UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Aрpellee, v. BERNARD LINDSEY, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 19-2169
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
June 29, 2021
Before Lynch, Lipez, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Scott W. Murray, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
State probation officers discovered a black case containing a variety of illegal narcotics during a probation compliance check in defendant Bernard Lindsey‘s apartment. The police department obtained and executed a warrant to search his apartment, including the two cellphones found near Lindsey, for evidence of drug dealing. Based on the evidence found, Lindsey was charged and convicted of possession with intent to distribute both cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamines.
In the district court, Lindsey challenged the warrant on the ground that there was no probable cause to search his cellphones. On appeal he adds an argument that any evidence taken from the phones must be suppressed because the warrant did not adequately specify which files on the phones would be searched. We reject these arguments along with Lindsey‘s other arguments on appeal and affirm.
I. Factual Background
In April 2018, Lindsey was living alone in an apartment in Concord, New Hampshire. On April 16, his parole officer, Jonathan Boisselle, went to Lindsey‘s apartmеnt with his partner, Benjamin Densmore, and two canine investigators to perform an unannounced home visit. Boisselle approached the apartment quietly and at the closed door heard movement inside. He knocked on the door and announced his presence several times. Boisselle heard a phone go off from inside the apartment but still no one
Boisselle entered аnd saw another man, Bryson London, sitting on a couch near the entrance. He smelled marijuana and asked Lindsey if he had any illicit substances in the house. Lindsey denied having marijuana or any other substances. Boisselle next saw that London had a marijuana pipe between his legs and that there was a marijuana grinder on the couch. While taking possession of the grinder and pipe, Boisselle noticed a black case partially obscured by London‘s arm and other debris. Boisselle, believing the case might be a firearms case, immediately opened it and discovered bags of what appeared to be methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl, as well as a scale, plastic bags, a metal spoon, tin foil and a plastic knife. The drugs were packaged in Ziploc bags and sandwich bags.
After opening the black case Boisselle and Densmore placed London and Lindsey under arrest. Boisselle patted Lindsey down and found a cellphone as well as approximately $3,400 in cash. Lindsey was employed as a server at the time making about $12 per hour but said that the money came from his tax return and that he had the money on his person because he did not believe in banks. The officers later learned that Lindsey had a bank accоunt. The
Boisselle next called the Concord Police Department (“CPD“) for assistance. Before the Concord police arrived, New Hampshire Department of Corrections Investigator Christopher Ward searched the apartment. On the dresser in the bedroom he found latex gloves, breathing masks, and a container of what appeared to be Inositol powder, an over-the-counter substance which is sometimes used to cut drugs.
Shortly thereafter the CPD obtained a search warrant for Lindsey‘s apartment. Officer Brian Womersley‘s supporting affidavit stated that Lindsey had an “extensive criminal history” including “sales/possession of controlled drugs,” that a witness had observed what appeared to be multiple drug sales out of a black Audi registered to Lindsey just five days earlier, and that four days earlier CPD officers, after responding to a report of possible drug activity, saw the black Audi parked in the area where suspected drug activity had been occurring. The affidavit also stated that Officer Boisselle had received reports from the Plymouth Police Department that Lindsey was selling drugs from his residence.
“Attachment A” to the warrant application stated the search would be for “Illicit Drugs,” “Drug Paraphernalia,” “Items, Documents, and Records relating to Drug Trafficking,” “Items which are Drug Profits or Evidence of Drug Trafficking Proceeds or to be used to obtain Drugs,” and “Any and All Electronic Devices” in order to “obtain[] any and all evidence . . . to corroborate Lindsey‘s criminal activity.” Attachment A also explained that the “Addendum to Attachment A” would speсify how the officers would search any seized electronic devices. However, someone mistakenly attached an Addendum which described procedures for searching
In executing the warrant, the officers found tin foil, a box of Ziploc bags, and a box of sandwich bags in the kitchen. The Ziploc and sandwich bags were of the same two types in which the drugs in the black case were packaged.
The government also searched the cellphones found on Lindsey‘s person and on the table in his living room. On one of these phones the government found “selfie” photos of Lindsey, a text message addressing Lindsey by his middle name, and a number of text messages from the preceding months suggesting that Lindsey had been engaged in drug dealing.2
The police also found a series of text messages between Lindsey and “Brysin” -- a misspelling of London‘s first name -- from the week preceding Lindsey‘s arrest. On April 9, 2018, Lindsey received a text message from another person with the phone number of someone named “Bryson.” Lindsey saved the number under “Brysin.” On April 11, Bryson texted Lindsey “Prices bro.”
II. Procedural History
Lindsey was indicted on one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine and Fentanyl under
On January 2, 2019, Lindsey filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the searches of the two cellphones on the grounds that there was not a sufficient “nexus” between the cellphones and the drug trafficking offense to conclude that there was a “‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found’ within the cellphones.” The government responded that the facts in the warrant provided a “substantial basis” for finding probable cause.
