OPINION
This is а trespass to try title action brought by the heirs of Benito Garcia, Sr. and wife, Lorenza, to recover possession and title to two tracts of land of approximately 14 acres located in Brooks County. They claim by adverse possession only, relying upon the ten year statute of limitation. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958). Among several defendants were Benito Garcia, Jr. and his wife, Virginia, the Miller brothers, Laurence, Jr., Gardner, and John, and Mrs. Adan Valadez as well as other Garcia heirs. Cross-actions by the Millers and Salinas against Crown Central Petroleum Corporation have been severed. (No. 16699; No. 16700)
Intervenor Frank Salinas pressed his claim for title to a part of the acreage based on his lumber company’s foreclosurе proceedings against the Garcias, Jr. The trial court ruled that Salinas’ claim for debt (deficiency owed after purchase) was barred by the four year statute of limitation. Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5527 (Vernon 1958). In addition, the trial court, after ruling that no fact issues existed as to the Millers, Valadez, and Salinas, instructed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiffs. The instructed verdict forms the foundаtion for twenty-two assertions of error by the Millers, Valadez, and Salinas. We agree that the trial court erred in directing the verdict and reverse the case.
FLOWELLA TOWNSITE
A background study of the subject fourteen acres proves instructive. Evidence shows that around 1910 certain land companies sold lots and acreage in the south Texas area, one of those companies being Burton and Danforth Land Company. Two men, Burton and Danforth, obtained land from the King Ranch, that land once being part of an 18,000 acre pasture known as La Parrita Ranch. They caused the land to be surveyed and platted; calling one of the Burton and Danforth subdivisions Flowella Townsite. The town was laid out in a circle around a flowing well. This was the center of Flowella, surrоunded by streets, parks and lots which comprised four additions: Marlborough Court, Rosemere Court, Van-deventer Court, and Belleview Court. It is Belleview Court which contains the subject *380 land of this appeal, the land being certain numbered lots in section 14.
A witness, Neil Rupp, testified that as a boy he worked with the surveyors who platted the Flowella townsite. He testified he saw the resulting work and that the “blueprint” of the town was burned in a courthouse fire later. The town of Flowella did not prosper, although for a time there was a school in the vicinity. The land reverted to its natural state of brush and grass except for those acres used for farming and grazing. It was poor land, not providing much for families who worked just a few acres. Rupp stated he ownеd about 2,000 acres and knew most of the inhabitants of the area, including the Garcia, Sr. family, some of them having worked for him.
THE GARCIA CLAIM
There was evidence that Garcia, Sr., with his wife, moved onto the north part of the 9.52 acres, tract one, around 1919. They lived in a small house with their ten children. Garcia, Sr. purchased that lot and other lots in the Belleview Court section from Robert Miller, predecessor in title to the Millers, and others. He farmed about five acres, thus feeding his family and selling some produce. He had livestock, but there was conflicting testimony about the fencing and where the cows and mules were kept. After Garcia’s death in 1936, his widow remained in the house. A son, Garcia, Jr. (sued here as a defendant but joining with the plaintiffs in the claim of adversе title) went to war about 1942 and returned after 1945. The widow died in 1976. Another son has recently returned to reside on the 9.52 acreage (tract one). The other heirs live away from the disputed land.
It was Garcia, Jr. who kept livestock on the 9.52 acres even after he moved to Fal-furrias. It is clear that the 4.07 acres (tract four) in the southwest corner of Belleview Court in Flowella was never lived upon by the Garcias. Garcia, Jr. and a brother testified they ran a few head of cattle and used the 4.07 acres to “trap” the animals. Testimony revealed that fences on the outside of the smaller acreage had been placed there by the county many years before. Whether or not there had been recent upkeеp was not clear. It was not disputed that the smaller tract was, for the most part, overrun with brush. Further, although Garcia, Jr. had never lived on that land, he stated, and others agreed, that he had a “party house” on its southern part, fronted by a county road. The claim by adverse possession of the Garcia plaintiffs to the 4.07 acres rests upon Benito, Jr.’s sketchy activitiеs there, and his alone. Their adverse claim to the 9.52 acres rests also upon his continuing activities there after his mother’s death. He and his wife had lived for several years in Falfurrias.
Two events precipitated this trespass to try title action originally filed in August, 1977, by the adverse claimants, the heirs of Garcia, Sr.: (1) In 1970 Garcia, Jr. executed a promissory note, secured by а deed of trust with vendor’s lien on the 4.07 acres, to Frank Salinas; (2) later the adverse claimants leased to Crown Central Petroleum Corporation the 14 acres to be included in a pooled unit for production of gas and gas distillate. Crown obtained production in May, 1974.
