Usselton v. PeopleUsselton v. People
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Shope
delivered the opinion of the Court:
Numerous errors are assigned upon this record, questioning the correctness of the rulings of the trial court in overruling the motion to quash the indictment, in the admission of testimony, in giving, refusing and modifying instructions, and in overruling the motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, and it is insisted with great earnestness, under the last assignment of error, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. In the view we take it will be unnecessary to discuss or determine all the questions thus raised.
It will be observed from the foregoing statement that the prosecutor has drawn, and the grand jury presented, an indictment against the plaintiffs in error as accessories before the fact to the murder of Sanders by Terrell. The pleader has followed the precedents, and the indictment contains the averments
By the ancient common law, existing prior to the reign of Henry IV,—the latter part of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries,—those persons only were considered principals who committed the overt act, while those who were present, aiding and abetting, were deemed accessories at the fact, and those who, not being present, had advised or encouraged the perpetration of the crime, were deemed accessories before the fact. During that reign it seems to have been settled as the law that he who was present, aiding and abetting in the perpetration of the crime, was to be considered as a principal, the courts holding that all who were actually or constructively present, but not actively participating in the crime, were principals of the second degree. (1 Russell on Crimes, (Greenl. ed.) 26; 1 Bishop on Crim. Law, 648.) And this continued to be the common law as it was adopted in this State.
An accessory before the fact, at common law, is defined by Sir Mathew Hale to be “one who, being absent at the time of the commission of the offense, doth yet procure, counsel or command another to commit it.” And absence, it is said, is indispensably necessary to constitute one an accessory, for if he be actually or constructively present when the felony is committed, he is an aider and abettor, and not an accessory before the fact, (1 Hale’s P. C. 615 ; 4 Blackstone’s Com. 36, 37; 1 Archbold on Crim. Pl. and Pr. 14;) or, as defined by
It seems that the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals, up to a late date, at least, has been retained in England. By Statute 7, Geo. IV, chap. 64, sec. 9, it is provided that persons who shall counsel, procure or command any other person to commit a felony shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and may be indicted and convicted, either as accessory before the fact to the principal felony, together with the principal felon, or after his conviction, or may be indicted and convicted of a substantive felony, whether the principal felon shall have been convicted or not, etc. (See 11 and 12 Vic. 46, sec. 1.) And such seems to be the rule in some of the States which have adopted, in substance, Statute 7, Geo. IV. In this State, however, the distinction between accessories before
It is observable that the advising or encouraging of another to commit a felony is not created into a substantive felony, of itself, but is made to so connect the offender with the principal felony that he becomes a principal in its commission. There is, in the nature of things, no difference in the degree of moral turpitude between the man whose will has procured the commission of a crime, and the one who willfully carries out his malignant purpose. By the law, persons whose will has
This question came incidentally before the court in Baxter v. The People, 3 Gilm. 368. The indictment in that case was for murder, and the court was asked to instruct the jury, that if the evidence showed that the defendant was guilty as an accessory before the fact, he could not be convicted under that indictment. The court, in construing the act under consideration, held that the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals was thereby abolished. It is said: “This act, then, makes all accessories at or before the fact, principals. The declaration that they shall be ‘deemed and considered,’ is as unequivocal as if the act had said, ‘are hereby declared to be.’ It is true, the act states what an- accessory is, but it then declares, in substance, that he is principal.” And after showing that the definition given in the statute of an accessory, is in harmony with the system pursued by the legislature in the definition of other offenses, it is said that such definition does not detract from the force of the provision that they shall be considered principals. And after noticing that accessories at the fact were, at common law, to be indicted and convicted as principals, it is held that the legislature has gone a step
It appears by this record that none of the defendants were accessories at common law, and if guilty at all, it is because they were present at the killing by Terrell, and aided or abetted him therein; and while the indictment might very properly have alleged that the mortal blow or wound was inflicted by Terrell, or by each and all of the defendants,v including Terrell, it should have concluded as for murder, that being the offense in respect of which they are, by the statute, to be deemed principals. If the indictment in this case had thus concluded,—that is, that these defendants, in the manner and by the means set out in the indictment, the said William J. Sanders did kill and murder, etc.,—it can not be doubted that it would have sufficiently charged the offense. The crime of which the defendants were convicted was murder, and that not being charged in the indictment against them, it was insufficient to support the verdict.
We are of opinion that, the indictment charging no substantive offense punishable by the laws of this State, the court erred in overruling the motion to quash the same, and also erred in not arresting the judgment. The judgment of the circuit court will accordingly be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to arrest the judgment and discharge the defendants (plaintiffs in error) from custody.
Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Magruder :I do not agree with all that is said in this opinion, though concurring in the judgment of reversal. (Dempsey v. People, 47 Ill. 323).