OPINION
This is an appeal from an entry of judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Defendant/Appellee, Acme Markets, Inc. and against Plaintiff/Appellant, George Valentine. After careful consideration of Appellant’s challenges, we remand for an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s second clаim only.
On September 18, 1990, Appellant, George Valentine, filed a complaint against Appellee, Acme Markets, Inc. (Acme), in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, seeking damages for personal injuries he sustained in a fall at one of Appellee’s supermarkets in Northeast Philadelрhia. A jury trial commenced on March 13,1995.
According to Appellant, he was at Appellee’s supermarket on March 2, 1990 to complain about an incorrect price he was charged for an item he had purchased the day before. As he followed a customer service representative around the right *260 side of a checkout counter, Appellant allegedly banged his leg on a pull-out shelf at the end of the counter and fell. 1 These shelves, used for bagging groceries, are approximately 14 inches lower than the checkout counter and offset four inches from the side which Appellant approached. Appellant’s expert witness testified that the pull-out shelf on the end of the counter was defectively designed since a customer could not see it until he rounded the corner of the counter. (N.T. 3/13/95 at 1.69, 1.85). Appellant sustained injuries from the fall, including a broken hip.
Acсording to Appellee’s witness, who was walking behind Appellant at the time of the fall, Appellant did not hit the pullout shelf; he simply did a “double step.” (N.T. 3/15/95 at 3.10). Appellee’s expert testified that a person maintaining a proper lookout should have been able to see and avoid banging into the shelf. (N.T. 3/15/95 аt 3.45-3.46).
On March 17,1995, the jury returned a verdict for Appellee, Acme. Appellant filed a timely Motion for Post-Trial Relief, which was denied on September 15, 1995. On October 20, 1995, the trial judge entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in threе significant ways which justify a new trial: (1) the court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of two prior and one subsequent fall by Appellant; (2) the court abused its discretion by granting Appellee’s Motion in Limine, precluding evidence of a fall at another Acme store, without permitting argument on the motion; and (3) the court misled and confused the jury by using jury instructions and a verdict sheet which did not correctly state the issues involved in the case. Because we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief on either his first or third claim, we will consider those claims first.
*261
Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence at trial are within thе trial judge’s sound discretion, and we will not reverse his decision absent an abuse of that discretion.
Engle v. West Penn Power Co.,
Appellant first contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it admittеd evidence of Appellant’s two prior and one subsequent falls. Though we agree that the evidence was improperly admitted, we do not agree that this error justifies a new trial.
[43 It is well established that it cannot be proven that a person committed an act by showing that that person committed a similar act in the past.
Levant v. Wasserman,
In the instant case, the trial judge concluded that the evidence of Appellant’s two prior falls was relevant to “ascertain [Appellant’s] prior medical history as well as other possible causes for the accident in question. Just because [Appellant] alleged that his fall was caused by the check-out counter *262 does not prevent [Appellee] from asserting that his fall was caused by another reason, including his medical condition.” (Trial Ct. Op. at 3). However, there is no evidence that Appellant’s two prior falls were related to any medical condition he might have had. There was no testimony regarding the cause of his 1987 fall, and his 1989 fall was attributed to his “legs [falling] out from under him”. (Deposition of Dr. David K. Saland, M.D., 1/4/95 at 35). There is also no testimony that Appellant suffered injuries in his two рrior falls that are similar to the injuries he suffered in this fall. In fact, there is no evidence that he suffered any injuries in his 1989 fall, and evidence only of facial lacerations suffered in his 1987 fall. The only purpose of this evidence, therefore, was to allow the jury to infer that because Appellant had fallen fоr no specific reason in the past, he probably just fell on his own this time too. This conclusion, however, is impermissible. Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Appellant’s two prior falls.
The trial court also admitted evidence of Appellant’s subsequent fall in a supermarket to impeach Appellant’s testimony that he was unable to shop in a supermarket after the accident in question. Though a witness’s credibility is always important in a trial, a witness may not be impeached on collateral matters.
Papa,
Although we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Appellant’s prior and subsequent falls, we find that this error was not harmful to Appellant. The evidence permitted the jury to infer that because Appellant had fallen on three other occasions, he fell in the instant case due to his own negligence. This would be highly prejudicial if the jury had concluded that, although Appellee defectivеly designed the counter, Appellant was eontributorily negligent. However, the jury never reached the threshold determination that Appellee was negligent. On the Jury Verdict Sheet, the jury concluded that “the Acme checkout counter was [not] defective as it existed on the date of the accident and that the defect of the checkout counter was [not] likely to cause injury.” Without an initial breach of duty by Appellee, Appellant cannot recover. Therefore, the erroneous admission of evidence concerning Appellant’s other falls did not prejudice Appellant.