Basing their claim for the land upon the ten year statute of limitation, Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958), the Garcia heirs must have instituted their suit within the ten years next after the cause of action accrued. The suit was filed in August, 1977. However, plaintiffs’ second amended original petition laid claim to the two tracts not only through the ten years’ limitation title but also through the three, five, and twenty-five year statutes, and alleged title within themselves by deeds. On the day of trial the trial court permittеd plaintiffs to abandon all pleadings as to title acquired by deed. They then relied solely upon the ten year statute. In addition, plaintiffs abandoned the instruments comprising their abstract of title at the same time.
THE MILLER CLAIM
The Millers sought to introduce their title to the two tracts of land by a will from *381 their predecessor, Robert Miller, which devised many of the Belleview lots in question, and оther lots in Marlborough Court and Vendeventer Court in Flowella to Laurence Miller, the father of the Miller brothers, defendants. They sought to introduce a deed from their father to Laurence, Jr. which granted the surface estate but which reserved the mineral estate in some lots which are the subject of this suit. Further they sought to introduce the deed from Laurence Miller, their father, to the three of them in which he later granted to them the mineral estate in many of those same lots. Thus they claim some lots in fee simple; in others they claim ownership of the mineral estate. These instruments were included in the Millers’ abstract of title, which had been requested by plaintiffs. The trial court, upon objection by plaintiffs, refused to admit these deeds or thе will.
Plaintiffs’ request for an instructed verdict rested upon the argument that there was an insufficient description in the Millers’ deeds and will of the property of this suit; that the property could not be located on the ground; that the townsite of Flowel-la could not be shown to exist for lack of an official plat. Thus, it is, they maintain, as if the land described in the will and deeds, in fact, never existed at all. In the will and deeds the land is described in this manner:
... the following parcels and lots of land [listing specific lot numbers] ... in Belle-view Courts, Flowella Townsite, in the Burton and Danforth Subdivision of the Parrita Ranch, according to a plat thereof recorded in the Map and Plat Records of Brooks County, Texas....
Since there exists no official plat of the Flowella townsite, plaintiffs argue, the reference to the “official plat” means nothing. Therefore, the Millers received nothing by will or conveyance by deed, nor did they retain any mineral rights because the deeds granting the surface lands only were void for lack of a valid description. The trial court excluded all the instruments containing reference to Flowellа and the numbered lots, ruling they could not be located on the ground and, therefore, were inadmissible.
Plaintiffs attached to their second amended original petition field notes describing by metes and bounds and objects on the ground the two tracts in dispute. The surveyor and maker of these field notes, Alfredo Barrera, testified on cross-examination that he could loсate the lots in the Belleview Court of the Flowella town-site on the ground. Other witnesses, both plaintiffs’ and defendants’, located the property of this suit on the maps of both parties. However, all of the defendants’ deeds, maps, and instruments identifying the land by lot numbers were excluded by the court. But we note that plaintiffs introduced into evidence a deed from Mrs. H.M. King to J.L. Burton, datеd March 6, 1916, which would constitute a common source of title for the Garcias and the Millers (the same instrument was listed also in the Millers’ excluded abstract of title). This deed contains the identical description of the disputed lots in the Flowella townsite as in the defendants’ deeds. (See description, infra).
THE PLAINTIFFS’ BURDEN
Trespass to try title is a statutory proceeding. Tex.R.Civ.P. 783
et seq.
(Vernon 1967). The property sought to be recovered must be described with particularity. Tex.R.Civ.P. 783(b),
supra. Leach v. Cassity’s Estate,
Where one sues by formal action in trespass to try title for the recovery оf real estate in the possession of another, he must recover, if at all, upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness or lack of title of his adversary.
Adams v. Rowles,
A plaintiff who claims title by adverse possession must establish by pleading and proof that the land he claims is identifiable and can be located in order to show his interest in it. See
Jones
v.
