Barrow, Winburn, Gene Mac John J. Lewis & III, appellee. Albert M. Pearson *4 THE
S92A1492. CARVER v. STATE. Justice. ap- brings this appellant of malice murder. He was convicted peal his motion for new trial.1 from the denial of Clifford, Gay Couples Curry Legal 1:2 and D. A Guide for Lesbian and H. appellant on was indicted The crime occurred on December 10, 1991, appellant jury guilty was sentenced to him December and the A found trial, January imprisonment day. Appellant’s filed was for new that same motion