Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the decree of the judge of the superior court for the eastern district of the territory of Florida.
After the acquisition of Florida by the United States, in virtue of the treaty with Spain, of the 22d of February 1819, various acts of congress were passed for the adjustment of private claims to land within the ceded territory. The tribunals appointed to decide on them, were ndt authorised to settle any' which exceeded a league square; on those exceeding that quantity, they were directed to report especially their opinion for the future action of congress. The lands embraced in the larger claims, were defined by surveys and plats returned; they vveré reserved from sale, and remained unsettled until, some resolution should be adopted for a final adjudication on their validity, which was done by the passage of the law of
The law of 1824, which is thus referred to, and forms a part of that- of 1828, furnishes the rules by which this court must be guided in assuming and exercising jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim in controversy. This law was passed to enable claimants to lands within the limits of Missouri and Arkansas, to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims tó land prior to the consummation of the cession of the territory acquired by the United States by the Louisiana treaty; and enacted, that any person, or their legal representative, claiming lands by virtue of any French or Spanish grant, concession, warrant, or order of survey, legally made, granted or issued, beforе the dale of the 10th March 1804, by the proper authorities, to any persons resident in the province at the dale thereof, which was protected and secured by the treaty, and which might have been perfected into a complete title, under and In conformity to the laws, usages and customs of the government under which the same originated, had not the sovereignty been transferred to the United States, may present his petition to the district court, setting forth the nature of his claim, the date of the grant, and quantity and boundary, by whom issued, and whether the claim had been submitted to any tribunal, and reported on by them) and how; praying that
A reference to the petition presented by the claimants in this base, shows that it contains a full statement of all the matters required by the first section of the Missouri law, excepting the condition of residence, which is not required by the act of 1828. Record, 1 to 22. It presents a claim for land in Florida, embraced by the treaty, not finally settled; containing the requisite quantity of land, not reported.on as antedated or forged, not annulled by the treaty, presented to and1 acted on by the commissioners according to law. The superior' court of Florida then had jurisdiction of the petition to hear and determine the same, according to the principles of justice and the laws and ordinances of Spain; and -the case is now regularly before us on an appeal from their decree.
The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction; it is coram judice,” whenever a case is presented which brings this power into action; if the petitioner states such a case in his petition that on a demurrer the court would render judgment in his favour, it is an undoubted case of jurisdiction, whether on an answer denying and putting in issue the allegations of the petition, the petitioner -makes out his case, is the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by the filing of a petition containing all the requisites and -in the manner prescribed by law.
The proceedings on the petition are to be conducted according to the rules of equity, except that the answer on behalf of the United States need not be verified on oath. — Sec. 2.
This court has often decided that by these rules are meant the well settled and established usages and principles of the court of chancery, as adópted and recognized in their decisions, which have been acted on here, under the provisions of the
The numerous cases which have been adjudged by this, and in the circuit courts, make it wholly unnecessary to refer to the sources from-.which it has been -extracted. By the stipulations of a treaty are to be understood its language and apparent intention manifested in the instrument, with a reference to the contracting parties, the subject matter, and persons oh whom it is to operate. The laws under which we now adjudication the rights embraced in the treaty, and its instructions, authorise and direct us to do it judicially, and give its judicial meaning and interpretation as a contract on the principles of justice and the rules of equity. When-the construction of this treaty was under the consideration of the court in the case of Foster and Elam v. Nelson,
This court did not deem the settlement, of boundaries a judicial but a political question — that it was not'its duty, to lead, but to follow the action of the other departments of the government; that when individual rights depended on national boundaries, “ the judiciary is not that department of the government to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is confided, and its duty commonly is to decide upon .individual rights according to those principles which the political departments of the nation have established.” “If the course of the nation has been a plain one, its courts would hesitate to pronounce it erroneous.” “ We think, then, however individual judges might construe the treaty of St Ildefonso, it is the province of the court to conform its decisions to the will of the’ legislature, if that will has been clearly expressed.”
As to the other question depending on the stipulations of the eighth article, the court declared: And the legislature must execute the contract before it cari become a rule for the court.
Our next rule of decision is — and proceedings under the treaty. By these are to be understood the acts and proceedings of the government, or others under its authority, subsequent to the treaty, in taking possession of the ceded territory, in organizing the local government, its acts within the authority of the organic law, the promises made, the pledges given by either the general or local government. Also the proceedings of commissioners and other officers or tribunals áppointed by congress to decide, and report on these claims so far as they have adopted and settled any rules and principles of decision within their powers, as guides to their judgment. These, in our opinion, are the “ proceedings under the same,” referred to, and intended by, the law, according to which we may decide, and are made a rule, a precedent for us.
The next guide is, “the several acts of congress in relation thereto,” clearly referring to the clause immediately preceding: “the stipulation of any treaty and proceedings under the same.” By “the several acts of congress in relation thereto,” must be taken as referring to all the laws on the subject matter of either, necessarily embracing lands, property and rights depending on the stipulations and proceedings so made and had. Thus the course of the legislature points to that of the judiciary, it must be in the same path.