Mid-State Homes, Inc.,
THE GARCIA, JR. LAND
A 1962 deed from Laurence Miller, Jr. to Garcia, Jr. (not in evidence) which conveyed several lots in the Belleview Court expressly reserved the mineral estate. Also Garcia, himself, testified he purchased that land from Miller. In 1970, Garcia, Jr. and his wife executed a promissory note, deed of trust and vendor’s lien on the 4.07 acre tract to sеcure repairs on their homestead in Falfurrias. Frank Salinas, owner of the lumber company making those repairs, after foreclosure and sheriff’s sale, now asserts his right to tract four as a purchaser at the sale. As an intervenor Salinas stands in the position of a plaintiff in the trespass to try title suit, and his proof must necessarily differ from the other defendants herе. We find that the evidence, including Garcia, Jr.’s admission of payments along with his acknowledgment of the debt after the four year limitation period for collection, raises an affirmative defensive issue for Salinas. We do not rule on the merits of that matter in this appeal; rather, we suggest that the pleadings of all the parties involved merit their attention in the event of a future trial. It is well settled that a party holding title through proper foreclosure proceedings and sheriff’s sale may sue in trespass to try title. The fact issues raised by the Salinas’ claim and the validity of that claim can properly be determined at another trial.
The defendants and Salinas sought to introduce in evidence plaintiffs’ abandoned pleadings and abstract of title. Plaintiffs’ chain of title would show that Garcia, Sr. purchased by deed from Robert Miller, predecessor of the Millers, and others, certain lots in the two tracts and that Garcia, Jr. also brought lots in Belleview Court from the Millers.
ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST
Admissions by a party which have been abandoned may be used in evidence as an admission against interest, but they are not conclusive against the pleader.
Long v. Knox, 155
Tex. 581,
We conclude that the abandoned pleadings and abstract of title contained two admissions against interest of the Garcia heirs: (1) they recognized as valid the descriptions contained in their deeds to the lots in the town of Flowella, Belleview Court, and (2) the Garcias had obtained deeds to many of these lots which reserved all of the mineral estatе to the Millers. These admissions contradicted plaintiffs’ position at trial. We hold that the trial court erred in excluding plaintiffs’ abandoned pleadings and abstract of title from evidence to be considered by the jury as admissions.
Before it is held that allegations in a trial pleading constitute judicial admissions, it must appear that such allegations are deliberatе, clear and unequivocal.
Carter v. Walton,
... in a part of what is known as Burton and Danforth’s Parrita Ranch, said land having been purchased by the said Burton and Danforth from Mrs. H.M. King, ... subdivided by them into lots, blocks and acreаge tracts, described and numbered upon a certain map or plat of said Parrita Ranch made for Burton and Dan-forth by C.F.H. Blucher and Sons, which map or plat is recorded in the Deed Records of Brooks County, Texas and entitled “Map of Parrita Ranch, Nueces, Hi-dalgo and Starr Counties, platted for Burton and Danforth ...” (emphasis added).
⅜ ⅝ ⅝: ⅝ ⅜ ⅜
18th. The following described town lots in the town of Flоwella, which is located in Section Fourteen (14), in Marlborough Court, Rosemere Court, Bellevue (sic) Court, and Vandeventer County (sic), respectively, ... (c) One (1), Ten (10) to Eighteen (18) both inclusive Twenty (20) Twenty two (22) Twenty four (24) to Thirty-two (32) both inclusive Thirty-four (34), Thirty-Six (36) Thirty eight (38) to Forty five (45) both inclusive Forty seven (47) to Fifty-five (55) both inclusive, Fifty nine (59) Sixty one (61) to Eighty (80) both inclusive (Eighty-two (82) to Eighty four (84) both inclusive, Ninety (90) Ninety-two (92) One Hundred (100) to One Hundred Twenty-onе (121) both inclusive; One Hundred Twenty-four (124) One Hundred Twenty eight (128) One Hundred Thirty (130) to One Hundred Forty-four (144) both inclusive in Belleview Court.
Many of these lots are the subject of this suit. When a party introduces written evidence on an issue before a court without limiting its purpose he is bound by its recitations, and cannot be heard to aver against it.
Lock v. Morris,
*384 THE INSTRUCTED VERDICT
It is the task of this reviewing court to determine whethеr the record contains any evidence of probative force raising fact issues on material questions presented, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the instructed verdict was rendered and to discard all contrary evidence and inferences.
Henderson v. Travelers’ Insurance Co.,
Because of our disposition of this appeal, we find it unnecessary to address the remaining points of error. Valadez, the Miller brothers, and Salinas rely upon chains of title originating from a common source. At another trial application of the appropriate statutes and laws of evidence will eliminate many of their claimed errors. Twenty-two of the appellants’ allegations of error rested upon the action of the trial court in directing the verdict.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the trespass to try title case involving the Millers and Valadez for a new trial. We, in addition, reverse and remand Salinas’ case in order that his claim of title by foreclosure and sheriff’s sale may be tried, in the same proceedings, along with his claim for a deficiency judgment, trustee’s fees, and attorney’s fees against Benito Garcia, Jr. and his wife.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded.