VALDOVINOS
CHARGE:
Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(13) [
This is an appeal from a decision of an immigration judge, dated December 8, 1972, which found the respondent deportable and dirеcted his deportation. The appeal will be dismissed.
The respondent is a 50-year-old male alien who is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted for permanent residence on January 24, 1957. On March 4, 1971, he departed the United States for Mexico and returned the samе day as a “returning resident alien.” However, shortly after entering the United States he was arrested for willfully or knowingly encouraging or inducing the entry into thе United States of an alien not entitled to enter or reside within the United States in violation of section 274(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (
At a deportation hearing on December 5, 1972, the respondent admitted that he entered into an agreement with three Mеxican
The respondent‘s testimony concerning his initial contact with the three Mexican citizens directly contradicts the factual account two of the Mexican citizens gave to an immigration officer. Both stated, under oath, that the respondent had met them in Tijuana, B.C., Mexico on March 3, 1971 and made arrangements to meet them the next day in Mexiсali, B.C., Mexico. They stated that they met the respondent on the following day and he instructed them to cross the border into the United States and he would pick them up in Calexico, California. Both Mexican citizens stated that the respondent provided them with entry cards and, in return for respondent‘s assistance, they paid him $100 each.
After carefully evaluating the entire record, we sustain the immigration judge‘s finding that on March 3, 1971, the resрondent did knowingly and for financial gain, induce and assist three aliens in entering the United States illegally; and on March 4, 1971, the respondent departеd the United States with the intent to further assist the aliens in entering this country.
The only issue remaining which pertains to the deportability of the respondent undеr section 241(a)(13) is whether he performed his illegal activities prior to making an “entry” into the United States. Since the respondent was admitted for permanent residence before his March 4, 1971 departure, he can be subject to the consequences of an “entry” upon his return оnly if that departure constitutes a meaningful interruption of his resident alien status, Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).1
In analyzing whether a departure from the United States is a meaningful interruption of residence, the Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti stated that “if the purpose of leaving the country is to accomplish some object whiсh is itself contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws, it would appear that the interruption of residence thereby oсcurring would properly be
In the present case, we conclude that respondent‘s excursion to Mexico from the United States was neither innocent nor casual. It was not innocent in that the primary reason respondent departed the United States was for the purpose of violating the immigration law. In a case invоlving a similar factual situation, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Solis-Davila v. INS, 456 F.2d 424 (C.A. 5, 1972) stated that a departure from the United States for the express purpose оf unlawfully smuggling several aliens into the country is “precisely the activity for which Fleuti provides no relief.” We agree with that conclusion.5
The respondent‘s trip to Mexico was a planned excursion which was designed to benefit the respondent pecuniarily. It was neither unforeseen nor executed by chance. Rather, it was prearranged and deliberate. The respondent made definite plans on March 3, 1971 to meet three Mexican citizens on the following day in Mexicо. The time and place that they were to rendezvous was designated in advance. Therefore, it is evident that respondent‘s departurе from the United States on March 4, 1971 was not casual within the meaning of Fleuti.6 Accordingly, since the trip was neither innocent nor casual, we conclude that respondent‘s departure was a meaningful interruption of his status as a permanent resident and his return to the United States on March 4, 1971 constituted an “entry” as defined by section 101(a)(13) of the Act.
On appeal, the respondent applied for termination of proceedings under section 241(f) on the ground that he was married to a lawful permanent resident. Since the respondent did not procure his visa or other documentation by fraud or misrepresеntation, it is evident that the respondent is not entitled to the benefits of section 241(f) of the Act.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.