Where congress have, by confirming the reports of commissioners or other tribunals, sanctioned the rules and principles on which they were founded, 'it.is a legislative affirmance of the construction put by these tribunals on the laws conferring the authority and prescribing the rules by which it should be exercised; or which is to all intents.and purposes of the same effect in law. It is a legislative ratification of an act done without.previous authority, and this subsequent recogni
The next rule laid down for our direction is, “ and the laws' and ordinances of the government from which it is alleged to be derived.” The laws of an absolute monarchy are not its legislative acts — they are the will and pleasure of'the monarch expressed in various ways — if expressed in any, it is a law;there is no other law making, law repealing power-call it by whatever name — a royal order — an ordinance — a cédula — a decree of council — or an act of an authorised officer — if made or promulgated by the king, by his consent or authority, it becomes as to the persons or subject matter to which it-relates, a law of the kingdom. It is emphatically so in Spain and all its dominions. Such, too, is the law of a Spanish province сonquered by England. The instructions of the king to his governors are the supreme law of the conquered colony; magna charta, still less the common law, does not extend its principles to it — King v. Picton, 30 St. Tr. 8vo ed. 866. A royal order, emanating from the king, is a supreme law, superseding and repealing all other preceding ones inconsistent with it. The laws of the Indies, have not their force as such by any legislative authority vested in the council; their authority is by the express or implied expression of the royal will and pleasure; they must necessarily yield to an order, prescribing a new rule, conferring new powers abrogating or. modifying previous ones.
•The principle that the acts of a king are in subordination• to the laws of the country, applies only where there is any law of higher obligation than his will; the rule contended for may prevail in a British, certainly not in a Spanish province. There is another source of law in all governments, usage, custom, which is always presumed to have been adopted with the consent of those who may be affected by it. In England, and in the states of this union which have no written constitution, it is the supreme law; always deemed to have had its origin in an act of a state legislature of competent power to make it valid and binding, or an act of parliament; 'which, representing all the inhabitants of the kingdom, acts with the consent of all, exercises the power of all, and its acts become binding by the authority of all; g Co. Inst. 58—Wills, 116. So it is
A general custom is a general law, and forms the law of a contract on the subject matter; though at variance with its terms, it enters into and controls its stipulations as an act of parliament or state legislature; 2 Mod. 238; W. Black. 1225; Doug. 207; 2 D. and E. 263—264; 1 H. Bl. 7, 8; 2 Binney, 486, 487; 5 Binney, 287; 2 S. and R. 17;
We are also required to finally decide icall other questions properly arising between the claimants and the United States.”
There is but one which has arisen in this case which does not refer to the laws of nations, the treaty and proceedings under it, the acts of congress, or the laws of Spain, — that is, the question of fraud in making the grant which is the foundation of the plaintiff’s title; which, as well as all others, we must, by the terms of the law, decide !l in conformity with the principles of justice.” We know of no, surer guides to the principles of justice, than the rules of the common law, administered under a special law, which directs, (section second) u that every petition which shall be presented under the provisions of this act, shall be conducted according to the rules of a court of equity,” and it does not become this tribunal to acknowledge,that the decisions of any other are to be deemed better evidence of those rules or the principles of justice.
In Conard versus Nicoll, a great and lamented judge thus defined fraud: “ The first inquiry is, what is fraud? From a view of all that has been said by learned judges and jurists upon this subject, it may be safely laid down, that to constitute actual fraud between two-or more persons to the prejudice of a third, contrivance and design to injure such third person by depriving him of some right, or otherwise impairing it, must be shown.”
He laid down three rules, which were incontrovertible:—
“ 1. That actual fraud is not to be presumed, but ought to be proved by the party who alleges it.
“2. If the motive and design of án act may be traced to an honest and legitimate source equally as to a corrupt one, the former ought to be preferred. This is but a corollary to the preceding principle.
“ 3. If the person against whom fraud is alleged, should be proved to have been guilty of it in any number of instances^ still if the particular act sought to be avoided be not shown to be tainted with fraud, it cannot be affected by these other frauds, unless in some way or other it bе connected with or form a part of them.”
This court unanimously adopted these principles as the max
The next subject for our consideration is, the evidence on which we are to decide. The third section of the act is as follows: “That the evidence which has been received by the different tribunals which have been constituted and appointed by law to receive such .evidence, and to report the same to the secretary of the treasury, or to the commissioners of the general land office, upon all claims presented to them, respectively, shall be received and admitted in evidence for or against the United States, in all trials under this act, when the p'erson testifying is dead or beyond the reach of the court’s process, together with such other testimony as it may be in the power of the petitioner, the person or persons interested in the defence made against establishing any claim, or the United States’ attorney to produce; and ivhich shall be admissible according to the rules of evidence and the principles of law.”
These provisions of the act of 1824 are applicable to this ease; they have not been altered by the act of 1828, and by the eighth section are expressly extended to the Florida claims. They are liberal — worthy of the government which has adopted and made them the rules by which to testtherights of private claimants to portions of the land embraced in the ceded territory. From a careful examination of the whole legislation of congress on the subject of the Louisiana and Florida treaties, we cannot entertain a doubt that it has from their beginning beén intended that the titles to the lands claimed should be settled by the same rules of construction, law and evidence, in all their newly acquired territory. That they have adopted as the basis of all their acts, the principle that the law of the province in which the land is situated.is the law which gives efficacy to the grant, and by which it is to be tested, whether it was property at the time the treaties took effect.
The United States seem never to have claimed any part of what could be shown by legal evidence and local law to have been severed from the royal domain before their right attached. In giving jurisdiction to the district court of Missouri to decideon these claims, the only case.expressly excepted is that of Jacques Glamorgan (in section 12, 3 Story L. U. S. 1964); and in the corresponding law, as to Florida; those annulled by the
The United States have by three cessions acquired territory, within which there have been many private-claims to land under Spanish titles. The first in point of time was by the compact with Georgia, in 1802, by the terms of which it was stipulated —“ That all persons who, on the 27th October 1795, were actual settlers within the territory thus ceded, shall be confirmed in all their grants, legally and fully executed prior to that day, by the former British government of West Florida, or by the government of Spain.” (1 Laws, 489.)
The stipulátions of the treaties by which they acquired Louisiana and Florida, contained provisions of a similar nature as to claims to land under Spain before the cession.