Aрpellant also contends that the trial court misled and confused the jury by using jury instructions and a verdict sheet which did not correctly state the issues involved in the case. We find no merit in this argument.
A trial judge has great discretion in instructing a jury, as long as the instructions fully convey the applicable rules of law in the case.
Bailey v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co.,
Appellant faults the jury instructions and verdict sheet because they “did not adequately or sufficiently inform the jury that the defective design of the entire counter was at issue.” (Appellant’s Brief at 34). Appellant points to his proposed verdict sheet for the correct language: “Do you find that the Acme checkout counter was defectively designed as it existed on the date of the accident and that the design of the checkout counter without the chrome rack and plastic bags was likely to cause injuries to customers?” (Plaintiffs proposed Vеrdict Sheet at 1).
Initially, we note that Appellant’s complaint did not allege a design defect; it alleged only that a “dangerous and defective condition” existed at Appellee’s supermarket. (Complaint at 2-3). Moreover, in his proposed jury instructions, Appellant did not refer to the “defective design” of thе checkout counter; instead he referred, on two occasions, to the “dangerous condition” at Appellee’s supermarket. (Plaintiff’s Points for Charge, # 6, # 9). The trial judge admitted these two points for charge almost verbatim. (N.T. 3/17/95 at 5.18-19).
Appellant’s argument is an exercise in semantics. He contends that he did not “claim[ ] there was anything physically wrong or broken with the pull-out shelf’ or “that the pullout shelf was in a defective condition.” (Appellant’s Brief at 36, 38). However, in doing so, he mischaracterizes the jury instructions. The instructions referred to the shelf as a defective condition, not in a defective condition. Therefore, we find that the trial judge’s rеference to the pull-out shelf as a defective condition did not mislead or confuse the jury regarding Appellant’s theory that “the entire checkout counter was defectively designed because it incorporated a pull-out shelf that was not visible to customers without the chrome bagging raсk.” (Appellant’s Brief at 34). By claiming that *265 the shelf did not belong on the end of the checkout counter, Appellant, in essence, is arguing that the shelf is a defective condition. 2 . As the trial court stated in its Opinion:
It is clear from a review of the entire record in this case the words shelf and counter were used by all parties to describe the same alleged defеctive condition. No prejudice was suffered by [Appellant] by the use of the word shelf in the charge to the jury. In addition, the applicable law on the issue of the defectiveness [sic] was more than adequately covered in the charge given. Considering the charge as a whole in light of the evidence presented by both parties, the charge was a fair statement of the law and was not prejudicial to [Appellant].
(Trial Ct. Op. at 5). After reviewing the record, we agree that the jury understood Appellant’s claims and the relationship between the checkout counter and pull-out shelf. 3
Finally, Aрpellant claims that the trial court erred by not permitting him to argue a pre-trial Motion in Limine precluding evidence of a similar fall at another of Appellee’s stores. We agree.
Rule 211 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that “[a]ny party or his attorney shall have the right to arguе any motion.” This clear and unambiguous language required the trial judge to allow Appellant to argue on the Motion when Appellant made a timely request to do so. See Tessier v.
Pietrangelo,
Appellant argues that this error entitles him to a new trial. However, the sоurces he cites, 1 Goodrich-Amram 2d § 211:2 and
Auman v. Juchniewitz,
In the instant case, the precluded evidence was the testimony of a witness who was allegedly injured on thе pull-out shelf at another of Appellee’s supermarkets almost six months prior to Appellant’s fall. Evidence of prior accidents involving the same instrumentality is generally relevant to show that a defect or dangerous condition existed or that the defendant had knowledge of the defect.
Vernon v. Stash,
*267 Therefore, after careful consideration of Appellant’s claims, we conclude that, at this time, he is not entitled to a new trial. However, we remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether Apрellant’s evidence of another fall at another of Appellee’s supermarkets was sufficiently similar to the accident in question to warrant admission.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Jurisdiction retained.
I would affirm the judgment in favor of appellee.
Notes
. There was a dispute as to which leg Appellant banged on the shelf. During his deposition, taken in May of 1992, Appellant testified that he hit his left leg on the shelf. (N.T. 3/15/95 at 3.73). However, during the jury trial, Appellant testified that he banged his right leg on the shelf. (N.T. 3/13/95 at 1.29).
. This Court has stated, in a strict liability context, that a “defective condition” includes defects in design and manufacture, as well as a failure tо warn.
Toth v. Economy Forms Corp.,
. Moreover, we note that the Verdict Sheet as presented to the jury provided Appellant with a better chance of recovery than his proposed questions. Appellant’s proposed question asked the jury to consider only if the checkout counter was defectively designed, while the actual verdict sheet asked the jury to consider whether the checkout counter was defective.