After a two-day jury trial on April 16 and 17, 2019, the jury found Lindsey guilty on both counts. At trial the government introduced, over Lindsey‘s objection, a number of text messages taken from one of the cellphones which indicated that Lindsey had been selling drugs in the months before his arrest. Lindsey objected on the grounds that еvidence of previous drug dealing was impermissible propensity evidence under
I think the cases seem pretty clear to me that in cases such as this where intent is the real focus of the case, that prior similar conduct is particularly relevant, has special relevance, and particular relevance to motive, intent to distribute, knowledge. Secondarily, of course, it provides background, completes
the narrative that the government‘s attempting . . . to prove.
The district court gave a limiting instruction to the jury stating that
text messages suggesting that the defendant previously engaged in conduct similar to that charged in this casе . . . may not be used to prove the defendant‘s character traits in order to argue or show that on a particular occasion the defendant acted in accordance with that character. . . . You may consider that evidence solely for the limited purpose of deciding whether the defendant had the state of mind or intent to distribute necessary to commit the crimes charged in the indictment. (Emphasis added.)
Lindsey also objected, without specifying on what grounds, to the prosecution‘s asking Officer Boisselle what prompted his visit to Lindsey‘s apartment and to the admission of the text message from Lindsey‘s girlfriend which addressed Lindsey by name and was used to prove ownership of the phone.4 The district court did not rule on the first objection and overruled the second objection.
Twelve days after the verdict issued, on April 29, 2019, Lindsey filed a motion for judgment of acquittal under
On November 7, 2019, the district court sentenced Lindsey to 80 months’ imprisonment on both counts, to be served concurrently. This timely appeal followed.
III. Analysis
Lindsey makes several arguments on appeal. We address them in turn.
A. The Motion to Suppress
Lindsey‘s lead argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress any evidence recovered from the cellphones. Lindsey argues both that the warrant application failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the suspected drug dealing and the cellphones and that the wаrrant was overly broad and failed to meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
In reviewing a motion to suppress, we review legal issues de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Mumme, 985 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2021). We review a determination
1. The Nexus Requirement
The Fourth Amendment states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Lindsey argues that there was no probable cause to believe there was evidence of drug dealing on the cellphones because the affidavit offered “no direct evidence” that the phones would contain evidence of any drug dealing and the “indirect” evidence was not strong enough to create a fair inference that there would be evidence of drug dealing on the cellphones. We disagree. There was substantial evidence presented in the warrant application and supporting affidavit that Lindsey had been engaged in drug dealing and that he had delivered drugs in his car to various locations. The affidavit also explained that Lindsey had more than one cellphone and that it is common for drug dealers to use multiple cellphones to conceal their drug business. This was enough to support a fair inference that the cellphones would contain evidence of drug dealing. See United States v. Adams, 971 F.3d 22, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that presence of multiple cellphones combined with other evidence of drug dealing was sufficient to show probable cause to search five cellphones found in defendant‘s car); see also United States v. Hernandez-Mieses, 931 F.3d 134, 140-41 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that district court did not err in concluding that “plain view” doctrine allowed
Lindsey argues that ruling against him will “advance[] a rule that automatically permits the search of any cellphone whose owner has been engaged in drug activity, even when there is no specific evidence that the phone was used to transact any illicit business, so long as the affidavit includes a generalized statement that drug dealers often use cellphones to conduct their business.”5 Contrary to Lindsey‘s argument, the warrant was not premised solely on the fact that Lindsey “engaged in drug activity.” The warrant application stated that Lindsey had multiple cellphones and that using multiple phones is a common tactic used by drug dealers to conceal their drug business. Whether probable cause would have
2. The Particularity Requirement
The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
The government argues that Lindsey waived the particularity argument by failing to raise it in the district court. Lindsey contends that he did raise the argument both in his written motion to suppress and during the hearing on his motion. We agree with the government that Lindsey failed to preserve this argument and so under
In general, legal arguments are preserved only when “raised squarely” in the district court. United States v. Peake, 874 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Loc. No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992)). “This rule ‘requires litigants to spell out their legal theories face-up and squarely in the trial court; if a claim is “merely insinuated” rather than “actually articulated,” that claim ordinarily is deemed unpreserved for purposes of appellate review.‘” Mancini v. City of Providence ex rel. Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 46 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94, 102 (1st Cir. 2006)). Unpreserved legal arguments as to motions to suppress are unreviewable except upon a showing of good cause.
Lindsey did not raise any particularity argument in his motion to suppress. He made only a nexus argument, stating that “[t]he totality of the circumstances . . . failed to supply probable cause” “because [the warrant did] not offer any reason why in these circumstances, these particular cellphones would hold any information pertinent to a drug transaction.” The statement in Lindsey‘s motion to suppress that the warrant application failed to “describe what evidence [the officers] expected to find in the phones which would pertain to the distribution of controlled substances,” unaccompanied by any mention of the particularity requirement, was not enough to raise or preserve the issue.
Nor was Lindsey‘s current argument squarely raised during the district court‘s hearing on the motion. Despite the district court‘s inquiry about exactly what the argument was, defense counsel never articulated the objection, now made on appeal, that the warrant was inherently deficient and no evidence seized pursuant to it was admissible because the warrant “failed to identify what items could be seized or viewed, thus violating the particularity requirement.”
