Value World Inc. of Indiana v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce DevelopmentValue World Inc. of Indiana v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development
OPINION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Employer, Value World, Inc. (Value World), appeals the determination of the Unemployment Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (Review Board) concluding that Value World did not have good cause for failing to attend an administrative appeal hearing.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Value World presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the Review Board committed reversible error by determining that Value World did not present sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that it had received notice of the appeal hearing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
C.C. was terminated from his position with Value World. He applied for unem *947 ployment benefits. On November 3, 2009, a claims deputy with the Indiana Department of Workforce Development determined that C.C. had been discharged for just cause. On November 9, 2009, C.C. appealed that determination, and on December 17, 2009, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a telephonic hearing considering C.C.'s appeal. The ALJ noted that Value World had failed to submit a contact phone number for the appeal hearing, and was not contacted. That same day, the ALJ entered a decision, which concluded that because Value World had failed to appear, it had not carried its burden of proof that there was just cause for C.C.'s dismissal from employment. Therefore, the ALJ found, C.C. to be eligible to draw unemployment insurance benefits.
On December 21, 2009, Value World requested an appeal of the ALJ's decision contending that it had never received notice regarding the date or time of the telephonic appeal hearing. On January 6, 2010, a hearing officer for the Review Board conducted a telephonic hearing on Value World's appeal, in which C.C. did not participate. During the hearing, Rick Wenger (Wenger), a District Manager of Value World, testified that Value World had not received "notification of any appeal." (Appellant's App. p. 37). The hearing officer noted that in the "appellate file" there was "Division Exhibit Number 3," which indicated that notice had been mailed to Value World at the correct address on November 25, 2009. (Appellant's App. p. 37). Wenger further testified that as far as he knew, they had not had any problems receiving mail. He described the process in which mail is opened for his review by the Office Manager, Betty Sullivan (Sullivan). Prior to Sullivan's opportunity to testify, Wenger concluded his testimony by stating:
Yeah, we were waiting for this notification to be honest with you. We were just waiting to hear from you and we never heard anything, and that was the ongoing question to [Sullivan,] did we get any notification, nope, not yet. But, you know, I just figured you're all busy.
(Appellant's App. pp. 38-89). Next, Sullivan testified that she would place all of the mail, except for "junk mail" on Wenger's desk. (Appellant's App. p. 39). Wenger closed by stating that "I hope the Board understands that we just didn't receive it. We always respond. I'm sure if you check our ID that we always respond to everything, so, history tracks itself." (Appellant's App. p. 41).
On January 11, 2010, the Board issued its Order affirming the decision of the ALJ. The Board concluded that Value World had presented insufficient evidence to prove that the hearing notice was not timely received. "In the absence of any convincing evidence explaining why the hearing notice might not have been timely received, the Review Board finds that [Value World] timely received the hearing notice." (Appellant's App. p. 2).
Value World now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Value World contends that the Review Board committed reversible error. Specifically, Value World argues that it presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that it had received notice of the appeal hearing before the ALJ.
In appeals of unemployment compensation proceedings, we determine whether the decision of the Review Board is reasonable in light of its findings. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't. of Workforce Dev.,
Where an administrative agency sends notice through the regular course of mail, a presumption arises that such notice is received; however, that presumption is rebuttable. KLR Inc. v. Ind. Unemploy't Ins. Review Bd.,
On appeal, we noted that it is difficult to overcome a presumption that notice of hearing was received due to the difficulty in proving a negative, ".e., that notice was not received ...." Id. (quoting Scott v. Review Bd. of Ind.,
The Review Board contends that KLR should not be treated as controlling precedent because the KLR court relied in part on precedent which has been abandoned by our supreme court upon the adoption of Indiana Evidence Rule 301. The KLR court relied, in part, upon the treatment given presumptions prior to Evid. R. 301:
[A] presumption of law is not evidence nor should it be weighed by the factfin-der as though it had evidentiary value. Rather, a presumption is a rule of law enabling the party in whose favor it operates to take his case to the trier of fact without presenting evidence of the fact presumed. It serves as a challenge for proof and indicates the party from whom such proof must be forthcoming. When the opponent of the presumption has met the burden thus imposed, however, the office of the presumption has been performed; the presumption is of no further effect and drops from the case.
Id. (quoting McClain v. Chem-Lube Corp.,
Two days prior to the issuance of our opinion in KLR, our supreme court handed down Schultz v. Ford Motor Co.,
Now we must answer whether, in light of the continuing effect of the presumption of actual notice, has Value World presented sufficient evidence to prove that notice was not received. Indiana Evidence Rule 301 does not define the quantum of evidence the opponent of the presumption must produce to rebut the presumption. See 1 Weinstein § 301.02[3][a], at 301-12 (2d ed. 2006). However, a presumption of law is not evidence and should not be weighed by the factfinder as though it has evidentiary value. Sumpter v. State,
The difficulty in proving a negative, i.e. the lack of notice, acknowledged in KLR is still applicable to our consideration here. See KLR,
In Sebasty v. Perschke,
While the presumption of receipt is not conclusive, neither is the statement by an interested party of non-receipt. [] It is then for the trier of fact to determine from all the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom what occurred. The court, sitting as trier of fact, concluded after hearing all the evidence in the case that the letter was received by Sebasty. We cannot say that the evidence leads solely to the opposite conclusion.
Id.
To the extent that KLR still has prece-dential value, it is not at odds with the result in Sebasty. In KLR, we concluded that the Review Board had improperly treated the issue of whether KLR failed to overcome the presumption of receipt as a matter of law. KLR,
*950 Here, the Review Board has treated the matter as a question of fact. The Review Board considered the manner in which Value World processed mail, and noted the consistency in which Value World had received mail without incident. The Review Board noted the real possibility that the notice "was received and inadvertently lost or discarded because of an internal mail sorting error." (Appellant's App. p. 2). Considering these facts in light of the continuing effect of the presumption that Value World received the notice, and lack of any evidence to demonstrate a possible reason that the notice may not have successfully made it to Value World, we conclude that the Review Board's decision was supported by sufficient evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Review Board's decision that Value World has not rebutted the presumption of actual notice was supported by sufficient evidence.
Affirmed.