The whole legislation of Congress, from 1803 to 1828, in relation to the three classes of cases, so far as respected Spanish titles, is of an uniform character on cases of a corresponding description. The rules vary according to the kind of title set up; distinctions have been made in all the laws between perfect or complete grants,' fully executed, or inchoate incomplete ones, < where a right had been in its inception, under or by colour of local law or authority, but required some act of the government to be done to complete it. Both classes have been submitted to the special tribunals appointed to settle, to report finally or specially upon them, and the claimants have, under certain circumstances, been permitted to assert their rights in court by various'laws, similar in their general character, but varying in detail to meet the cases provided for.
They are too numerous to be noticed in detail — some will be referred to hereafter; but it is sufficient for the present to observe, that from the whole scope and spirit of the laws on the subject of Spanish titles, the intention of congress is most clearly manifested, that ¡the tribunals authorised to examine and decide on their validity, whether special or judicial, should be governed by the same rules of law and evidence in, their adjudication on claims of the same given character. The second and third sections of the Missouri act of 1824, the first, sixth, and eighth of the Florida act of 1828, can admit of no other construction. It was within the discretion of the legislature to select the cases to be submitted to either tribunal;
The counsel of the United States have considered the merits of this case as resting mainly, if not wholly, on the eighth article of the treaty; but the law compels us to take a view of it much less limited. That article names only grants; and if we decide alone on it, we must decree against the claim, unless we think the title gоod under it; though if it was for a quantity not exceeding a league square, any other tribunal would confirm it. This would be making a distinction so unworthy a just legislature, that we shall not impute to them the intention of directing it to be the rule'of our action. We shall certainly not adopt it unless it is clearly Imposed by the authority of a law expressed in terms admitting of no doubt.
The fourth section of the Florida act of 1822,
We now proceed to consider the validity of the present claim. — The claimant offered and gave in evidence an original grant, from Don Alexandre Ramirez, styling himself, “intendant of the army, subdelegate superintendent general of the royal domain of the island of Cuba, and the two Floridas,” &c. &c. . It purported to convey the land in controversy to Arredondo and Son, to have been made in' the exercise of the faculties which had been conferred'on Ramirez by the king; it was made in the royal name for the number of acres of land,
It- is but a reasonable presumption that congress in legislating on the subject of Spanish grants in the three territories which they have acquired since 1802, and in devising and providing efficient means for the ascertaining and finally settling all claims of title-under them by persons asserting that the lands they claimed had been severed from the public
In providing for carrying into effect the stipulations of the compact of cession with Georgia, the fifth section of the act of 1803 provides. That all persons claiming landl pursúant thereto should before the 1st March 1804, deliver to the register of the land office, in the proper district, a notice containing a statement of the nature and extent of his claim and a plot thereof; also, for the purpose of being recorded; every grant, order of survey, deed of conveyance, or other written evidence of his claim — in default whereof all his right, so far as depended on the cession, or the law was declared void — forever barred — and the grant inadmissible in any court in the United States against any grant from them. (
As no law required the exhibition of the authority under which a grant warrant, or order of survey was made; as it formed a part of the evidence of title to be recorded, deposited, or acted on by the commissioners, they were not authorized to call for it before making their decision.
The grant legally and fully executed was competent evidence of the matters set forth in it, and as none other was necessary it was in effect conclusive. But congress thought it proper to authorise the commissioners not to confine their examination to the mere execution of the alleged grant. By the third section of the same law it is provided as follows. “ Or whenever either of the. said boards shall not be satisfied that such grant, warrant or order of survey, did issue at the time it bears date, the said commissioners shall not be bound to consider such grant, warrant, or order of survey as conclusive evidence of the title, but may require such other proof of its validity; as they may think proper.” — Nothing can more
In the law of the succeeding session, passed for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to land within the territory of Orleans and district of Louisiana, it was directed that the evidence of claims to land should be recorded — but there was this proviso in the fourth section: “ That where lands are claimed by virtue of a complete French or Spanish grant as aforesaid, it shall not be necassary for the claimant to have any other evidence of his claim recorded, than the original grant or patent; together with the warrant or order of survey, and the plot.” Other provisions follow similar to those in the preceding law relating to claims included in the articles of agreement, with Georgia. (
The act of 1822, for ascertaining claims and titles to land in the territory of Florida (
To apply the principle contended for to the various papers which are sent from the general or the local land offices, as instructions to officers under their direction; or evidence of incomplete title to land, by requiring any other evidence, of the authority, by which it was done than the signature of the' officer, the genuineness of the paper, proved by witnesses or authenticated by an official seal, would be not only of dangerous tendency, but an entire novelty in our jurisprudence, as “ a rule of equity or evidence,” or “ principle of law or justice.” The judicial history of the landed controversies, under the land laws of Virginia and North Carolina, as construed and acted on within those states, and in those where the lands ceded by these states to the United States lie, and Pennsylva-, nia, whose land tenures are very similar in substance, in all which the origin of titles is in very general, vague, inceptive' equity; will show the universal adoption of the rule, that the
A patent under the seal of the United States or a state is conclusive proof of the act of granting by it's authority; its exemplification is a record of absolute verity. Patterson v. Winn,
The grants of colonial governors, before the revolution, have always been, and yet are, taken as plenary evidence of the grant itself, as well as authority to dispose of the public lands. Its actual exercise, without any evidence,of disavowal, revocation, or denial by the king, and his consequent acquiescence and presumed ratification, aré sufficient proof in the absence of any to the contrary (subsequent to the grant) of the royal assent to the exercise of his prerogative by his local governors. This or no other court can require proof that there exists in every government a power to dispose of its property; in the absence of. any elséwhere, we are bound to presume and consider, that it exists in the officers or tribunal who exercises it, by making grants, and that it is fully evidenced, by occupation, enjoyment, and transfers of property, had and made under them? without disturbance by any superior power, and respected by all co-ordinate and inferior officers and tribunals throughout the state, colony or province where it lies.
