USA v. DavidovicsUSA v. Davidovics
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 3, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Defendant Oren Davidovics challenges one condition of supervised release imposed by the district court following his conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of enticement of a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity, in violation of
1. Defendant first argues that the district court committed procedural error by failing to explain why it substituted “direct view” for “100 feet,” the formulation found in the plea agreement. The district court stated that the release conditions were reasonably related to deterrence and the need to protect the public, and the court discussed the nature of Defendant‘s crimes. The court was not required to be more specific. Generally, a court must explain its choice among “several sentencing options.” United States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2011). But, before the district court, Defendant did not challenge the pre-sentencing report‘s statement that the direct view restriction is “consistent with the parties’ stipulations in the Plea Agreement” or object to the district court‘s imposition of the direct view restriction. Cf. id. (concluding that the Rudd district court erred by failing to explain its choice between the parties’ stipulated direct-
Moreover, as Defendant agrees, the record supports the court‘s decision to restrict where he may reside upon release. See id., at 1260-61 (explaining that courts need not state “the reasons for imposing each condition of supervised release, if it is apparent from the record” (citation and emphasis omitted)). And the direct view restriction clearly supports the goals of sentencing. See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming on plain-error review a direct-view restriction as “reasonably related” to the defendant‘s conviction for possession of child pornography “and to the goals of rehabilitating [the defendant] and protecting the public from his potential sexual interest in children“).
2. Defendant also argues that the provision is facially vague and overbroad “because a location could be miles away from [his] residence but still technically be in direct view.” Given the context and purpose of the restriction, and given the common understanding of the words used, we interpret the provision to mean a direct line of sight that allows Defendant to see minors who are entering, leaving, or using the location described. Accordingly, the provision is neither vague nor overbroad on plain-error review. See United States v. Gibson, 998 F.3d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 2021) (defining vagueness); Daniels, 541 F.3d at 928 (affirming a direct-view restriction as substantively reasonable); United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232, 1236 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In a case such as this, even very broad conditions are reasonable if they are intended to promote the probationer‘s rehabilitation and to protect the public.“). Moreover, one of the requirements for relief on plain-error review is an effect on substantial rights and Defendant has not shown that the opportunity to live within direct view of schools, parks, and the like is a substantial right, or that the restriction will burden his ability to find suitable housing. See Magdaleno, 43 F.4th at 1221 (stating the requirements for plain-error review).
AFFIRMED.