Valentine v. ThomasValentine v. Thomas
This is an appeal from a judgment maintaining the exception of prescription filed by defendant, Dr. John A. Thomas.
The following facts were stipulated to by the parties and filed with the trial court:
1. Plaintiff was admitted to Doctor‘s Memorial Hospital on November 24, 1977, suffering from a traumatic acromioclavicular separation.
2. On November 25, 1977, Dr. John Thomas surgically repaired the acromioclavicular joint and in the process of that treatment used two Kerchner (sic) wires.
3. David Valentine was seen post-operatively on several occasions by Dr. John Thomas, and on January 4, 1978, two portions of wire were removed from the shoulder of the plaintiff.
4. Plaintiff was last medically treated by Dr. John Thomas on January 20, 1978.
5. On March 9, 1981, the plaintiff was examined by Dr. Allen Farries, and an x-ray showed a small fragment of the Kershner (sic) wire or pin remaining in his shoulder on that date.
6. David Valentine was next seen on March 23, 1981, by Dr. Farries, and surgery was scheduled to remove the portion of the pin.
7. On March 30, 1981, a portion of the pin was surgically removed.
8. The date of discovery of the portion of the pin remaining in his shoulder was March 9, 1981.
9. A proposed complaint was filed with the Commissioner of Insurance one or two days priоr to February 25, 1982.1
10. Suit was filed in the 19th Judicial District Court on March 22, 1982.
The only issue on appeal is whether
“A. No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, chiropractor, dentist, or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this state, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission or neglect; provided, however, that even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims must be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect.
B. The provisions of this Section shall apply to all persons whether or not infirm or under disability оf any kind and including minors and interdicts.” (emphasis by the court)
Plaintiff did not discover the alleged act of malpractice until after the three year peremptory period provided in
EQUAL PROTECTION
Plaintiff contends that
In this case, we are dealing with a particular group of individuals, viz., victims of malpractice. Victims who discover their injuries within three years of the alleged act, omission or neglect may file suit for damages (if suit is otherwise brought timely);5 victims who discover their injuries three years after the act, omission, or neglect are forever barred from filing suit.
Equal protection requires that if the law violates a “fundamental interest” or is based upon a trait which renders the classification “suspect“, there must be a compelling governmental interest to justify the difference in treatment by law. In cases where there is no fundamental right involved and no suspect classification, the issue is whether the law which discriminates is supported by a rational basis reasonably related to the governmental interеst sought to be advanced by it. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256 (La.1978).
We initially find that the statute does not affect a fundamental right or create a suspect classification.6 Therefore, the question is whether the discriminatory treatment in the statute is supported by a rational basis reasonably related to the governmental interest sought to be advanced.
This statute is one of several passed in response to sharp increases in medical malpractice insurance rates and the resulting threat of reduced health care to the patient and of greatly incrеased medical costs to the public. Limitations on the time within which an injured patient may bring a malpractice action will serve to restrict the number of suits brought. The interest sought to be advanced is the alleviation of the insurance crisis by reducing medical malpractice claims, thereby reducing medical malpractice insurance rates, resulting in health care being more accessible to patients at reasonable costs. We find that the classification is rationally related to the state objective sought to be achieved.
Plaintiff particularly relies on the Mills case, supra. That case involved the constitutionality of a Texas statute which provided that a paternity suit to identify the natural father of an illegitimate child for purposes of obtaining support must be brought before the child is one year old, or the suit is barred. The Supreme Court found thаt the statute did not provide a time period sufficiently long in duration to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in illegitimate children to assert claims on behalf of the children and that the time limitation placed on that opportunity was not substantiаlly related to the state‘s interest in avoiding litigation of
The standard used in the Mills case to test the constitutionality of the statute involved was whether the statute was substantially related to the state‘s interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. This is the proper standard to be used to determine whеther a statute relating to illegitimates violates guarantees of equal protection, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978), and is higher than the standard for analysis used in cases such as the instant case, viz., that the law which discriminates must be supported by a rational basis reasonably related to the governmental interest sought to be advanced. The Court in Mills could conceive of no essential evidence that invariably would be lost in one year; nor could it find that the passage of a year would appreciably increase the likelihood of fraudulent claims. Thus, the substantial relationship was lacking.
In the instant case, under the standard enunciated above, we have found that
Louisiana courts have long recognized thаt it is particularly within the scope of the legislature to establish time periods affecting the imposition of liability for past acts. Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, supra. The court in Burmaster found that
Similarly, in Ancor v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 260 La. 372, 256 So.2d 122 (La.1971), the court upheld a two yeаr peremptory period for a claim for workmen‘s compensation benefits in
Accordingly, we find that
DUE PROCESS
A statute violаtes notions of substantive due process when it does not bear a real and substantial relationship to an appropriate governmental objective. Everett v. Goldman, supra. The test is whether the regulation is reasonable in relation to the goal to be attained and is adoptеd in the interest of the community as a whole. We find that the statute does not violate substantive due process for basically the same reasons we find that it does not violate guarantees of equal protection.
Conceivably, in a small number of cases injuries for mediсal malpractice may not manifest themselves for many years after the malpractice occurs. To allow an indefinite time for claims to be brought is to allow for an increase in the number of claims brought with the resultant increase in insurance rates and increase in medical costs to the public. A time limit on liability must be established at some point. We are of the opinion that three years is a reasonable length of time for acts of malpractice to be discovered and suits to be instituted therefor.
The objective of thе legislature was obviously to decrease health care costs to the public and thereby make health care more readily available. This is a legitimate goal for a state lawmaking body to attempt to attain. We therefore find that
Also, it is peculiarly in the realm of the legislature to regulate causes of action, including replacement and even abolition of causes of action, that оne person may have against another for personal injuries. Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, supra.
ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Plaintiff‘s last argument is that the statute infringes upon his right of access to the courts. The right of access to the courts protects fundamental interests to a greater extent than those interests not considered to be of fundamental constitutional importance. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 631, 34 L.Ed.2d 626 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); Everett v. Goldman, supra. When a claimant is not asserting a right subject to special constitutional protection, access may be limited or regulated if there is a rational basis for the limitation and regulation. See Everett v. Goldman, supra and cases cited therein.
We have аlready held that the right urged by plaintiff is not a fundamental right. We have also found that there is a rational basis for the statute. Therefore, the statute does not unconstitutionally deny plaintiff access to the courts.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed аt appellant‘s costs.
AFFIRMED.