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Lindsey argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to show that he “knowingly and intentionally possessed . . . a controlled substance with the specific intent to distribute” because there was “no evidence” to suggest that the black case containing drugs and drug packaging belonged to Lindsey rather than to London. He also asserts that even if there was evidence that Lindsey had just sold cocaine to London, that “does
We review de novo the district court‘s denial of a defendant‘s Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Guzmán-Montañez, 756 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014). “When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, ‘we draw the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most agreeable to the jury verdict.‘” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 717 F.3d 35, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2013)). The inquiry is whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “[d]efendants challenging convictions for insufficiency of evidence face an uphill battle on appeal.” United States v. Millán-Machuca, 991 F.3d 7, 17 (1st Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (first quoting United States v. Bailey, 405 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir. 2005); and then quoting United States v. Rodríguez-Martinez, 778 F.3d 367, 371 (1st Cir. 2015)).
To make out a case of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substаnce under
The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the black case and drugs it contained belonged to Lindsey. The text message evidence showed that someone named “Brysin” -- who the jury could readily infer was Bryson London -- had asked Lindsey five days before the arrest about his “[p]rices.” And on the morning of the arrest, “Brysin” asked Lindsey to pick him up and bring “the whites,” which is a commonly used term for cocaine. Lindsey had $3,643 dollars of cash on his person, which the jury could fairly infer were drug proceeds. The drugs in the black case were packaged in the same type of Ziploc and sandwich bags found elsewhere in Lindsey‘s apartment. The officers also found breathing masks, latex gloves, and an over-the-counter powder commonly used to cut drugs in Lindsey‘s bedroom. The jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Lindsey was selling drugs to London and that the cаse, which contained drug-packing materials and a wide range of drugs in distribution quantities, belonged to Lindsey rather than to London.
Lindsey argues that the trial court erred in admitting text messages which showed Lindsey engaging in past drug dealing because the messages were improper propensity evidence.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the text messages solely for the purpose of showing that Lindsey intеnded to distribute the drugs in the black case. Evidence of past drug dealing may be relevant to show that a
D. The Admission of Other Evidence
Lindsey argues that the admission of Officer Boisselle‘s testimony that the purpose of the probation visit was to investigate “concerns of noncompliance” with the terms of his
We review a district court‘s admission of allegedly prejudicial evidence under
As to Officer Boisselle‘s statement that there were “concerns of noncompliance with the terms of [Lindsey‘s] supervision,” there is no basis to conclude that its admission
Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the text message from Lindsey‘s girlfriend. The text message was relevant to show Lindsey‘s ownership of the cellphone and the district court reduced any risk of prejudice by instructing the jury that “the content of the message is totally irrelevant to anything you‘re deciding, so don‘t consider it for any other purpose other than it‘s being offered on the limited purpose of your considering ownership of the phone.” See United States v. Moon, 802 F.3d 135, 144-45 (1st Cir. 2015) (explaining that limiting instructions “minimize[] the risk of prejudice“).
IV. Conclusion
Affirmed.
-Concurring Opinion Follows-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. BERNARD LINDSEY, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 19-2169
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
June 29, 2021
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I write separately only to express my continued reservations about ongoing reliance on our holding in United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 1996), that evidence of prior drug distribution is admissible to prove the element of intent in a later drug distribution case. See United States v. Henry, 848 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2017) (Kayatta, J., concurring) (“[T]he admission of evidence of a prior conviction to establish the ‘intent’ of the defendant in connection with the offense being tried can become indistinguishable from the admission of evidence of a prior cоnviction to prove a propensity to commit that type of crime.“).
The lure of the propensity argument is admittedly seductive. But propensity is “not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (footnote omitted). And because “[a]lmost any bad act evidence simultaneously condemns by besmirching character and by showing one or more of motive, opportunity, [or] intent, . . . not to mention the other purpоses of which this list is meant to be illustrative,” the “list of exceptions in Rule 404(b), if applied mechanically, would overwhelm the central principle.” United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 269 (4th Cir. 2017) (emphasis
The opinion for the court in this case claims to distinguish the “impermissible propensity” inference (that “because Lindsey had previously sold drugs, he must have had an intent to sell drugs in April 2018“) from a supposedly permissible inference (that because “Lindsey was presently in the business of selling drugs,” it was “more likely that he intended to sell [the] drugs” with which he was found). I fail to see the relevant difference, at least as pertains to sales made months and weeks prior to the charged sale. With either formulation, thе path of reasoning runs through propensity: His prior sales evidence a propensity making it more likely that he was planning to sell drugs on this occasion. See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he government must explain how [the evidence] fits into a chain of inferences -- a chain that connects the evidence to a proper purpose, no link of which is a forbidden propensity inference.“)
Nevertheless, for two reasons I agree that the admission of the text messages does not call for upsetting the conviction: First, the text messages exchanged with London on the day of the arrest were properly admissible because they show London and Lindsеy arranging the intended sale that is the subject of this case. They thus present no “uncharged conduct” issue. Second,