32 Pa. Super. 111 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1906
Opinion by
The single question presented by this record arises from the following averment in the affidavit of defense, viz: “ The lamps for which suit is brought were furnished by the plaintiff upon twelve different orders from the defendant which were accepted in writing by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has failed to attach to his statement of claim copies of said orders and acceptances.” The action was founded on a book account. The statement, filed and supported by affidavit, contains a true and correct copy of the plaintiff’s book of original entry, showing the transaction in full detail, and sets forth the usual averments that the goods therein charged for were sold and delivered to the defendant at its instance and request, that the prices charged were usual and reasonable and that defendant had agreed to pay the same. None of these averments were denied in the affidavit of defense. At the trial the plaintiff, under the rules of court and general practice, offered in evidence the sworn copy of its book account, the correctness of which had not been denied, proved by one of its officers that no part of the balance therein shown to be due had been paid and rested. The copy of the account offered in evidence supported the cause of action declared on. The objection made to it, even if otherwise meritorious, was not then available because it rested on an allegation of fact which must have been first established by way of defense before it could be properly considered by the court. The learned court was, therefore, right in admitting the offer and the plaintiff had then made out a complete prima facie case: Carpenter v. Cement Co., 211 Pa. 551; Knowlan v. Clopp, 29 Pa. Superior Ct. 424.
The defendant then offered in evidence the several written orders on which the goods were shipped and asked for binding instructions in its favor on the ground that its contract was special and in writing, and that plaintiff having failed to declare on the special contract and attach copies of the orders to the statement, could not recover. The court refused to so instruct, held that the evidence showed but the ordinary commercial transaction of a sale of merchandise and that plaintiff could and ought to recover.
It is true the orders in this case were in writing specifying the number, kind and price of the various articles and the destinations to which they were tó be consigned, but all this in no wise leads to the conclusion that there was, in the legal sense, presented anything but the usual and ordinary sale of merchandise. The orders themselves, written on blanks prepared for that purpose, seem to indicate that the parties themselves regarded their dealing as within the familiar lines of an everyday commercial transaction.
In none of the cases cited can we find authority for the conclusion that because a sale of goods is founded on an order in writing signed by the purchaser and accepted by the seller, the
In Hall & Co. v. Woolen Co., 187 Pa. 18, a written contract signed by both parties, it was held that the contract was so palpably ambiguous that it could not support a verdict without the aid of explanatory evidence. The court below, in refusing to permit the plaintiff to prove, by its books of account, deliveries according to its construction of the contract, uses this language which was adopted by the Supreme Court: “ The contract of sale is an express contract for the sale of an article not in existence at the time of the sale, but to be manufactured and made in the future. No property therein passed to the vendee until made or manufactured and either actually delivered to the defendants or at least set aside to them and accepted by them, and, therefore, except upon proof of such acceptance it could not be the subject of book entry.” This statement of the rule of law which must control points out, with such clearness as to prohibit further discussion, why the sale we are now considering should not be regarded as a special contract the performance of which the plaintiff must prove by the general rules of evidence, but should be classified with those ordinary commercial transactions that become the proper subjects of book accounts, in the trial of which the long-established rules of
Judgment affirmed.