A public grant, or one made in the name and assumed authority of the sovereign power of the country, has never been
If admitted, the court, jury, or chancellor, must receive it as evidence both of the facts it recites and declares, leading to and the foundation of the grant, and all other facts legally inferable by either from what is so apparent on its face. Taking, then, as a settled principle, that a public gra'nt is to be taken as evidence that it issued by lawful authority, we proceed to examine the legal- effect of a Spanish grant in adjudicating on their validity, by the principles of justice in a court; and by the rules of equity, evidence, and law, directed by the act of 1824, which forms a part of the law under which their validity is submitted to our judicial consideration.
The validity and legality of an act done by a governor of a conquered province, depends on the jurisdiction over the subject matter delegated to him by his instruction from the king, and the local laws and usages of the colony, when they have been adopted as the rules for its government. If any jurisdiction is given, and not limited, all acts done in its exercise are legal and valid; if there is -a discretion conferred, its abuse is a matter between the governor and his government, &c.; King v. Picton, late governor of Trinidad, 30 St. Tr. 869-871.
It is an universal principle, that, where power or jurisdiction is delegated to any public officer or tribunal over a subject matter, and its exercise is confided to his or their discretion; the acts so done are binding and valid as to the subject matter; and individual rights will not be disturbed collaterally for any thing done in the exercise of that discretion within the authority and power conferred. • The only questions which can arise between an individual claiming a right under the acts done, and the public, or any person denying its validity, are, power in the officer, and fraud in the party. All other questions are settled by the decision made or the act done by the tribunal or officer; whether executive, (1 Cr. 170-171)—legislative, (
The principles of these cases are too important not to be referred to, and.though time does not admit of their extraction and embodying in our opinion, we have no hesitation in declaring that they meet with our entire concurrence, so far as applicable to this case. But there are other cases which hаve been decided by this court, which have, in our opinion, so direct a bearing on.the effect and validity of the grant in question, as to deserve a close examination; they will be considered in their order.
In Polk’s lessee against Wendell, various objections were made to the validity of a grant from the state.of North Carolina, as not having issued under the authority of law. The court laid down this- general principle: ‘‘But there are cases in which a grant is absolutely Void; as when the state has no title to the thing granted,- or where the officer had no authority to issue the grant,” (9 Cr. 99; repeated in the same case,
Another equally so was established in that.case: “ There was one point made in the argument of this ease, which, from its general importance, deserves our serious attention, and which may have entered into the views of the circuit court in making their decision. It was, whether admitting this grant to be void, innocent purchasers, without notice, holding under it, should be affected by its nullity. On general principles it is incontestable, that a grantee can eonvey no more than, be possesses. Hence, those who come in under the holder of a void
The claimants in this case did not rest their’title merely on the grant, It appeared in evidence, by authentic documents, that, in 1816, a controversy arose between the captain general and the intendant of the Island of Cuba, as to the superintendency of the royal domain of the Floridas, which being referred to the king, he-, by a royal order of the 3d September, 1817, conferred it on the intendant, Ramirez, commanding him •therein to facilitate the increase of the population of those provinces by all the means which his zeal and prudence could dictate.” This is the order recited in the grant, and the authority under which it was made; with the general superintendency of the domain of the provinces, the local authorities acting under his direction and supervision, and acting under the command contained in the order; we can have no hesitation in saying that the grant in question was within the authority thus conferred. This order was a supreme law, superseding all others so far as.it extended; its object was to increase the settlement and population of the whole province, which could only be done by corresponding grants of land adequate in extent to their desired effect. The power to do it was ample, and the means confided to the discretion of the officer, which was not limited. We cannot say that in executing this grant, he baá acted without authority. Our opinion, therefore, is that both on the general principles of law and the acts of congress, the grant is perfect and valid, and even if a special authority was requisite, that it is conferred by the royal order referred to. The bearing of the law of nations on such a title, and property thus acquired, while the province was in the possession and undisputed dominion of Spain, is manifest according to its principles, recognized and affirmed by this courts —
The original treaty has been examined in the department of ■state — it is executed as an original, and headed “ original” in •both languages — it cannot have escaped our attention that it relates to the territory ceded, the boundaries between those of the two governments,, the mutual renunciations, and the rights of the inhabitants of the ceded territories. There is an obvious reason for its being in Spanish as >vell as in English — the king had a direct interest, so far as affected his own dominions adjoining the United States, and a laudable desire to protect the inhabitants of the ceded provinces in all their rights and property. His honour was concerned most deeply in not do
His minister was not willing to trust so important a matter, to a treaty only in the English language. The present situation of the holders of the grants, the state of the country, the opinion of this court in Foster v. Nelson, and the argument in this cause, show the wisdom and justice which рrompted him to express the intention of the king in his own language and that of his subjects. Similar or equally good reasons may have induced the ministers of this government to have the treaty drawn in its language, and thus considering the treaty in both languages, and each as is declared at its head, “ original,” the one version neither controls nor is to be preferred to the other: each expresses the meaning of the contracting parties, respectiyely, in their own language, as in-the opinion of each, expressing and declaring the intention of. both. If they are mistaken, and the words used do not and.are not understood after-
A government is never presumed to grant the same land twice, 7 J. R. 8. Thus a grant, even by act of parliament, which conveys a title good against the king, takes away no right of property from any other; though it contains no saving clause, it passes no other fight than that of the public, although the grant is general of the land; 8 Co. 274, b.; 1 Vent. 176; 2 J. R. 263. If land is granted by a. state, its legislative power is incompetent to annul the grant and grant the land to another; such law is void, Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87, &c. A state cannot impose a tax on land, granted with an exemption from taxation, New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cr. 164; nor take away a corporate franchise, Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
