Case Information
*1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION
CARRIE VALK, a/n/f, G.W.B.V., a §
minor child, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:24-cv-2582-L-BN §
ROYSE CITY INDEPENDENT §
SCHOOL DISTRICT, §
§
Defendant. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Carrie Valk, as next friend of her minor child, filed a complaint seeking money damages, alleging disability discrimination against Defendant Royse City Independent School District (“RCISD”). See Dkt. No. 1.
In response to RCISD’s motion to dismiss the original complaint, see Dkt. Nos. 1, 6, & 7, Valk filed a timely amended complaint as a matter of course (again, just for money damages), alleging claims just under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. , and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. , see Dkt. No. 8; F ED . R. C IV . P. 15(a)(1)(B).
RCISD moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. Nos. 9 & 10.
United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay then referred this lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). See Dkt. No. 11.
Valk responded to motion. See Dkt. No. 16. And RCISD replied. See Dkt. No.
17.
For the reasons and to the extent set out below, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant the motion and dismiss this case.
Legal Standards
Considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig.
,
Even so, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
,
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
,
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
*3
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.”
Id.
(cleaned up; quoting
Twombly
,
And, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed
factual allegations, it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and
conclusions, and, so, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true,
it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Iqbal
,
Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice.
See id.
;
Armstrong v. Ashley
,
And, so, “to survive a motion to dismiss” under
Twombly
and
Iqbal
, plaintiffs
must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive
plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend
entitle them to relief.
Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss.
,
Analysis
Valk brings this suit on behalf of her minor son, identified as G.W.B.V., who, at the relevant time, was a student receiving “special education services for an Intellectual Disability and a Speech Impairment in a self-contained special education classroom” at an elementary school in RCISD. Dkt. No. 8 at 1.
Valk alleges that RCISD discriminated against G.W.B.V. based on his disability “by failing to protect him from physical harm and failing to care for his personal needs” because (1), “[o]n at least one occasion,” “another student in G.W.B.V.’s classroom assaulted him during school hours in a self-contained special education classroom” “in the presence of [RCISD]’s employees” who “were aware of the assault as it was taking place and did not prevent it because of G.W.B.V.’s significant disabilities” and (2), “[o]n at least one occasion, [RCISD]’s employees in G.W.B.V.’s classroom failed to provide personal care to G.W.B.V. by allowing him to remain in underwear with feces because of G.W.B.V.’s significant disabilities.” Id. at 1 & 3.
Several “distinct, but linked, [federal] statutes” protect students with disabilities. Lartigue v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist. , 100 F.4th 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2024).
The first is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq.
, (“IDEA”), which is not implicated by a suit seeking just money damages, as
“the IDEA’s remedy is compensatory education, not compensatory damages,” while
Title II of the ADA “protects the rights of all individuals with disabilities, banning
*5
discrimination by public entities, including schools.”
Lartigue
, 100 F.4th at 514
(cleaned up);
see also Access Living of Metro. Chi. v. Uber Techs., Inc.
,
And, “[u]nlike the IDEA, the ADA authorizes ‘individuals to seek redress for
violations of their substantive guarantees by bringing suits for injunctive relief or
money damages.’”
Lartigue
, 100 F.4th at 514 (quoting
Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub.
Sch.
,
The language in the ADA generally tracks the language set forth in [Section 504]. And the ADA expressly provides that the remedies, procedures, and rights available under the Rehabilitation Act are also accessible under the ADA. Thus, [courts in this circuit] equate liability standards under [Section 504] and the ADA.”
J.W. v. Paley
,
To establish a prima facie case [of discrimination] under either statute, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that he is a qualified individual ... ; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability.
J.W.
,
In the related context of employment discrimination claims under Title I of the
ADA, when a court applies Rule 12(b)(6)’s standards, the complaint “need not contain
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework
set forth ... in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
,
“But a plaintiff is still required to plead sufficient facts
on all of the ultimate
elements
of [each] claim.”
