2 Cow. 543 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1824
The first question which presents itself-is, whether the lessee obgoods .and chattels fon a term, has an interestwhich is the; subject of -.a sale on execution.
It .is. well settled in the. .English courts, that the, lessee’s Interest in goods maybe sold,. (Gordon v. Harper, 7 T. R. 11, Ward v. Macauley, 4 id. 489, Manning's case, 8 Co. 191,) and the purchaser,is entitled to, the beneficial use-of them during the term.
The-next question is, whether,the Sheriff by a sale absolute; in,its terms, on an execution against the lessee, cap, di vest the lessor of his. interest ?
It is contended on the; part ¡of the. defendant in .error, that the.purchaser at the Sheriff ’s.sale acquires..a, complete title, and will hold-the. chattels .thus purchased, against the.lessor, or .general owner-; and severalau.thqrities.are,cited, to .support. that position. The cases cited, decide,-that; when goods of-a defendant are- sold, on execution,, and,» afterwards, the. judgment is reversed;.though the." judgment i‘s, that,the. defendant shall-be restored .to.-all he.hath lost, &.c,, yet in such case the purchaser shall hold the property, because .the Sheriff, at the time of the sale, had lawful authority to sell, and,-therefore, the defendant shall not be restored-to-the possession of the goods themselves, but shall receive the, value of them.
In a note to Matthew Manning's case, (8 Co. 191,) there is a case (Amner v. Loddington) in-pain).; Pinpoint held a
So in the case titidér consideration, the interest of the lessor cannot Be destroyed in Virtue of a sate either By Hústéd ■or the Sheriff. The purchaser from one 'dr the other, -possesses thé Merest df Hristed till the ‘expiration of the lease, and then the property reverts to the Original owner. A'contrary doctrine would‘give the Sheriff power, By virtue of an execution against one mail, to take the goods arid chattels of another, arid By a sale, to diVest the dw'rie'r rif Ms title.
That the correct doctriné is laid down in this nóte to Manning’s case, we have the authority of Lord Mansfield, in Cooper v. Chitty and Blackiston, (1 Burr. 34,) where he says, (speaking of Manning’s case among others,) “ None of these cases authorize the Sheriff to sell the goods of a third person; and it is admitted the vendee is not protected here, because at the time of the sale, the Sheriff had no authority to sell.” So in the case under consideration, the Sheriff had no authority to sell any thing but the goods of Husted. The
My opinion, therefore, is, that the Sheriff had authority to sell the interest of Husted ; that it was not in bis power to divest Newman, the lessor, of his property in the goods ; nor has he done so. Newman, therefore, has no right of action against him. When the suit was commenced, Newman could not know that his goods would not be restored to him at the expiration of the lease. He was, therefore, premature in bringing his suit, unless an injury had been done to his reversionary interest. Had the Sheriff or any other person destroyed the goods, in that case, it would be apparent that they could not be restored, and' probably an action would lie at any time after the destruction of .them; but such is not this case. I am of opinion, that the judgment in the Court below should be reversed.
Judgment reversed.