It became, then, all important to ascertain what -was granted by what Was excepted. The king of Spain was the. grantor, the treatywas his deed, the exception was made by him, and its nаture and effect depended on his intention, expressed by his words, in reference to the thing granted and the thing reserved and excepted in and by the grant. The Spanish version was in his words and expressed his intention,' and though the American version showed the intention of this government .to be different, we cannot adopt it as the rule by which to decide what was granted, what excepted, and what reserved; the rules of law are too clear to be mistaken and too imperative to be disregarded by this court. We must be governed by the cléarly expressed and manifest intention of the grantor, and not the grantee in private a fortiori in public grants. That we might not be mistaken in the intention or in the true meaning of Spanish words, two dictionaries were consulted, one of them printed in Madrid, and two translations were made of the eighth article, each by competent judges of Spanish, and both agreeing with each other, and the translation of each agreeing with the definition of the dictionaries. “Quedan5*in Spanish, correctly translated, means “ shall remain” — the verb “ quedan” is in French “ reste-,” Latin, “ manere” “ remunere,” and English, “ remain” in the present tense. In the English original, the words are “ shall be55 — words in tlie future. The difference is all important as to all Spanish grants, if the words of the treaty were that all the grants of land “ shall remain confirmed,” then the United States by accepting the cession, could assert no claim to these lands'thus expressly excepted. The proprietors could bring suits to recover them without any action of congress,.and any question arising would
But aside from this consideration, we find the words used in the Spanish sense as to the grants made after the 24th of January 1818, which are, by the same article in English, “ hereby declared and agreed to be null and void. ” The ratification is in Spanish and English. The Spanish words in the Spanish version are “ quedado” and “ quedan” in reference to the annulled grants; the English are “ have remained,” “do remain.” The principles of justice and the rules of both Jaw and equity are too obvious not to require that in deciding on the effect and legal operation of this article of the treaty by the declared and manifested intention of the king, the meaning of Spanish words sh mid be the same in confirming as in annulling grants a regard to the honour and justice of a great republic, alike forbid the imputation of a desire that its legislation should be so construed and its law so administered, that the same word should refer to the future as to confirming and tо the present in annulling grants in the same article of the same treaty.
For these reasons and in this conviction, we consider that the grants were confirmed and annulled respectively — simultaneously with the ratification and confirmation of the treaty, and that when the territory was ceded, the United States had no right in any of the lands embraced in the confirmed grants.
As this point was urged at length by counsel on both sides, it was due to them that the court should consider it fully and express their opinion upon it clearly; argued as this case has been, upon grounds deemed by both Aides vital to its merits-.we could not exclude them upon our consideration. But there are other grounds, which, though no] adverted to by counsel, .would, in our view, have led to the same result. It is wholly immaterial to the decision of this case, whether the eighth article of the treaty is construed to be an actual present confirmation and ratification of the grants by both governments, or a stipulation of it for the future; for the laws of 1824 and 1828, require .us .to decide on the validity of the title of the
We are also of opinion that the legal construction of the eighth article in English, would lead to the same conclusion at which we have arrived, according to the view heretofore taken of the Spanish. The law deems every man to be in the legal seisin and possession of land to which, he has a perfect and complete title; this seisin and possession is co-extensive with his right and continues till he is. ousted thereof by an actual adverse possession. This is a settled principle of the common law, recognized and adopted by this court in Green v. Litter,
This gives to the words “ in possession of the lands” their well settled and fixed meaning; possession does not imply occupation or residence; had it been so intended, we must presume they would have been used. By adopting words of a known legal import, the grantors must be presumed to have used them in that sense, and to have so intended them; to depart from this rule would be to overturn established principles.
To adopt the literal English version and reject its meaning as settled at common law and by this court would make this article confine the confirmation of grants of land to cases of actual occupation and residence. This would be to give to-the
This part of the eighth article was for the benefit Of those persons who were purchasers under the faith of a public grant, evidently intended to be protected and secured in their rights by the stipulation of a treaty which ought to be construed liberally by a tribunal authorized and required to decide on the validity of these grants by the principles of justice and according to the rules of equity having a due regard to this article of the treaty. We cannot better regard it than by carrying into effect these principles-and rules, by such an exposition of it as we are convinced meets the intention of the par-ties and effectuates the object intended to be accomplished.
The condition of settling- two hundred families on the land has not been complied with in fact; the question is, ha.‘¡ it been complied with in law, or has such matter been presented to the court as dispenses with the-performance and divests the grant of that condition.
It is an acknowledged rule of law that if a grant is made on a condition subsequent, and its pérformance becomes impossible by the act of the grantor, the grant becomes single. We are not prepared to say that the condition of settling two hundred Spanish families in' an American territory has been, or is
It has been objected to the validity of the grant that it exceeds the quantity authorized by the laws of the province. The view we have taken of the royal order dated in September 1817, preceding the grant, and by the* authority of which it purports to have been made, renders it unnecessary to say more in relation to this objection than that, the disposition of the royal domain in Florida was within the jurisdiction of the intendant Ramirez. That he had power to make the grant, the. terms and extent of which were within his discretion, of the proper exercise of which this court has neither the power or right to judge. We will, however, observe that we are well satisfied that the local authority was competent to make grants of lands of a greater .quantity, than that to which the
The question of fraud has been pressed in the argument, but we perceive nothing in the evidence which shows its existence so as to bring it home to the claimants or that it exists at all according to the definition and rules heretofore settled.