Norsworthy
, 70 F.4th at 336 (cleaned up; emphasis in
original);
see, e.g.
,
Nelson v. Collins
, 765 F. App’x 75, 75-76 (5th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam) (affirming dismissal of an ADA Title II claim where the plaintiff’s
“allegations [did] not set forth facts supporting a claim that he was discriminated
against in any way because of his disability”);
cf. Brackens v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.
,
No. 3:10-cv-642-D,
Still, “more is required when (as here) a plaintiff seeks compensatory damages
rather than injunctive relief.”
Lamar Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. V. J.T. b/n/f April S.
,
*7
No. 4:20-cv-02353,
In such a case, a plaintiff must ultimately “prove that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against him.”
Id.
(citing
Cadena v. El Paso Cnty.
, 946
F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2020));
see also Delano-Pyle v Victoria Cnty.
,
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has “not
comprehensively defined ‘intentional discrimination,’ but under [its] caselaw, [that
term] includes ‘purposeful[ ]’ discrimination,
Perez v. Doctors Hosp. at Renaissance,
Ltd.
, 624 F. App’x 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2015), as well as actions ‘manifest[ing] some
discriminatory animus.’
Carter
,
The factual content in Valk’s amended complaint does not allow the Court to reasonably infer that RCISD subjected G.W.B.V. to intentional discrimination under the ADA and Section 504.
It only offers, as to the alleged assault, that it occurred in the presence of RCISD employees who were aware of it and “did not prevent it because of G.W.B.V.’s significant disabilities” and, as to the allegation that RCISD failed to care for G.W.B.V.’s personal needs, that the District’s employees allowed “him to remain in underwear with feces because of G.W.B.V.’s significant disabilities.”
Such assertions are conclusory as to the requirement that the alleged ADA or Section 504 discrimination occurred “by reason of” G.W.B.V.’s disability. That is, all that has been alleged is that (1) G.W.B.V. has a disability and that (2), on one occasion, G.W.B.V. was the victim of an assault by a fellow student and that, on a separate occasion, he was allowed to remain in soiled underwear. But the amended complaint then fails to offer factual content from which the Court may infer that these events occurred because of his disability. Cf. Sanchez v. Chevron N. Am. Exploration & Prod. Co. , No. 20-30783, 2021 WL 5513509, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2021) (per curiam) (“A complaint need not allege each prong of the prima facie test for disparate treatment … ; to support a disparate treatment … , though, it must plausibly set out facts that the defendant took the adverse employment action against a plaintiff *9 because of [a] protected status. [Accordingly, a] plaintiff must allege facts, direct or circumstantial, that would suggest [the employer’s] actions were based on [the plaintiff’s protected status] or that [the employer] treated similarly situated employees [not of the plaintiff’s protected status] more favorably.” (cleaned up; emphasis in original)).
And the amended allegations are particularly conclusory as to requirement that, here, they also must allow for a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination based on G.W.B.V.’s disability, because the amended allegations fail to eliminate negligence or inadvertence, as opposed to intentional discrimination, as reasons underlying the alleged claims of discrimination.
In sum, the Court should grant the motion to dismiss.
And, because, after Valk amended the allegations in response to a motion to
dismiss, the amended allegations remain deficient, Valk has stated her best case and
demonstrated that further leave to amend would be futile, so the Court should
dismiss this case with prejudice.
Cf. Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex.
,
That said, the opportunity file objections to these findings, conclusions, and
recommendation (as further explained below) allows Valk another opportunity to
show that this case should not be dismissed with prejudice and that the Court should
instead grant leave to amend.
See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n
,
But the Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice absent timely
objections that show a basis to amend to allege a plausible claim – that is, one
supported by “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal
,
Recommendation
The Court should grant Defendant Royse City Independent School District’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint [Dkt. No. 9] and dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice unless Plaintiff files timely objections that show a basis to amend to allege a plausible claim.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy.
See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. C IV . P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
*11
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error.
See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n
,
DATED: July 9, 2025
_________________________________________ DAVID L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE