*1 claim for an industrial accident Likewise, at Gibbens’ direction. she filed a claim with her insurer, rather employer, than with the at Gibbens’ direction. Because own its agent gave Moran the information, wrong Desert Inn cannot now benefit from Moran’s failure to strictly Therefore, with the comply statute. Desert Inn’s contention is without merit.

We affirm the denial of appellant’s petition for judicial review. MOTOR, INC., VALLEY Corporation; a Nevada Appel DONALD REED, W. REED and SHIRLEY J. lants, v. E. ALMBERG; W. ALMBERG and VIVIAN FRED FISHER; FISHER and MAURINE LARRY GILBRETSON; GILBRETSON and MARY THELMA HECKETHORN; GEORGE HERNANDEZ and DONNA HERNANDEZ; ANN HANSEN: A. Z. JOY and JOY; VIVIAN REYNOLDS; RICHARD R. DEAN STUBBS; STUBBS and JEAN and H. C. VOGLER Respondents. VOGLER, and CHERYL Olsen, Gary D. Fairman and David R. Ely, for Appellants. Barrows, Elko, Wilson and for Respondents.

OPINION Court, C. J.:

theBy Young, of the district court judgment perma- an from a appeal This is “‘trailers,’ also known placing from nently enjoining appellants homes,’ a ‘manufactured homes’” in also known as as ‘mobile Mountain known as City Ely commonly in the of subdivision View”). Subdivision, (hereafter Units 1 and 2 “Mountain View a restrictive cove- upon court was based judgment The district which that: provides to Mountain View applicable nant of a STRUCTURES. No structure 7. TEMPORARY basement, tent, shack, character, trailer, garage, temporary barn, lot as a any shall be used on outbuilding or other at time. any residence ruled that the term “trailer” alternatively court

The district homes, and manufactured appellants’ included unambiguously the drafters of ambiguous, “trailer” was that the term assuming manufac- appellants’ the term to include the covenant intended tured homes. trial, on the issue of presented evidence was conflicting

At the term of covenant seven intended whether the drafters found homes. The district court to include appellants’ “trailer” The district such a construction. the drafters did intend that substantial evidence and by is finding supported court’s of fact 52(a); v. NRCP Sutherland appeal. not be disturbed on will 192, 1287, (1989). Gross, P.2d 1289-90 105 Nev. 772 be that restrictive covenants will has held previously This court can still of the covenants original purpose as the long enforced as will inure to the substantial benefit and accomplished be 142, Co., Nev. Constr. 99 v. Buttrum Tompkins restricted area. at trial 145-46, (1983). produced The evidence P.2d enforcement of covenant contention that supports respondents’ of Mountain View and exclusive character will maintain the seven Therefore, the restric- homes. respondents’ the resale of facilitate enforced. should be tive covenant second basis for the district court’s we hold that

Because sound, granting the is we need not permanent injunction address appellants’ remaining contentions. we affirm Accordingly, the of the district court. judgment Mowbray, JJ., Steffen and concur.

Springer, J., Rose, J., concurs, with whom dissenting: The manufactured homes are constructed permanently on the sites and cannot building possibly come within the definition of “temporary structures” section 7. prohibited These homes are not temporary they structures nor are “trailers.” Although wheels are attached to a chassis for transportation purposes, the removed, wheels are and the ultimately homes permanently affixed to the real estate in the form of a “manufactured home.” These are homes not trailers in simply any sense of the word.1 I dissent. TORRES, Appellant,

CLARA v. FARMERS INSURANCE Respond- EXCHANGE, CORPORATION, A FOREIGN *3 ent. Massi,

Albert D. Las for Vegas, Appellant. Beckley, Singleton, DeLanoy, Jemison & List and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Las for Vegas, Respondent. vehicle, separate propelled by 1“Trailer. A not power, driven or its own independent- power.” (5th

but drawn Dictionary some Black’s Law ed. 1979).