It is objected that the lands in question are within the Indian boundary, and not subject to be granted. Of the fact of such location there seems lobe no doubt, as the centre of the grant is the Indian town of Alachua. The title of the Indians to these lands is not a matter.before us.; the grant is made subject to their rights if they return to resume them, and their abandonment has been ascertained by a proceeding which the intendant in the grant calls a sentence pronounced by him in his official character, on the report of the attorney and surveyor general. This seems to be a mode of proceeding known to the Spanish law in force in the province, in the nature of an inquest of office, as a judicial act, which vitally affecting the royal domain, come within its general superintendency, under the royal order of September. It ivas conducted, so far as we can perceive, by the proper officers; the law officer of the crown to report on. the laws affecting the subject, and the surveyor general as to the fact'; so that on their joint report, the superior officer could decree officially, whether, from the nature of the Indian right of occupancy, it had in law and by the actual condition of the land, in fact, reverted to and beeome re-annexed to the royal domain by the abandonment of the occupancy. The intendant pronounced his sentence on the report of these officers, and declared the granted lands to be a part of the royal domain, and open to a grant, reserving the Indian right of occupancy whenever it should be resumed. The fact of abandonment was the important one .to be ascertained, if voluntary, the dominion of
This is a matter which we feel bound to consider a judicial one, and that we cannot look behind the final sentence of an authorised tribunal to examine into the evidence on which it was founded; but must take it as a “res adjudícala” by a foreign tribunal, judicially known and to be respected as such. Similar proceedings are directed by the various acts of congress; the land commissioners, or officers of the land offices, as the case may be, confirm or reject claims, and the land embraced in the rejected claims, reverts to the public fund. So it is provided by the seventh section of the act of 1824, as to claims barred by not being duly presented or prosecuted, or which shall be decreed against finally by this court. There is another answer to this objection, which deserves notice: grants of land within the Indian boundary, are not excepted in the laws referring them to judicial decision; congress made what exceptions they thought proper; as the law has not done it, we do not feel authorised.to make an exception of this.
It is lastly objected, that the extension of time by the intendant in December 1820, was without authority, being subsequent to the ratification of the'treaty by the king of Spain. But the ratification by the United States was in February following, and the treaty did not take effect till its ratification by both parties operated like the delivery of a deed to make it the binding act of both. That it may and does relate to its date as between the two governments, so far as respects the rights of either under it, may be undoubted; but as respects individual rights, in any way affeeted by it, a very different rule ought to prevail. To exact the performance of the condition of- settlement of two hundred Spanish families, or any great progress in its commencement, after the date of the treaty and during the confused and uncertain state of things preceding its ratification; would be both unreasonable and unjust; and if the question was new in this court, we should have no hesitation in saying, that as to the grants of land subject to the condition of settlements, the ratification of the treaty must be taken at its date. But the question is not a new one. In .1792 the. state of Pennsylvania passed a law for the sale of her va
Being therefore of opinion that the title of the claimants is valid, according to the stipulations of the treaty of 1819, the laws of nations, of the United States, and of Spain, the judgment of the court below is affirmed,
Notes
By a reference to the thirteenth and fourteenth lines in the sixth section of'this law, as.printed in the pamphlet edition, in page 62, it reads, “ according to the forms, rules, &c. prescribed by the distiict judge and claimants in the state of Missouri, &c. by act of congress,” &c. To- have taken this expression literally, would have confined the superior court of Florida to the rules prescribed by the judge of the district court of Missouri, and claimants; by acts of congress of 1824. That act authorised the judge to prescribe no rules, and it was absurd to suppose it meant that the claimants themselves should prescribe them. The court, therefore, could not. but consider the evident meaning of the law to be “ rules,” &c. prescribed by the law itself, and wa3 so stated in tire opinion, which was delivered one day sooner than had been expected, and there was no time for revision'. Satisfied that there was an error in the printing, I examined the" original roll in the department of state, yesterday, and found the mistake; the word by had been inserted in the printed law, instead of to, as it was in the original roll: so that the law reads, “ the rules, &c. prescribed to the district judge and claimants by the act of congress.” The important bearing of this word on the power of the court and the rules of its decision, has made the insertion of this note necessary, and as it may be useful in courts at a distance from the seat of. government to have a correct copy of this section of the law, the following paper is directed'to be appended; 20th March 1832. Per Mr Justice Baldwin.
I certify that the following is a true copy of the sixth section of an act of congress, approved the 23d of May 1828, entitled “ an act supplementary to the several acts providing for the settlement and confirmation of private land -claims in Florida;” viz.
“ Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, that all claims to land within the territory of Florida, embraced by the treaty between Spain and the United States, of the 22d of February 1819, which shall not be decided and finally settled under the foregoing provisions of this act, containing a greater quantity ot land than the commissioners were authorised to decide, and-above the amount confirmed by this act, and which have not been reported as antedated or forged, by said com. missioners, or register aqd receiver acting as such, shall be received ami adjudi*708 cated by the judge of the superior court of the district within which the land lies, upon the pеtition of the claimant, according to the forms, rules, regulations, conditions, restrictions, and limitations prescribed to the district judge and claimants in the state of Missouri, by act of congress, .approved May'2.0th, 1824, entitled ‘ an act enabling the claimants to land within the limits of the state of Missouri and territory of Arkansas, to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims:’ Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to authorise said judges to take cognizance of any claim, annulled by the said treaty or the decree ratifying the' same by the king of Spain; nor any claim not presented to the commissioners or register and receiver, fn conformity to the several atts of congress providing for the settlement of private land claims in Florida.”
Faithfully compared with the roil’in this office.
Witness my hand, at the department of state, in the city of Washington, this 20th day of March 1832.
