USA Pаyday Cash Advance Centers, American Cash Advance, Inc., EZ Credit, Inc., Fast Cash ‘Til Payday, Inc., Great American Cash Advance, Inc., Great American Crеdit, Inc., Monday ‘Til Payday, Inc., USA Payday Advance, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center No. 8, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center No. 9, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advancе Center No. 10, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center No. 11, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center No. 12, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center No. 13, Inc., and USA Payday Cash Advance Center No. 14, Inc. brought a declaratory judgment action against John W. Oxendine, individually and in his official capacity as Industrial Loan Cоmmissioner, in Fulton Superior Court to determine that the Industrial Loan Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over its business practices as service provider for and involved with County Bank of Rehobeth Beach, a Delaware state chartered bank, which is subject to regulation under the Federal Dеposit Insurance Act. However, the service provider contract with County Bank was never introduced into evidence so that the merits of the declaratory judgment action could not be reached by the trial court even if there had been an exhaustion of administrative remedies by USA Payday Cash Advance Centers. Oxendine moved for summary judgment for plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust plaintiffs’ administrative remedies before the Industriаl Loan Commissioner; the *633 motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court for Oxendine. Finding no error, we affirm.
In July 2002, the Commissioner authorized an examination of the “payday loan” activities of USA Payday Cash Advance Centers. As a result of the examination, an administrative “show cause” order issuеd, and the plaintiffs were among the parties named in the order. After the hearing on October 11, 2002, the Commissioner found that the plaintiffs were in violаtion of the Industrial Loan Act in making loans without an industrial loan license and in making false and deceptive advertisements of loans; the Commissioner commanded them to cease and desist from making loans “except as permitted under the Georgia Industrial Loan Act.” Plaintiffs were сharging an annual interest rate of 650 percent. On October 22, 2002, the superior court denied plaintiffs’ appeal of the order. On December 2, 2002, plaintiffs dismissed that appeal.
On December 3, 2002, plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action and alleged that they no longer made thе loans but that, as “service providers” for County Bank, the loans were now made by County Bank through them. November 13, 2002, was the effective date for such new business procedure to begin. Plaintiffs claimed an exemption from the Georgia Industrial Loan Act as agents for the out-of-state bank. Hоwever, such provider agreement, that was alleged in the verified pleadings, was never put into evidence.
At the time that the declarаtory judgment action was brought, the Commissioner had not decided whether or not to open an investigation into plaintiffs’ new business arrangement with County Bank, because the Commissioner had no facts about the new arrangement and loans and had taken no position in regard to the new рrocedure.
The Commissioner moved for summary judgment on the grounds that no “actual or justiciable controversy” existed with regard to plaintiffs’ new аrrangement with County Bank and that there had been no ruling sought on plaintiffs’ new arrangement by the Commissioner pursuant to his regulations permitting requests for declaratory rulings. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial action.
Under OCGA § 7-3-1 et seq., the Geоrgia Industrial Loan Act, loans under $3,000 or less come within the ambit of the Act. “A payday loan is a loan of short duration, typically two weeks, at an astronomical annual interest rate.”
Smith v. Steinkamp,
In an attempt to circumvent state usury laws, some payday lenders have contracted with federаlly chartered banks or state chartered banks insured by the FDIC to take advantage of federal banking laws that allow such banks to make loans across state lines without regard to that state’s interest and usury laws in “rent-a-charter” or “rent-a-bank” contracts. See Colorado v. ACE Cash Express, 188 FSupp.2d 1282, 1285-1286 (D. Colo. 2002); Long v. ACE Cash Express, 2001 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 24617 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Goleta Nat. Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 FSupp.2d 711 (E.D. N.C. 2002). Whether this has оccurred in this case and whether it is legitimate or a mere subterfuge intended to circumvent Georgia usury laws cannot be reached in this case, because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies and to put the agreement with County Bank into evidence.
Under the separation of powers under the Georgia Constitution, the judicial branch lacks jurisdiction to deal with an executive branch function until there has been an exhaustion of administrative remedies, i.e., the executive branch has no further remedy. The specific legislative empowеrment for judicial review of executive action is strictly followed.
Perkins v. Dept. of Med. Assistance,
Long-standing Georgia law requires that a party aggrieved by a state agency’s decision must raise all issues before that agency and exhaust available аdministrative remedies before seeking any judicial review of the agency’s decision. As long as there is an effective and available аdministrative remedy, a party is required to pursue that remedy before seeking equitable relief in superior court.
Cerulean Cos. v. Tiller, supra at 66 (1). Therefore,
[a]n action for declaratory judgment will not be entertained where the rights of the parties have already accrued and the plaintiff faces no risk of taking future undirected action. Where a statute provides a party with a means of review by an administrative agency, such procedure is generally an adequate remedy at law so as to preclude the grant of equitable relief.
(Citations omitted.)
Brogdon v. State Bd. of Veterinary Medicine,
Judgment affirmed.