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Valley Outdoor, Inc., a California Corporation v. City of Riverside, a California Municipal Corporation Stephen Whyld, an Individual Does, 1-50
446 F.3d 948
9th Cir.
2006
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 OUTDOOR, INC., VALLEY corporation,

a California

Plaintiff-Appellant, RIVERSIDE, a California OF

CITY corporation; Stephen 1-50,

Whyld, individual; Does, De

fendants-Appellees.

No. 04-55029. Appeals,

United States Court of

Ninth Circuit. 20Q5.

Argued and .Submitted Oct. April

Filed *2 Disner,

Eliot G. Van Etten Suzumoto & LLP, Monica, California, Becket ar- Santa gued plaintiff-appellant. for the cause Menthe, Darrel C. Van Etten Suzumoto & LLP, Monica, California, Becket Santa was on the briefs. Coates, Martin, Greines,

Timothy T. LLP, Angeles, Stein & Richland Los Cali- fornia, argued cause for defendant- Priamos, appellee. Gregory P. Attor- Brown, ney, and James E. Office of the Riverside, California; Attorney, Mi- Bell, Bell, Watase, chael A. Orrock & Riv- Diamond, erside, California; and Alan Martin, LLP, Greines, & Richland Stein California, Angeles, were on the brief. Los FRIEDMAN,* Before: O’SCANNLAIN, PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

O’SCANNLAIN, Judge: Circuit to a billboard this ordinance, a bill- we must decide whether vari- company board has to assert * Friedman, designation. Cir- Daniel M. Senior United States Circuit, Judge sitting by cuit the Federal ban), exceptions

ous claims under the First and Fourteenth content-based prohibition of the U.S. Constitution. which included the Amendments a freeway. within 750 feet of I lawsuit, days filing Ten after J. *3 Outdoor, (“Valley”) Inc. leases Stephens, president Valley, Keith at- n advertising space. Though it outdoor permit tempted to tender ma- throughout owns billboards Southern Cali- at filing terials but was rebuffed fornia, particular concern this case because, told, City window he was still are five which it erected within billboards would not billboards within 750 feet Riverside, City California. 20, 2000, freeway. By February of a Val- ley completed construction of all five bill-

A 25, February Valley again boards. On attempted for the required per- having applied Without to do time, so, City accepted mits. This Valley began pour the foundations 8, applications, city if January for five billboards on 2000. A and officials stated that provision necessary then-effective of the Riverside additional information became Municipal prohibited provide by filing Code billboards with- could a “correc- freeway. in 750 feet of a See RIVER- tion letter.” SIDE, CAL., MUN. CODE Valley’s applications pend- While were (enacted 1983). 19.76.020(B)(2)(a)(vii) § City, ing, impelled by the Outdoor generally (“Original See id. ch. 19.76 Ordi- decision, Group Media enacted a new ordi- nance”). Valley concedes that each of the 2, nance with an date of effective March five at billboards issue is located within (“Amended Ordinance”), restoring Freeway. 100 feet of Before com- prohibition sign- on commercial off-site construction, pleting Valley commenced age. Among things, other the Amended 10, against City January this action re-adopted freeway Ordinance the 750-foot 2000, initially contending, under 42 U.S.C. exclusion zone.1 1983, Original in- Ordinance fringed upon Valley’s First Amendment - Subsequently, Valley received a letter rights. 1, City, 2000, from the dated March which rejected again permit applications. its later, however, days

Three the Califor- (1) rejection The reasons stated for were: nia Appeal, litigation, Court of in unrelated provided imprecise had identifi- issued a invalidating provi- decision certain cation of the color and materials used for Original sions of the Ordinance. See sign uprights; Riverside v. Media Group, Outdoor Inc., provide specific No. E022351 failed to street (Cal.Ct.App.2000). Spe- addresses cifically, sign the court for two struck down Sections locations. Rather than re- 19.76.020(1)(C)(a letter, off-premises quest ban on bill- correction returned boards) (various 19.76.020(2)(A)-(N) payment. and fee yet 1. We again note that the at has rewrit- the time of the events at issue here. We zoning governing ten the opportunity section of its code leave to the district court the Riverside, Cal., signs. provisions See Ordinance 6804 consider whether the new code 14, (June 2005), (which http://www.nver- brought available at were not to our attention sideca.gov/pIanning/applicationforms/O- parties) disposition have relevance to indicated, Alaska, 6804-signs.pdf. Unless otherwise of the merits. SeeJacobus v. (9th Cir.2003). appeared we cite to the code as it 1102-04 29, 2002, the district court de- April issued a On On March parties’ nied both cross-motions for sum- for each billboard. “Stop Notice” Work 21, 2000, order, mary judgment. court Also, by letter dated March comply held as a matter of law that sections signs “[t]he explained “d[id] regulate of the amended ordinance which of the various non-con- one or more with City’s off-premises are unenforceable criteria of the physical tent based at ac- including things against such billboards issue sign ordinance area, prior tion which were erected to March sign height proximity sign ” added). added). result, (emphasis 2000” As a Val- (emphasis freeway ley’s governed only by billboards are those five to Re- subsequently “Notice[s] issued relied, Original in sections of the left explicitly Ordinance Signs,” move *4 standing Group reen- after the Outdoor Media on the substantive restrictions part, City appeal decision. The does not by the Amended Ordinance. acted ruling. B Complaint,