(Signed) Daniel Brent, C. C.
An Impressions/ this opinion was submit(Vd/to,_anii correcte'dTby, Mr Justice Baldwin by the printer, before it was put.to press.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Not concurring in the conclusion to which the court has come in this case, and considering the. magnitude of the property involved, not only in this case but in the application of the principles which govern the decision, to other cases, and. that th,e construction now given to the treaty is confessedly at variance with that which has been heretofore adopted, I shall briefly assign my reasons for dissenting from the opinion of the court. It is not my purpose to enter into an examination of all the questions which have been discussed at the bar. The view which I have taken of the case, does n;ot make it necessary for me to do so.
The grant under which the petitioners in the court below set up their claim, bears date on the 22d of December IS 17, and is for a tract of land in East Florida, a little short of three hundred thousand acres. It was made by Don Alexander Ramirez, intendant o£- the island of Cuba, and superintendent of -the two Floridas. It recites that the- memorial for the same was presented to the intendancy on the 15th of November, then last past, praying a gratuitous concess
The validity of this claim, depends on the construction of the eighth article of the treaty between the United States and the king of Spain, bearing date the 22d of Fеbruary 1819. It is contended on the part of the appellees, that under .the true construction of this treaty the only questions open for inquiry are, 1st, whether the grant is genuine, and, 2dly, whether made by lawful authority. That upon the' establishment of these points, the treaty, ipso facto, confirms the grant, and closes the door to alb further inquiry — the date of the grant being antecedent to that of the,treaty. It is admitted that, this is a different interpretation of the treaty, from that which has heretofore prevailed in our own government; and the change of construction iá rested upon an interpretation of the Spanish language, as used in the treaty,.rejecting the English side of that instrumént. The treaty when signed was in both languages; and each must be considered as the original language, and neither-as a translation. It cannot be said that the English is an erroneous translation, of the Spanish, any more than that the Spanish is an erroneous translation.of the English. The English sidétjf the eighth article of the' treaty reads thus: "all the grants of land' made before the 24th of January 1818, by his catholic majesty,- or by his lawful authorities, in the said territories ceded by his majesty to the. United States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent, that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of his catholic majesty. But the owners in possession of such lands, who by reason of the recent circumstances of- the Spánish nation, and the revolutions in Europe, have been prevented from fulfilling all the conditions of their grants, shall cotaplete them within the terms limited'in the same, respectively, from the date of the treaty; in default of which the said grants shall be null and void. All grants made since the 24th of January 1818, when
The material, parts in which the English and Spanish are said not to agree are, 1st, where the English declares that the grants “shall be ratified and confirmed,” the Spanish is “ shall remain ratified and confirmed;” and, 2dly, where the English is, “shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possess on of the land,” the Spanish construction is, “to the persons in possession of the grants;” and, 3dlyj in that part of the article which extends the time for fulfilling thp conditions, which according to the English, is, to the owners in possession of the “land,” the Spanish construction is, “the owners in possession of the grants.” It will readily be pereeiyed that the different readings lead to very different results, and which materially affect the grant in question. If titles are confirmed only to persons in possession#! the land at thé date of the treaty, the grant in question does not come within the saving; for there is no pretence that Arredondo, or any person claiming under him, was at the date of the treaty in-possession of the land, or had done any thing towards fulfilling the conditions upon which the grant was made to depend, and without which it is declared to be null and void. If the construction of the Spanish side of the treaty, as now contended, is to be adopted, and all grants before the 24th of January 1818, are confirmed by the treaty, proprio vigore, — the declaration that they shall be confirmed to the same extent that the same grants-would be valid, if the territories had remained under the dominion of his catholic majesty, are entirely nugatory, and must be rejected: for we have no right to enter into the inquiry how far they would be valid under the Spanish government. Such was most manifestly not the intention of the contracting parties; but that the United States should be substituted in the place of Spain, and should carry into execution in good faith the contracts made under the Spanish government for the disposition of the lands, and which the Spanish government was bound ex debito justitiee to carry into execution. The treaty must be considered as made in reference to an established system relative .to the disposition of the land in the territories ceded — and that' all grants would be open to examination,
I do not profess to understand the Spanish language, and shall therefore not undertake to say whether the criticisms are well founded or not. But it must strike any one as a little extraordinary, not only that the negotiators of the treaty should have sanctioned such a material discrepancy; but that congress should have been legislating for ten years past upon the English side of the treaty, different boards of commissioners sitting and trying the titles under such constructions, and that this court should have fallen' into the same error, and the mistake not discovered till now.
But admitting this discrepancy, as now contended for, exists between the English and Spanish side of the treaty, the question arises, which must we adopt? I know of no rule that requires a court of justice to reject the English, and adоpt the Spanish. If congress in their liberality should think proper to do this, the power could not be disputed, and so far as it extended to the protection of actual,bona fide settlers upon the land, the power, in my judgment, would be wisely and discreetly' exercised. But it does not seem to me that a court of justice can be called upon, as a matter of courtesy, to yield this to a foreign power,, in the construction of a treaty; and no rules of law applicable to the construction of contracts, will, in my judgment, justify it. It certainly will not be pretended that the royal rule of construction applies to this case. That where a grant is made by the. king, it is to be taken most beneficially for the king and against- the grantee. It is, I think, not claiming too much to consider it a contract between equals; and the rule would be more applicable which requires in such case, that, the grant should be construed most strongly against the grantor.
