USA v. Cesar Alvarez

Sep 1, 2026
24-13912

PER CURIAM:

Cesar Diaz Alvarez appeals his forty-eight-month, above-guideline sentence, imposed after he pleaded guilty to aggravated reentry under 8 U.S.C. section 1326(a) and (b)(2). On appeal, he argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court: (1) overemphasized his criminal history; (2) inadequately considered mitigating factors; and (3) didn‘t account for unwarranted sentencing disparities. After careful review, we affirm.

I.

Diaz Alvarez, a Venezuelan national, has been living illegally in the United States on-and-off since at least 1995. His time in the United States included eight criminal convictions between 1995 and 2011. In 1999—one year after he was convicted of drug trafficking in Miami—an immigration judge ordered Diaz Alvarez‘s removal, and he was deported. Diaz Alvarez reentered the United States, and, in 2010, he was indicted and charged with illegal reentry after deportation. Diaz Alvarez pleaded guilty to that offense and was sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment. In 2013, he was released and deported again.

In 2024, a Coast Guard cutter spotted a vessel off the coast of the Bahamas traveling toward the United States with its navigation lights turned off. After following the vessel for several hours, when it was about ten nautical miles offshore (and within the territorial waters of the United States), the Coast Guard interdicted the vessel. Coast Guard officers found Diaz Alvarez aboard the vessel along with twenty-five others.

A federal grand jury returned a twenty-eight-count indictment against Diaz Alvarez and two other men on the vessel. The sole offense Diaz Alvarez was charged with was aggravated reentry. Diaz Alvarez pleaded guilty without a plea agreement, and the district court held a sentencing hearing.

Diaz Alvarez‘s presentence investigation report calculated an offense level of fifteen and a guideline range of twenty-four to thirty months’ imprisonment. Neither party objected to the report, and both argued that a bottom-of-the-guideline sentence was in order. Diaz Alvarez also asserted that there were mitigating factors supporting a bottom-of-the-guideline sentence: first, he had immediately accepted responsibility for the crime by pleading guilty; and second, he had suffered brain damage during a political protest in Venezuela.

But as the district court explained, the guideline range did not account for the seriousness of Diaz Alvarez‘s criminal history. The district court also emphasized that Diaz Alvarez had been previously convicted of a similar crime—reentry after deportation—and was undeterred. After considering the presentence investigation report, the parties’ arguments, and the sentencing factors, the district court found that a guideline sentence was not appropriate and sentenced Diaz Alvarez to forty-eight-months’ imprisonment—an eighteen-month upward variance.

II.

The sole issue on appeal is whether Diaz Alvarez‘s sentence was substantively unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence by considering the totality of the circumstances under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The party challenging the sentence has the burden to establish that it was unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). A district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation modified).

The section 3553(a) factors include the history and characteristics of the defendant, the nature and seriousness of the crime, the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, the guideline range, and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Though the district court must consider the sentencing factors in imposing a sentence, it need not discuss each factor. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).

The district court‘s above-guideline sentence was not substantively unreasonable under the section 3553(a) factors. Diaz Alvarez had an extensive criminal history. Over sixteen years, he was convicted of battery, obstruction of justice (three times), possession of cocaine and marijuana with the intent to distribute, possession of a firearm with an altered serial number, aggravated fleeing and eluding, driving with a suspended license, stealing cable, unlawfully applying for a driver‘s license (four counts), and perjury (four counts). This was also not Diaz Alvarez‘s first illegal entry conviction. He was convicted of the same offense in 2011, but his thirty-month-sentence did not deter him from breaking the law again. And his forty-eight-month sentence was well-below the twenty-year maximum for aggravated illegal reentry. See United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.“).

Diaz Alvarez raises three arguments in response. First, he contends that the guideline range already accounted for his criminal history. Because his criminal history already increased his offense level, no additional consideration was necessary. But placing substantial weight on a defendant‘s record is not an abuse of discretion because five of the section 3553(a) factors relate to criminal history. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1263 (11th Cir. 2015). And even when a defendant‘s “previous offenses were included in his criminal history and were therefore part of the calculation of his guideline range,” considering that history “fits squarely into one of the [section] 3553(a) factors, the history and characteristics of the offense,” and is “a proper basis for the court‘s consideration.” Williams, 526 F.3d at 1324 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661).

Still, Diaz Alvarez argues that the district court “focused almost exclusively” on his criminal record when imposing the sentence. “A district court‘s unjustified reliance on a single [section] 3553(a) factor may be a ‘symptom’ of an unreasonable sentence.” Id. at 1322 (citation modified). But Diaz Alvarez is wrong that the court focused only on his criminal history. The district court explained that it considered the parties’ statements, the presentence investigation report, and the other factors in imposing the above-guideline sentence. In addition, the district court specifically explained that it considered the seriousness of the offense and the need for deterrence. While the district court considered more than just Diaz Alvarez‘s criminal history, it did not need to give all the factors equal weight. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. To the extent the district court emphasized Diaz Alvarez‘s criminal history, it had discretion to attach greater weight to that factor over the others. See id.

Second, Diaz Alvarez asserts that the district court failed to consider certain mitigating factors. Diaz Alvarez points to his acceptance of responsibility for the offense by pleading guilty and the fact that he suffered brain damage after being beaten in a political protest in Venezuela. But the district court did consider Diaz Alvarez‘s acceptance of responsibility. It lowered his offense level by three levels because of his early acceptance. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. And the fact that the district court didn‘t specifically mention certain mitigation does not mean that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 873 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Although [the defendant] argues that there were mitigating factors that the judge did not specifically mention at sentencing, these facts . . . do not compel the conclusion that the sentence crafted in accordance with the [section] 3553(a) factors was substantively unreasonable.“).

Third, Diaz Alvarez maintains that his sentence created unwarranted sentencing disparities between him and his two codefendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The guidelines aim to “avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)). But “[a] well-founded claim of disparity . . . assumes that apples are being compared to apples.” Id. at 1101 (quoting United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d 508, 514 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Here, there is no apples-to-apples comparison because Diaz Alvarez was not similarly situated to his two codefendants. He was the only defendant convicted of aggravated reentry—a crime that is punishable by a twenty-year maximum sentence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Although one of the two codefendants was charged with a similar offense, illegal reentry, that offense was only punishable by a two-year maximum sentence. See id. § 1326(a). And because the other codefendant was not even charged with a similar offense, there was no “similar criminal conduct” to compare to Diaz Alvarez‘s conduct. Even if the codefendants had committed similar crimes, comparing sentences would not be appropriate because Diaz Alvarez‘s criminal history was much more extensive. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Diaz Alvarez‘s sentence did not create unwarranted sentencing disparities between Diaz Alvarez and his codefendants.

AFFIRMED.