Ussery v. HaynesUssery v. Haynes
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Bohling
The alleged false imprisonment complained of was the confinement of plaintiff for something over two months in the State Hospital for the Insane at Fulton, pursuant to an adjudication of insanity by the County Court of Saline County made on May 15, 1935. Plaintiff contends that the proceedings leading to her confinement were illegal and void. Her petition, inter alia, alleged, in effect, a wrongful conspiracy among the defendants and that they acted maliciously, but during the trial, when defendants were offering evidence tending to show that there had been no conspiracy, she announced, through her counsel, that “she is not relying upon a conspiracy between the defendants;” and she also, by leave of court, struck out of her petition the allegations of malice. And we add here, there was no evidence tending to show malice or intentional wrongful conduct on the part of any of the defendants, nor was there any evidence of conspiracy. It is apparent from the record before us that plaintiff and the trial court proceeded below on the theory that the proceedings in the county court and the adjudication of insanity were invalid and that therefore the defendants, or any of them who had anything to do with plaintiffs confinement, were liable as for false imprisonment regardless of whether or not they acted in good faith and without malice and regardless of whether or not plaintiff was in fact insane and a fit subject for treatment in said hospital. Defendants offered evidence to prove that such were the facts but the court refused to admit it. Plaintiff‘s main instruction, submitting the case, was framed on that theory and the same theory was reflected in the court‘s refusal of instructions requested by defendants.
It will be necessary for us to determine, first, whether there was a valid adjudication of insanity against plaintiff, and second, if there was not, whether, because thereof, the defendants are liable in this action. The determination of those questions requires a statement of the facts relative to said adjudication.
“Petition to County Court to Send Patient to State Hospital.
“To the Honorable County Court of Saline County, Missouri:
“The Undersigned, a citizen residing in the county and state aforesaid, hereby states that Maudie Ussery of Malta Bend, Mo., is insane, that her insanity is of less than 1 year‘s duration; that she has not estate sufficient to support her at a State Hospital, and is a resident of said county and State aforesaid.
“These facts can be proven by J. S. Ussery and Dr. R. C. Haynes a respectable physician.
“This 14 day of May, 1935.
“(Signed) J. S. Ussery.”
The court thereupon caused to be issued and delivered to defendant R. C. Haynes, to be served upon plaintiff, the following notice:
“In the County Court of Saline County, Missouri
“May aj‘d Term, 1935.
“To Maudie Ussery:
“You are hereby notified that an information in writing, subscribed and sworn to, has been filed in this Court, said Information alleging that you are a person of unsound mind and incapable of managing your affairs; and that an inquiry will be had and the evidence heard touching the condition of your mind, before the County Court of Saline County, Missouri, at its office 9:00 o‘clock in the City of Marshall, Saline County, Missouri, on the 15th day of May, 1935, at which time you are entitled to be present at said hearing, and be represented by counsel.
“Given under my hand and seal of said office this 14 day of May, 1935.
“(Signed) C. W. Piper
“Clerk of County Court.
“(Seal) by A. G. Cameron, D. C.”
At the same time the court requested Dr. Haynes (who was county physician) to examine Mrs. Ussery as to her mental condition. Dr. Haynes proceeded to the Ussery home and, according to his testimony, examined Mrs. Ussery, concluded that she was insane, served the notice by twice reading it to her, and on the same day made the following return thereon:
“Return
“I, the undersigned, Robert C. Haynes, County in the State of Missouri, do hereby certify that I served the above Notice in Person
on the above alleged insane person on this the 14 day of May, 1935, in the County of Saline and State of Missouri, by reading the same to the said—and delivering to—a copy thereof. “(Signed) Robert C. Haynes
“Saline County, Missouri.”
While it might be thought from his return, as made and signed by him, that he delivered a copy of the notice to Mrs. Ussery and neglected to fill in the blank space in the return (probably a printed form) by writing her name therein, the oral evidence indicates that he did not leave a copy. He testified that he read it to her twice and explained to her in detail what it meant, but he did not say he left a copy, nor that he had been furnished a copy. Plaintiff‘s children testified that he read the notice to their mother twice, but none mentioned that he left a copy. That particular point was not being stressed by plaintiff at the trial, which may account for the proof thereon not being entirely clear but we conclude from the record as a whole that Dr. Haynes did not deliver a copy of the notice to Mrs. Ussery.
