LEONARD E. VAINIO, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of HELEN MARIE VAINIO, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CANDI BROOKSHIRE and THE MONTANA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Respondents and Respondents.
No. 92-332
Supreme Court of Montana
Decided May 13, 1993
258 Mont. 273 | 852 P.2d 596 | 50 St. Rep. 529
Submitted on Briefs January 14, 1993.
For Respondents: Leonard J. Haxby, Butte (Brookshire); David Rusoff, Human Rights Commission, Helena.
JUSTICE HUNT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Appellant Leonard Vainio, acting as personal representative of Helen Marie Vainio‘s estate, appeals the decision of the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, affirming the order of the Montana Human Rights Commission (HRC) finding that Helen Vainio‘s employee/supervisor committed sexual harassment against respondent Candi Brookshire, and the HRC‘s damage award of $20,000 to Brookshire for emotional distress.
We affirm.
Appellant presented 11 issues for this Court‘s consideration. We rephrase and consolidate the issues as follows:
- Does
§ 49-2-506(1)(b), MCA , of the Montana Human Rights Act violate the Montana Constitution because the Act‘s procedural provisions do not allow for a jury trial? - Does
§ 49-2-506(1)(b), MCA , constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial and legislative powers? - Did the District Court err in finding that Helen Vainio was properly notified of the complaint?
- Did the District Court err in finding Helen Vainio liable on the basis of respondeat superior?
Did the District Court err in upholding the HRC‘s ruling striking part of appellant‘s witnesses and exhibits? - Did the District Court err in holding that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not provide a remedy for sexual harassment?
- Did the District Court err in affirming the HRC‘s award of $20,000 in emotional distress damages?
- Did the District Court err in affirming the HRC‘s decision not to allow the HRC‘s investigative report into evidence?
On September 2, 1988, Brookshire filed a complaint with the HRC against Harvey Phillips and the Silver Slipper, a lounge and casino located in Butte. On September 19, 1988, Brookshire amended her complaint, alleging that she was sexually harassed by Phillips during her employment at the Silver Slipper prior to being fired on June 2, 1988. During the time of the sexual harassment, the Silver Slipper Bar was owned by Helen Vainio, who is now deceased. The Silver Slipper has since been sold to Silver Slipper, Inc.
On September 5, 1989, the matter was certified for hearing and Phillips, Brookshire, and Silver Slipper, Inc., were all properly served with notice. On April 12, 1990, a contested case hearing was held in Butte. In her findings of fact, and conclusions of law, and order, the hearing examiner concluded that Phillips unlawfully sexually harassed Brookshire and that Helena Vainio, as owner of the Silver Slipper, was liable for the harassment. Silver Slipper, Inc., was found not liable. Appellant filed exceptions with the HRC to the hearing examiner‘s findings. On March 29, 1991, the HRC issued its order affirming the hearing examiner‘s order. Appellant appealed the HRC‘s opinion and order to the District Court. A hearing was held on December 30, 1991, and on May 12, 1992, the District Court issued its order affirming the HRC. Appellant appeals from the District Court order.
Appellant did not file a transcript of the contested case hearing for this Court to review, but did provide this Court with a transcript of the District Court‘s hearing.
I.
Does
Appellant contends
We have held that the Montana Human Rights Act does not unconstitutionally deny persons the right to a trial by jury. Romero, 777 P.2d at 296. Prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which creates a statutory right to a trial by jury under Title VII where there is a claim for compensatory or punitive damages, there was no right to trial by jury under Title VII. Slack v. Havens (9th Cir. 1975), 522 F.2d 1091, 1094. In Romero, we stated that legislative bodies may assign adjudication of statutory rights to administrative agencies in which a jury trial would be incompatible without violating the Seventh Amendment. Romero, 777 P.2d at 296. Through its enforcement of the Human Rights Act, the HRC protects the State‘s interest in eliminating discrimination. Appellant failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the administrative contested case procedures under the Human Rights Act unconstitutionally denied Helen Vainio‘s right to a jury trial. We hold that Helen Vainio was not unconstitutionally denied a jury trial.
II.
Does
Appellant asserts that
Did the District Court err in finding that Helen Vainio was a party to the action?
Appellant asserts that Brookshire failed to name Helen Vainio in her complaint to the HRC as required by
A complaint may be filed by or on behalf of any person claiming to be aggrieved by any discriminatory practice prohibited by this chapter. The complaint must be in the form of a written, verified complaint stating the name and address of the person ... alleged to have engaged in the discriminatory practice and the particulars of the alleged discriminatory practice.
...
The complaint listed Phillips and the Silver Slipper as respondents and stated the proper address and telephone number of the Silver Slipper. The complaint alleged unlawful discriminatory practices occurring throughout Brookshire‘s employment at the Silver Slipper. There is no requirement that a complaint filed under this statute name the individual owner of a business.
Appellant also contends that Helen Vainio was not promptly served with Brookshire‘s harassment complaint. Section
IV.
Did the District Court err in finding Helen Vainio liable on the basis of respondeat superior?
Section
V.
Did the District Court err in upholding the HRC‘s ruling striking part of appellant‘s witnesses and exhibits?
Administrative Rule 24.9.317(4), permits the hearing examiner or HRC to limit the prosecution or defense of a contested case if a party fails to comply or engage in discovery. This Court has held that the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery is regarded with favor. Huffine v. Boylan (1989), 239 Mont. 515, 517, 782 P.2d 77, 78. An appropriate sanction is the limitation of proof to matters disclosed through discovery. Vehrs v. Piquette (1984), 210 Mont. 386, 393, 684 P.2d 476, 480. Any last minute tender of relevant documents will not cure the discovery problem. Dassori v. Roy Stanley Chevrolet Co. (1986), 224 Mont. 178, 728 P.2d 430. We will not overturn a trier of fact decision as to the determination of an appropriate sanction absent an abuse of discretion. Dassori, 728 P.2d at 432.
According to the minute entry of the hearing examiner, during a prehearing conference on March 21 and 22, 1990, the attorneys in this case were ordered to exchange their list of witnesses, contentions, and copies of exhibits, and revise a final prehearing order. Previous to this prehearing conference, appellant‘s counsel failed to participate in the preparation of the prehearing memorandum or file any separate addendum for the March 21, 1990, conference. The conference was continued to the following day to give appellant‘s counsel the opportunity to prepare his additions and discuss them with Brookshire‘s counsel. Brookshire‘s counsel did not receive appellant‘s wit-
VI.
Did the District Court err in holding that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not provide a remedy for sexual harassment?
Appellant argues that Brookshire‘s exclusive remedy for damages for emotional pain and suffering is under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and not under the Montana Human Rights Act. The Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for physical injuries on the job. Section
VII.
Did the District Court err in affirming the HRC‘s award of $20,000 in emotional distress damages?
Section
[R]equire any reasonable measure to correct the discriminatory practice and to rectify any harm, pecuniary or otherwise, to the person discriminated against .... [Emphasis added.]
Section
Appellant contends that the HRC‘s award of $20,000 for emotional distress was clearly erroneous. We do not agree. The District Court found that Phillips‘s conduct toward Brookshire included, among other things, brushing his body against her buttocks, putting his hand up her skirt, grabbing her breasts, and requesting Brookshire
VIII.
Did the District Court err in affirming the HRC‘s decision not to allow the HRC‘s investigative report into evidence?
Finally, appellant contends that there was evidence contained in the HRC‘s investigative file which would establish that Helen Vainio was not made a party to the action. As we stated previously, Helen Vainio was properly noticed and is a party to this action.
We affirm the decision of the District Court.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, JUSTICES GRAY, HARRISON, McDONOUGH and WEBER concur.
JUSTICE TRIEWEILER concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority‘s conclusions under Issues II through VIII of the majority opinion. However, because I conclude that compensatory damages for emotional distress are recoverable under
We have previously held that “[t]he right to trial by jury in this state is the same as that guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment [to the United States Constitution].” (Citation omitted.) Linder v. Smith (1981), 193 Mont. 20, 23, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189. While I do not agree that the right to trial by jury under Montana‘s Constitution should be limited by federal interpretations of the United States Constitution, I conclude that even on the basis of those decisions, appellant had a right to a jury trial of the damage issue in this case.
