Plaintiff instituted this action on a policy of insurance issued to him by defendant, and recovered judgment in the trial court for loss of his property as well as for a penalty for vexatious refusal to pay the loss.
In Crossman v. Baldwin, 49 Conn. 490, there was a contract to purchase “all the furniture” in a certain hotel and it was held to include a piano.
In Sumner v. Blakelee, 59 N. H. 242, pianos were held to be included in household furniture mentioned in a chattel mortgage.
In Alsup v. Jordan, 69 Tex. 300, it was held that an exemption from execution of “household and kitchen furniture” would include a piano.
In Lee v. Gorham, 165 Mass. 130, the statute providing that conditional sales of “furniture or other household effects” should be in writing, was held to apply to the sale of a piano.
An English case involved a bequest of “all and singular the household furniture and other household effects of and belonging to the testator in the dwelling house and premises at the time of his decease.” There was found in the house and premises “four fowling pieces, a pair of pistols, lathes and apparatus for turning, models of a cutter and mortar, several paintings in frames, one hundred volumes of books, an organ, a par
It follows from the foregoing authorities, all bearing on the very question here presented, that when defendant’s agent was notified of other insurance on plaintiff’s furniture, it was notice of other insurance on his piano.
But defendant insists that it should at least be relieved of the penalty assessed under the provisions of the statute for vexatious delay. [R. S. 1899, sec. 8012.] We held in Blackwell v. Insurance Co., 80 Mo. App. 75, that to justify a penalty for delay in payment of insurance, the refusal must have been without reasonable excuse and that the mere fact of it being found at the trial that the insurance money was due the assured, would not alone determine that the delay was vexatious and without cause. But where there is competent evidence tending to prove vexatious delay, a question is made for the jury and we must accept the verdict. In this case no excuse appears as did in .the Blackwell case and we think the court properly submitted the question to the jury. It has been so determined by the Supreme Court (Keller v. Insurance Co., 198 Mo. 440), and by this court in Kellogg v. Insurance Co., 133 Mo. App. 391.
On' the whole record we find no reason' for disturbing the judgment and it is accordingly affirmed.