In Amended its Third 2 declaratory Original relief that the seeks trial, solely Valley’s At based on failure violate the First and Amended Ordinances required for and to obtain the by drawing Amendments and Fourteenth construction on denying distinctions and content-based issue, City the five billboards at filed a law; injunctive of the re- equal protection motion in limine to exclude all evidence City enforcing from prevent lief to City “improperly, unlawfully to re- Original and Amended Ordinances unconstitutionally handled or refused to billboards; de- quire Valley to remove its process permit ... claratory relief that the ordinances effect allegedly City by plain- submitted taking; damages Fifth Amendment tiffs,” granted which the district court of under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation ruling In a from the October actions Valley’s rights constitutional bench, explained plaintiff the court that a “under color of law.” taken constitutionality of may challenge in provision

one code where it is “independently en- violation another Valley vio- provision. forceable” Because 10, 2000, July response in On by be- City’s permit provisions lated the subject City’s motion to dismiss for lack of applying without for a ginning construction jurisdiction, the district court dis- matter standing, no the court stat- permit, had posed Valley’s argument Origi- ed, provisions substantive nal violated the First Amend- Ordinance of the billboard ordinances. court held that ment. The district 4, 2003, the district court constitutionality Original of the Ordinance On November issue; unconstitutionality granted judgment motion for was a moot Having granted the mo- already determined in Outdoor a matter law. had been and, case, excluding tion in limine all critical evi- Group, any Media dence, legally the court found “no suffi- repealed had it. The district court con- evidentiary in- cient basis for reasonable temporaneously permanent issued a Outdoor, applying jury plaintiff to find for junction forbidding the 50(a)(2). The court Inc.” FED. R. CIV. P. provisions Original invalidated Valley’s motion for a subsequently denied against Valley. Ordinance zone, freeway, exclusionary trial, Valley timely filed its notice the 750-foot new Amendment; under the First and claims appeal.2 arbitrary and arising allegedly from the unlawful manner in which the refused II Valley’s process permit applications. grant of reviewing the district court’s City, note the com- judgment for the on a standing We consider proceed- which this case plex procedure See, claim-by-claim e.g., basis.3 Donahue judgment as granted ed: (1st Boston, evidentiary of an a matter of law because Cir.2002) (citations omitted). City ar applica- on an ruling which the court based gues standing across the lacks standing doctrine. We unravel this tion of began board because it construction before controversy sequence, consid- the same obtaining required permits. to as- ering whether claims; whether the district court sert granting the mo- its discretion abused limine; finally, whether Orig first claim is that the judgment entitled to as a matter facially inal and Amended Ordinances are *5 of law. invalid because their substantive restric tions, freeway such as the 750-foot exclu

A zone, sion violate various First Amend Valley appeal, principles. Valley On contends that has ment contends that standing proceed standing by to with claims that fall is not affected its failure to categories: under one of two facial chal- obtain construc provisions to tion lenge attempt the substantive of the because to do so would Ordinances, Original e.g., and Amended have been futile. Despite scheduling injunction, Valley sought our of a mediation con- state trial court's to 14, 2004, April publication ference for filed an resume the of commercial adver- tising pending on its billboards our decision. action state abatement in California court. 8, City responded arguing The on March that merely injunc- trial court there issued an The stay our order somehow revived the state trial Valley displaying prohibiting com- preliminary injunction. court’s invalidated advertising. City appealed, mercial The and requested further that we confirm Appeal Court of reversed and California Valley subject prior "that remains to the in- remanded with instructions that the trial junction foreclosing placing it from new com- injunction requiring Valley court enter an to copy signs," mercial on the or that we lift the remove the billboards to their foundations. stay necessary order insofar as to enable that Supreme The California Court denied review. Valley restriction. and the each filed injunction required Because the would have 14, responses respective- dated March 13 and billboards, 4, January removal of the ly. light opinion today, deny of our we as granted stay proceedings of state court requests stay moot all clarification preserve jurisdiction. in order to our See 28 order. 2283; 1651(a), Sandpiper Village §§ U.S.C. Ass’n, Corp., Inc. v. Condo. Louisiana-Pacific Group, 3. Virtual Media Inc. v. San 831, (9th Cir.2005); 428 F.3d 843-44 Bennett Mateo, (N.D.Cal.2002), 2002 WL 485044 aff'd Medtronic, Inc., 801, (9th 805-07 (9th Fed.Appx. 2003 WL 21259923 Cir.2002). Cir.2003), Outdoor, County and Inc. v. 2, 2006, Riverside, (9th Cir.2003), On March moved this court 337 F.3d 1111 of two cases clarifying staying upon for an order our order which the district court re lied, proceedings. Reasoning straightforward applications state court that the are of sever- Appeal ability standing California Court of had reversed the doctrines. above, provisions of the billboard the substantive noted As n ordinances. the sub that the cannot

held Original of the stantive restrictions Valley. The against Amended Ordinances also contends that has Ordinance is irrelevant because

Original category to assert the second restrictions were invalidat its substantive challenges City’s authori claims: its the district by Grcmp; ed Media Outdoor ty to or to late-filed already court has determined its mootness discretion, complete at its enjoined its application. this case City’s allegedly arbitrary well as the con Ordinance, Further, the Amended as a exercising duct that discretion law, apply Valley’s not matter of does Valley argues case.5 “[i]t im signs, prior installed proper to discard the evidence the rec Ordinance’s effective date. Amended’s application” permit ord of selective Thus, missed the parties both have obvious ting requirements, agree. and we point: and most relevant because neither standing, Valley To establish must provisions Original invalidated of the (1) that there is an actual or immi show: entirety of Amend Ordinance nor the injury, particu nent which is concrete and against ed can be enforced Ordinance (2) larized, conjectural; hypothetical not case, Valley in this lacks stand billboards injury fairly traceable ing validity the constitutional actions; likely, that it is Virgi restrictions. See substantive merely speculative, injury will be Ass’n, Inc., Am. nia v. Booksellers redressed decision. See favorable 108 S.Ct. 98 L.Ed.2d U.S. Wildlife, 504 Lujan v. U.S. *6 of Defenders (1988).4 555, 560-61, 112 119 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Thus, (1992); properly held Soc’y, Nat’l Audubon Inc. v. (9th Cir.2002). Davis, challenge Valley standing that lacked to reason, Valley standing stating City the that the would 4. For the same lacks challenge to the Amended Ordinance under proposed the were materials because the California Constitution. freeway. City The located within 750 feet of Valley standing ap- Valley's attempt We also note that even if denied second to submit City's purported application because, because of the according plication materials Ordinance, the Amended the claim became papers imprecisely City's explanation, court held that moot when district gray the shade of used on bill- stated apply. ordinance does not Dream Palace Cf. they at which boards and the street addresses County Maricopa, 384 F.3d this were located. Whereas deficiencies of (9th Cir.2004) (holding possibil- that there is a meager variety typically remedied were ity injury government of immediate if the is letter, City simple re- correction here process amending "in the so that [the law] application materials and instruct- turned challenged pre- restrictions will to Perhaps Valley apply anew. not coinci- ed to businesses”). existing rejection only dentally, City penned this Valley points to circumstantial evidence that day prior to the Amended Ordinance's one matter, suggests, as a factual an illicit motiva- permits,” granting effective date. "Instead of actions. At the time of tion behind concludes, kept "the made sure it Valley's attempt to itself of the Riverside avail pass a the air until it could new the ball in Municipal permit applica- Code’s "late-filed” statute, employ to which it could then sign process, City’s original ordi- Opening Valley.” Appellant's to Nonetheless, a nance had been invalidated. Brief at 16. city rejected Valley's application official provisions, reliance on one of the invalidated reasons, constitutionally suspect ag- prevent to seeks billboards, such, and, applica- party may as maintaining grieved specific first two in that con- regulation not contest the tion of the parties do text”). issue is redressabil- claim. precisely crucial This is elements. The Valley’s commencing construction ity. permits does not applying required for the that first to note important It is “self-help,” as the disqualifying constitute contains a de- ordinance City’s billboard concluded, actually gives court but district by which the will procedure tailed controversy. very case or rise to this filed after the be- process application Thus, that ruling court erred the district construction, ie., a “late-filed” ginning of constitu- standing lacked to assert RIVERSIDE, permit application. See City’s conduct tional claims related to the 19.76.210(E).6 CAL., CODE MUN. process to the late-filed refusing Notwithstanding procedure and Val- applications. therewith, re- ley’s compliance process Valley’s permit applica- fused B tions, and continues to assert standing simply per- because it filed lacks Valley has Having determined that mit after construc- extent, next foregoing essence, then, complete, it claims tion. on the ruling the district court’s consider discretionary authority dispose of a late- excluding motion in limine evidence any given fit in application filed as sees course, noted, the City’s conduct. Of case. unbridled discretion under its asserts municipal code to decide which late-filed City possesses authority

If indeed applicants get to erect billboards filing, late seek abatement the case such, there exists a which do not. As invalidating a court order a substan- then discretionary authority claim that tenable such as the 750-foot free- tive restriction activity expressive nature over way perimeter would not redress Amendment. facially violative of the First injury. reversing But an alleged order Dist., 534 Chicago Thomas v. Park City’s allegedly arbitrary treatment of Val- See 316, 323, 122 S.Ct. 151 L.Ed.2d ley’s rejecting late-filed the U.S. *7 (2002); Young City Valley, v. Simi City’s authority accomplish to do so would 783 of (9th Cir.2000); See, IDK, 807, 216 F.3d 819 Desert e.g., that result. Inc. v. Clark (9th Cir.1988) Adver., 1185, County, F.2d 1196 Inc. v. Moreno 836 Outdoor of (9th 814, government Valley, 103 F.3d 818-19 Cir. (noting that when the “re- 1996).7 claim, the evidence of arbitrary vokes or denies licenses for Given this Yamaguchi Late-filing applicants per complaint, v. United States 6. are not deemed se the see Force, 1475, ineligible Dep’t F.3d 1481 permits inspec- to receive the the Air 109 of billboard; (9th Cir.1997) (holding complaint necessary that tions to construct a only provide need “fair notice” to defendant only they pay that ordinance indicates must asserted); RIVERSIDE, CAL., contemplated of the claim in penalty modest fee. order, pretrial 19.76.210(E)(l)-(3). conference see United States v. § MUN. CODE More- Circle, 882, over, Nat'l Bank 652 F.2d First provided explicitly 45-day the code for a of (9th Cir.1981) (holding that such orders are to grace period sign within could builders liberally and that an issue is be construed necessary applications. file Id. sufficiently preserved "implicit- 19.76.210(F). if it is at least text); preserved ly” by in Val- embraced limine, record, ley's proof Upon offer of on the motion in review of the we are satisfied Lui, 844, argument sufficiently v. 941 F.2d that this was raised in see United States rejection handling Valley’s permit applications improper of is City’s allegedly govern- is indeed rele- relevant because is indicative of Valley’s permit applications Quite simply, goes Equal to whether the mental conduct that the Protection vant. may statutory authority of its to Clause forbid.8 City’s exercise late-filed for ex- grant or to sum, therefore, activity arbitrary. was pressive granting abused its discretion in the mo- tion in limine because its exclusion of the argued has also that predicated upon evidence Was an inaccu- right equal protection to City violated rate doctrine. See arbitrarily, maliciously, dishonestly Village Dep’t Developmental Richard S. v. applications. denying permit See (9th Servs., 1080, 317 F.3d 1085-86- Cir. Olech, 562, v. 528 U.S. Willowbrook 2003). Evidence of the manner in which 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 120 S.Ct. “handled or refused to may that a “class of one” (holding process permit applications” clearly is rele- claim); Lockary an equal protection assert vant to a challenging precisely claim (9th Kayfetz, v. 917 F.2d 1155-56 conduct. Cir.1990). Valley present offered to evi showing City’s motivation dence C malicious, stemming