The majority relies on our prior decision in Romero v. J & J Tire (1989), 238 Mont. 146, 777 P.2d 292. However, in that case compensatory damages were not at issue, and the court correctly looked to federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to determine whether a jury trial was guaranteed under Montana‘s Human Rights Act. In that case, we held that:
This Court has stated that in discrimination cases under the Human Rights Act, it is helpful to look to federal law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at
42 U.S.C. [Section]s 2000e, et seq. Snell v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. (1982), 198 Mont. 56, 62, 643 P.2d 841, 844. ...“When Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment‘s injunction that jury trial is to be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common law.‘”
However, our holding in Romero must be reexamined for several reasons. First of all, compensatory or legal damages for pain and suffering were not an issue in Romero. Second, the federal case law relied upon in Romero was decided before the 1991 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Prior to those amendments, the only relief provided for under the enforcement provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act was equitable relief. See Curtis v. Loether (1974), 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed. 2d 260. The District Court could enjoin the conduct complained of, order reinstatement of the effected employee, with or without back pay, or grant any other equitable relief that the court deemed appropriate. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197, 94 S.Ct. at 1009. However, in 1991,
...
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 ,2000e-16 ] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) ,2000e-16 ], from the respondent.
When the Act was amended to allow for compensatory or punitive damages, it was also amended to provide that:
If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section -
(1) any party may demand a trial by jury ....
But when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no functional justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law.
We think it is clear that a damages action under § 812 is an action to enforce “legal rights” within the meaning of our Seventh Amendment decisions. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, (1970) 396 U.S. 531, 533, 542, 90 S.Ct. 733, 735, 740, 24 L.Ed.2d 729; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood (1962), 369 U.S. 469, 476-477, 82 S.Ct. 894, 899, 8 L.Ed.2d 44. A damages action under the statute sounds basically in tort - the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant‘s wrongful breach. As the Court of Appeals noted, this cause of action is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law.
More important, the relief sought here - actual and punitive damages - is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195, 94 S.Ct at 1009.
The Court then went on to distinguish between actions brought pursuant to Title VIII, which provided for actual and punitive dam-
As in Curtis, the rights enforced by Brookshire in this case were ultimately enforceable in a court of law. See
This issue has been previously decided by the State of Alaska in Loomis Electronics Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer (Ala. 1976), 549 P.2d 1341. In that case, Schaefer sued Loomis for discriminatory hiring practices. Loomis moved for a jury trial, which was denied. The Alaska Supreme Court observed that the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury in Alaska was similar to that found in the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Furthermore, it found that the statutory prohibition against discriminatory hiring practices in Alaska was similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It acknowledged that federal cases at that time had concluded that the relief provided for under Title VII of the Federal Act was equitable in nature and that there was, therefore, no right under the United States Constitution to trial by jury of those claims. However, it distinguished the Alaska statute in the following manner, which is relevant to this case:
Title VII of the Federal Act contemplates only equitable relief. No such limitation is found in the language of AS 22.10.020(c). After authorizing the superior court to enjoin illegal activities, through the application of its traditional powers of equity, the legislature of Alaska went on to authorize the court to order any other relief, including the payment of money. The language of the statute is clearly intended to provide a litigant complete relief in an appropriate case. ... We believe the broad language of AS 22.10.020(c) indicates a legislative intent to authorize an award of compensatory and punitive damages for violations of AS 18.80, in addition to the equitable remedies such as enjoining illegal employment activities and ordering back pay as a form of restitution.
After discussing the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Curtis, the Alaska Supreme Court went on to conclude that:
Similarly, in the instant case, where part of the relief sought is compensatory and punitive damages, we believe that Article I, § 16, of the Constitution of Alaska, guarantees the parties the right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the order of the superior court, striking
petitioner‘s demand for a trial by jury, should not have been entered.
Likewise, the damages authorized by
The right to trial by jury is the most fundamental protection in our state and in our country against tyranny by judges, legislators, bureaucrats, and other governmental officials. I conclude that, under the facts in this case, appellant was denied that constitutional right and that Brookshire‘s claim, while otherwise fully supported by the record, should be remanded for a jury trial on the issue of compensatory damages.