At the time named in the notice, on May 15, 1935, the county court, being duly in session, all three judges being present and sitting, held a hearing, and entered of record its finding, judgment and order, as follows:
“And now it appears to the court that J. S. Ussery, a citizen of Saline County, Missouri, has filed information in writing that Maudie Ussery of Grand Pass, Missouri, is insane; that her insanity is of less than one year‘s duration; that she has not estate sufficient to support her at State Hospital No. 1 at Fulton, Missouri, and that she is a resident of Saline County, Missouri; and that now the above cause coming on to be heard, and the facts as stated, being proved by two good witnesses, one of whom is a respectable practicing physician, it is considered by the court that the said Maudie Ussery is insane and a proper person to be sent to the State Hospital at Fulton, Missouri, as a county patient.
“It is therefore ordered by the court that the said Maudie Ussery be sent to State Hospital No. 1 at Fulton, Missouri, to undergo treatment thereat as a county patient, and that the clerk of this court make out and transmit to the Superintendent of said Hospital a copy of this order with the request that the said Maudie Ussery be admitted to said Hospital.”
Plaintiff, the alleged insane person, did not appear at the hearing. The county court appointed a reputable attorney to represent her, who attended the hearing on her behalf, but it is not shown that she had anything to do with his appointment or appearance, or knew thereof at the time. Pursuant to said judgment and order of the county court plaintiff was committed to the hospital. Such further facts as may be necessary will be stated in the course of our opinion.
Under
It will be seen that the statute gives the county court jurisdiction to inquire into the sanity of persons alleged to be insane and to adjudicate thereon, where it is sought to send such persons to a state hospital at the expense of the county and it is the only court that has authority to order an insane person sent to a state hospital at the public expense. When, therefore, the statement required by
It is further contended that the service of the notice was invalid and that, therefore, in legal effect plaintiff had no notice. This contention presents a more serious question. In the statutes prescribing the procedure in county courts for inquiring into the sanity of poor persons alleged to be insane and sending them to a state hospital, as such statutes existed in 1935, we find no provision for notice to the alleged insane person. The statute has since been amended in this respect so as to require notice. [Laws 1937, p. 510,
As we have pointed out the statutes we are considering made no provision for notice to the alleged insane person and, of course, there-
But it does not necessarily follow from the above holding that the defendants are liable in damages in this case. The county courts are courts of record and, as pointed out above, to them alone is committed jurisdiction to commit persons to the state hospitals for the insane at the expense of their respective counties. In doing that they have authority and it is necessary to determine whether or not the person in question is insane. In exercising this jurisdiction they act judicially. In 25 Corpus Juris, page 515, section 98, we read:
“As the rule is frequently stated, a judicial officer is not liable for acts done in his judicial capacity where there is not a clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter and person, even though such acts constitute an excessive exercise of jurisdiction or involve a decision that the officer had jurisdiction over the particular case where in fact he had none. By excess of jurisdiction, as distinguished from the entire absence of jurisdiction, is meant that the act, although within the general power of the judge, is not authorized with respect to the particular case, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of his general power in that particular case are wanting; but the distinction is not always clear in itself, nor is it consistently treated. Several well considered opinions have accordingly stated the rule in somewhat different terms to the effect that a judicial officer is not liable when the arrest or detention is in a case belonging to a class over which he has cognizance, and is by complaint or other proceedings put at least colorably under his jurisdiction. The principle involved is that all judicial officers are protected by their official character from liability in tort, because of public conduct clearly within the pale of their authority, although involving demonstrable legal error.”
“If there is not a clear absence of all jurisdiction, and if the complaint, or affidavit or other preliminary proceedings confer on him at least colorably the right to determine whether or not to act in the particular case, a judicial officer is not liable for his erroneous decision, although his decision involves an error of law, or of fact.”
The “carefully considered case” referred to in the above quotation is Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1155, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 164; and see notes to said case in Ann. Cas. 1914C, and 44 L. R. A. (N. S.).
While our county and probate courts are, generally speaking, courts of limited jurisdiction, yet, as said in State v. Fulton, 152 Mo. App. 345, 348, 133 S. W. 95, the case of Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250 (overruling some prior decisions), announced the principle that “while the probate and county courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and their power to act is provided by the statute, yet as to such matters as the statute places exclusively within their jurisdiction they stand on the same footing as courts of general jurisdiction, and the same presumptions are to be indulged in favor of the regularity of their proceedings and the validity of their judgments and orders
In Desloge v. Tucker, supra, 196 Mo. l. c. 601, 94 S. W. 286, it is said that “though probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, yet, moving in the orbit of their constitutional and statutory powers, in the administration of estates, they are not inferior courts, and the same liberal presumptions and intendments are indulged to sustain their proceedings and jurisdiction (attacked collaterally) as are indulged in behalf of other courts of record.” [See, also, to like effect, Brawford v. Wolfe, 103 Mo. 391, 395, 15 S. W. 426.]