was Because the district court erred in having permit application during filed a limine, granting the motion in it also in gap legally which the wrongly granted City’s motion for powerless prevent placement Val judgment Viewing as a matter of law. ley’s signs proximity freeway. light evidence most favorable to Macrane, See Esmail 53 F.3d Valley (including the evidence which (7th Cir.1995) (holding that govern excluded), court wrongly district the chal may engage spiteful ment “a effort lenge City’s allegedly unguided ‘get’ wholly for [an individual] reasons arbitrary denial of the late-filed objec any legitimate unrelated to state applications presents a sufficient basis tive”). jury A could find that differen upon juror which a reasonable could find applica tial treatment of late-filed Inc., Valley. El-Hakem v. See BJY may wholly have irrational and been (9th Cir.2005). 1068, 1072 arbitrary, equal protection violation of Penman, principles. Armendariz v. See Ill (9th Cir.1996) (en 1326-27 banc); aim, Lockary, 917 F.2d at 1155-56. As It clear that perhaps such, one, agree keep the evidence of the is to visual clutter “to a noble minimum, City’s allegedly “improper specifically regard or unlawful” with (9th 1991) (holding see In re pre protection argument complaint, *8 Cir. that an issue is in its appeal Cir.2003) (re (9th served for if “the substance of the Lopez, 345 F.3d objection thoroughly explored has been dur quiring adequate notice of the claim such that ing hearing”); preserved the and further on pleadings compelled would have trial Indep. Washington Towers appeal, cf. issue); preserved court to rule on the Washington, (9th Cir.2003) argument in the corrected final conference reasoned, (requiring parties provide Circle, order, see First Nat’l Bank legal arguments appeal). theory on The as to 886; preserved argument at a for chal unconstitutionality City's conduct in limine lenge during the offer motion fully consistently and articulated. proof; preserved argument, and for appeal. argument 8. Like the First Amendment dis above, Valley equal cussed articulated RIVERSIDE, to,- location of the billboards

adjacent freeways.” appropriate CAL., through compro- 19.76.005. Never- could have been settled MUN. CODE theless, ultimate whatever success mise. excluded merits, on the evidence situation, however, The is not sim- limine clearly to the determina- relevant City’s includes ple. permit procedure The Finding otherwise based

tion of this case. may grant it a provisions by detailed which standing, application on its of the rules begun permit after construction has been abused its discretion completed. Valley attempted or even been motion in limine and in ren- granting the procedure, to invoke that but of law. judgement as a matter dering rejected Valley’s attempt to obtain belated part AFFIRMED in and REVERSED suggest that at permit grounds a least for trial pro- and REMANDED part not already had decided opinion. ceedings consistent with this retroactively Valley’s authorize billboards. City’s returning The stated reasons for FRIEDMAN, Judge, concurring Circuit permit application, second after construc- in the result: completed, tion of the billboards had been I Although disagree with some of the improperly were that had identified opinion, agree in its I court’s statements up- the color and material used for the judgment for that the district court’s rights given precise and had not street stand, City as a matter of law cannot and for two of the billboards. As addresses that the case should be remanded to that suggests in opinion, the court its these proceedings. court for trial appropriate deficiencies seem more to be through dealt a letter than with correction City requires beginning that before by rejecting application. billboard, the construction of a one must permit. Valley a apply for and receive did I concur in the result in this case be- Instead, began not do construction so. explication cause I think that the further and laid concrete foundations for five bill- development and of the facts that boards. After this work had been done opinion apparently contemplates court’s a permit, sought permit without then a final disposi- would facilitate the ultimate City, rejected request. from the its complex complicated of this hope case. I that evidence would be de- involved, If all that were the case (1) veloped addressing these items: Val- would clear simple. outcome be Be- reasons, ley’s any, if seeking for not complied cause had not with the permit before construction of City’s permit requirement and no offered (other the billboards than its claim that otherwise, explanation, reasonable futile); application such would have been so, to do City justifiably its failure City’s apparently reasons for rejected Valley’s belated efforts to cure its considering the merits of ret- noncompliance by retroactively attempt request permit deny- roactive for a or for permit. Although Valley to obtain' a now (other ing that request than the that applying permit states for a apparent position that it has absolute dis- starting construction would have fu- been grant cretion to without tile, way knowing there is no what the reason). stating if would have done *9 If Valley good been filed. had made a

faith endeavor obtain a construction, perhaps the differ-

ences between and the over

Case Details

Case Name: Valley Outdoor, Inc., a California Corporation v. City of Riverside, a California Municipal Corporation Stephen Whyld, an Individual Does, 1-50
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 27, 2006
Citation: 446 F.3d 948
Docket Number: 04-55029
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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