Valenti v. CommissionerValenti v. Commissioner
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Raum
MEMORANDUM OPINION
RAUM, Judge: The Commissioner determined income tax deficiencies of $ 43,175 and $ 12,404 for petitioners’ 1988 and 1989 taxable years. At issue is whether petitioners were entitled to deduct wagering losses in excess of wagering gains for each of those tax years, pursuant to
Petitioners are husband and wife. At the time they filed their petition, they resided in Arcadia, California.
The parties have stipulated that “In tax years 1988 and 1989, petitioner was engaged in the trade or business of wagering on horse races.” For both years, petitioners included as part of their joint Federal income tax return (Form 1040) an attached Schedule C (entitled “Profit or Loss From Business“), in which they reported petitioner‘s profit or loss from gambling activities, which consisted of wagering on horse races. The Schedule C for 1988 for wagering activities reported gross receipts of $ 151,644 and expenses of $ 305,862, resulting in a $ 154,198 net loss from wagering. The Schedule C for 1989 for wagering activities reported gross receipts of $ 120,640 and expenses of $ 164,940, resulting in a $ 44,300 net loss from wagering activities. Petitioners deducted the foregoing Schedule C net wagering losses in full against their other taxable income on their respective Forms 1040 for 1988 and 1989. In disallowing these deductions, the Commissioner‘s notice of
1. Application of Section 165(d) to Net Wagering Losses Incurred as Part of a Trade or Business
Pursuant to
To resolve the apparent “conflict” between
The losses here are described * * * under both sections [i.e.,
sections 162(a) and165(d) ] of the code, and the question is -- which section applies? * * *section 162(a) deals with a wide variety of businesses while * * *section 165(d) deals specifically with gambling losses. * * *
Thus, it has been held both by this Court and various courts of appeals that wagering losses cannot be deducted, except to the extent of the taxpayer‘s gains from wagering activities, and it has been so held even where such activities were conducted as a trade or business as opposed to a hobby. Boyd v. United States, 762 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1985); Estate of Todisco v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1985), affg. T.C. Memo 1983-247, but remanding for factual recomputation; Nitzberg v. Commissioner, supra; Skeeles v. United States, supra; Offutt v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1214 (1951); Kozma v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1986-177; Ward v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1986-237.
Petitioners attempt to overcome this well-established line of cases on a variety of theories. For example, petitioners argue that
Moreover, the provisions in
Petitioners state their position as follows:
Respondent seeks to extend the restrictions of
section 165(d) to gambling activities undertaken as a trade or business. However, at the time of the enactment ofsection 165(d) and its [statutory] predecessor, gambling had not been recognized as a trade or business. This recognition did not occur until the [U.S. Supreme Court‘s] decision in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger, supra, in 1987. Thus, clearly at the time Congress enactedsection 165(d) and its predecessor, it was looking only toward casual gambling activities as being within the ambit of that code section. 6 [Pet. Opening Brief at p. 4]
Accordingly, petitioners reason, since petitioner‘s gambling activities were not of a merely casual nature but were instead conducted as a trade or business activity, first recognized as such in 1987 in Groetzinger, they were not limited by
Petitioners have also relied on Bathalter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1987-530, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 902, 54 T.C.M. 902, a case which involved the same issue as Groetzinger, but which similarly does not support them. Indeed, a dictum in Balthalter ironically undermines petitioners’ position:
If petitioner had had a loss in his gambling business, rather than the $ 2,725.11 gain the parties stipulated to * * * then
section 165(d) would have served to prevent petitioner from using that loss to offset other income. Since petitioner did not have a loss in his gambling business,section 165(d) does not operate at all in the instant case. [Bathalter v. Commissioner, supra at 905; emphasis added.]
We hold that petitioners’ imaginative attempt to twist the plain meaning of the statutory provisions must fail.
2. Equal Protection Under the Law
Finally, petitioners argue that the Commissioner‘s disallowance of the deduction for petitioner‘s net wagering losses violates their constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Like petitioners’ other arguments, their equal protection claim is without merit. Petitioners’ contention is in essence that, by applying the wagering loss restrictions of
Although there is an
The wide scope of powers of the legislature under the
It is inherent in the exercise of the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions. Neither due process nor equal protection imposes upon a state any rigid rule of equality of taxation. * * * This Court has repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. * * *
Like considerations govern exemptions from the operation of a tax imposed on the members of a class. A legislature is not bound to tax every member of a class or none. It may make distinctions of degree having a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts which would support it. * * * [Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.]
And as to the matter of classification by Congress, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), is particularly significant. There, the Supreme Court responded to a challenge to a Federal tax upon employers, where it was argued, among other grounds, that the statute was invalid because it didn‘t apply to employers of less than eight, to agricultural labor, to domestic service in a private home, as well as to various other classes. In holding the tax valid the Supreme Court stated at 584:
The
Fifth Amendment unlike the Fourteenth has noequal protection clause . * * * But even the states, though subject to such a clause, are not confined to a formula of rigid uniformity in framing measures of taxation. * * * They may tax some kinds of property at one rate, and others at another, and exempt others altogether. * * * They may lay an excise on the operations of a particular kind of business, and exempt some other kind of business closely akin thereto. * * * If this latitude of judgment is lawful for the states, it is lawful, a fortiori, in legislation by the Congress, which is subject to restraints less narrow and confining. * * * [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]
There is certainly ample basis for singling out gambling for treatment different from that available to other trades or business. The history of gambling was discussed at length in Skeeles v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. 362, 365-368, 95 F. Supp. 242, 242-244 (1951), tracing it back millennia, as far back as the Talmud, which, the Court noted, “classes gambling winnings with thievery.” The Court of Claims also recounted moral opposition to gambling by churches generally, and discussed anti-gambling legislation over the years. Further, we take judicial notice of the fact that although gambling has many defenders and sponsors, there is also widespread public opposition to professional gambling, and that there is at least some public perception that organized crime has infiltrated the business world of gambling. Plainly, a classification that differentiates the business of gambling from other business has “a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny * * * [it] must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts which would support it.” Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., supra at 509. The argument that
Decision will be entered for respondent.
Notes
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, tit. I, 47 Stat. 169, 179
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, tit. I, 45 Stat. 791, 799
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, tit. II, 44 Stat. 9, 26
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, tit. II, 43 Stat. 253, 269
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, tit. II, 42 Stat. 227, 239
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, tit. II, 40 Stat. 1057, 1066