In the matter of examining into and determining the question whether plaintiff should be committed to the hospital the county court had jurisdiction of the subject matter. The statute gave it jurisdiction of that class of cases and a written statement, as provided by statute, had been filed invoking its action in the particular case. It had to determine that notice had been served upon her before it could render judgment against her. In doing so it acted judicially. “The first question to be decided by any court in any case is whether or not it has jurisdiction in point of fact.” [Bealmer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 281 Mo. 495, 501, 220 S. W. 954, 956. See, also, Mahon v. Fletcher‘s Estate (Mo. App.), 246 S. W. 372; Hadley v. Bernero, 103 Mo. App. 549, 78 S. W. 64; Dowdy v. Wamble, 110 Mo. 280, 19 S. W. 489.] In State v. Baty, 166 Mo. 561, 66 S. W. 428, it is said, “Every presumption will be indulged in favor of the correctness of the action of a court of general jurisdiction, and that it proceeds by right and not by wrong. (Citing cases.) If the record is silent about a matter necessary to confer jurisdiction, or, more properly, to cause it to attach in the particular instance, the existence of such matter (nothing appearing of record to the contrary) will be presumed.” And to same effect see Hadley v. Bernero, supra, where the record was silent as to finding of a fact necessary to give the circuit court appellate jurisdiction but the court retained and decided the case.
It is not shown that the county court made a record showing that it found notice had been given and it did not so state in its judgment. The statute did not provide that such fact should be stated in the judgment or order required to be entered of record. But since such finding or determination was necessary before the court could proceed to final judgment against plaintiff we think, in the light of the principles enunciated in the cases we have cited above, the presumption must be indulged that it did so determine. In so de-
Neither can Dr. Haynes or Piper be held liable. Dr. Haynes took no part in the actual commitment of plaintiff to the hospital. He was called and testified as a witness but there is no contention that he gave false or biased testimony. He also, at the behest of the county court, made out the certificate required by the statute to be made and transmitted to the superintendent of the hospital. And there his connection with the matter ended.
Piper, as clerk, through his deputy (he did not do it himself), issued the notice to plaintiff, as by statute commanded. It was based on a sufficient statement, theretofore filed. He also, through his deputy, issued the warrant of commitment, again as by statute required. It was based on the court‘s judgment and order, which was fair and sufficient on its face. As to Haynes and Piper, as well as to the county judges, we repeat there was no evidence of conspiracy, malice or intentional wrongful conduct. All appear to have acted throughout honestly and in good faith.
We mention briefly one or two other contentions now urged by plaintiff. She now urges that the “information,” or statement filed by Mr. Ussery was not filed till May 16th, a day after the hearing held by the county court. This contention is based on the fact that the clerk stamped or marked that paper, as well as the notice on which Dr. Haynes made his return, “Filed May 16, 1935.” It appears from Piper‘s testimony that those papers were originally lodged with the court and the filing stamp or mark put on by him later. However that may be the filing stamp is not conclusive of the time of the actual filing, in view of other parts of the county court‘s record and files. The court‘s judgment, entered May 15th, recites that “J. S. Ussery . . . has filed information,” etc. He filed but one, dated May 14th. Notice was issued on May 14th, reciting that information “has been filed.” The return of service of that notice shows service thereof, such as it was, on May 14th. And in addition to all this, plaintiff‘s petition herein alleged that the statement was filed May 14, 1935, and that the notice was issued and Dr. Haynes’ return thereon made on May 14, 1935. This contention is without merit.
Plaintiff also now says the warrant of commitment was void, because directed to “State Hospital No. 1, Fulton, Mo.,” instead of to C. B. Davis, who actually served it, accompanied by some members of plaintiff‘s family. The warrant named Davis and another to assist in executing it. According to the form prescribed by statute,
At the close of plaintiff‘s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence the defendants all requested peremptory instructions directing verdicts for them. The court refused those requested instructions and gave for plaintiff an instruction declaring that she had been illegally confined in the hospital and directing a verdict for her against “all or any of the defendants” found to have been “instrumental in causing her confinement,” or to have contributed thereto, directly or indirectly. It is contended that certain instructions given on behalf of defendants were in conflict with plaintiff‘s said instruction, and perhaps, to some extent, they were. The circuit court no doubt so concluded, as it was on that ground it sustained the motion for new trial. In the view we take of the case it is needless to set out the instructions or consider the question of conflict, because in our opinion the court should have directed a verdict for defendants. But since the jury returned such verdict, the right result is reached by permitting that verdict to stand. The order of the circuit court sustaining the motion for new trial is reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions to the circuit court to set aside said order, reinstate the verdict and enter judgment in accordance therewith. Westhues and Bohling, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by Cooley, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.