It is certainly true, as a general rule, that all written instruments are to be construed by themselves, without resorting
“ Every treaty,” says Vattel, “ must be interpreted as the parties understood it when the act was proposed and accepted.” The lawful interpretation of the contract ought to tend only to the discovery of the thoughts of .the author or authors of --the contract; as soon as we meet with any obscurity, we should seek for what was probably in the thoughts of those who drew it up, and interpret it accordingly. This is the general rule of all interpretation. That'all miserable subtleties and quibbles about words are overthrown by this unerring rule. (Vattel, see 262, p. 228, 230.)
Such understanding, in the present case, is to be collected from written evidence which will speak for itself, and not from cparole declarations, which might be misunderstood or misrecollected; and if we resort to such written evidence, no doubt, it appears to me, can remain on the construction of the treaty, that it was not the understanding, either of Mr Adams or Don Onis, that all grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818, by his catholic majesty or his lawful authorities, should' be confirmed by the mere force and operation of the treaty.
It is said the treaty does not purport, to transfer private property; that all such property is excepted under the second article. This proposition cannot be true in the broad extent to which it has been laid down. It may not transfer private property, but it annuls private property, if every grant, of whatever description, is to be considered private property. For upon this construction, there would be a direct repugnancy between the second and the eighth articles; the latter declares that all grants made since the 24th of January 1818, shall be null and void. But the king of Spain did not consider a mere gratuitous grant, upon conditions whjch had in no manner whatever been fulfilled, as private property. This indst have
The material point of difference between the negotiators in framing this article was, whether it should absolutely confirm all grants made prior to the 24th of January ISIS, or only sub modo, so as to enure to the benefit of actual bona fide settlers on the land at the time the treaty wa made; and the article resulted in the form in which it now stands.
The article states that the proposition to cede the territory originated on the part of Spain on the 24th of January 1818; or that is assumed as the date, though doubtless there must have been some previous communications on the subject, either here or by our minister in Spain; for Mr Erving, by his letter of the 10th of February 1818, wrote to Mr Adams, that the king of Spain had lately made large grants of land in East Florida to several of his favourites; and that he had been credibly informed, that by a sweeping grant to the duke of Alagon, he had within a few days past given away the remainder. 1st vol. State Papers, 18.
Our government was therefore apprised of what was probably going on with respect to grants in Florida, and must be presumed to have intended to guard against them. On the-24th of October 1818, Don Onis sent to Mr Adarps a proposition to cede the Floridаs, with the following clause: “ The donations or sales of lands made by the government of his majesty, or by legal authorities, until this time, are nevertheless to be recognized as valid.” On the 31st of October Mr Adams answered, declining his proposal, and requiring all the grants lately alleged to have been made by Spain should be cancelled, and proposed to carry back the time to all grants made after the year 1802. This Don Onis declined, but offered to annul all grants made after the 24th January 1818; saying, that the
Again, on the 9th February 1819, Don Onis, in his project of a treaty sent to Mr Adams, reiterates the same, provision, that all grants shall be confirmed and acknowledged as valid except those which had been issued after the 24th of January 1818,-which should be null in consideration that the grantees had not complied with the conditions of the cessions. 1 S. P. 87.
In all this correspondence we find Don Onis persisting in his claim, that all grants prior to the 24th of January 1818, should be absolutely confirmed; and assigning as the reason why those issued subsequent to that date should be annulled, because the grantees had not complied with the conditions; and we find Mr Adams continually rejecting the proposition to consider the grants before that period absolutely confirmed: and yet it. is now insisted that all such are confirmed by the treaty. The subsequent negotiation shows that the article, as it now stands, was put into that shape expressly for the purpose of guarding against such construction, and with the understanding, both of Don Onis and Mr Neuville, who acted in his behalf during a part of the negotiation, that the grants'of land dated before as well as after the 24th of January 1818, were annulled, except those upon which settlements had been commenced, the completion of which had-beefi prevented by the circumstances pf Spain and the recent revolutions in Europe. It is unnecessary for me to state more particularly this correspondence; the result, as above stated, will be found fully supported by a reference to the correspondence in the first volume of State Papers, pp. 13, 25, 26, 34, 46, 68, 74, 75. There can be no doubt that such was the understanding of Don O’ Is and Mr De Neuville; and Mr Adams, in a letter to our minister in Spain, whilst the treaty was pending before the king for ratification, states that the reasons why the grants to the duke of Alagon and others were not excluded by name, were: 1, conformably to the desire of Mr Onis to save the honour of the king; and, 2, because from the despatches of Mr Erving it was supposed there were other grants of the same kind, and
That the grant to Arredondo was made under similar circumstances, and liable to the same objections with those to Alagon, Punon Rostro and Vargas, is most manifest. Applications for them all were made within a few months of each other, in the latter part of the year 1817 and beginning of 1818, and no settlements made on either at the date of the treaty: and to consider the treaty as precluding all inquiry into the validity of this grant, appears to me directly in the lace of the very words of the treaty, and most manifestly against the clear understanding of those by whom it was made: and such is the construction given to this article by this court in the case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 314.
The court say the words of the article are, .“ that all the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818, by his catholic majesty, &c. shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of 'the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained upder the dominion of his catholic majesty.” Do these words act directly on the grants so as to give validity to those not otherwise valid, or do they pledge the faith of the United States to pass acts which shall ratify and confirm them? That article does not declare that all the grants made by his catholic majesty before the 24th of January 1818, shall be valid.to the same extent as if the ceded territories had remained under his dominion; and yet this is the very construction sought to be given to it in the present case. It does not say that those grants are hereby confirmed. Had such been its language, it would have acted .directly on the subject, and would have repealed those acts of congress which were repugnan to it.' But its language is, that those grants shall be ratified and confirmed to’ the persons in possession, &c. By whom shall they be ratified and confirmed? This seems to be the language of contract; and if it is, the ratification and confirmation which are promised, must be the act of the legislature.
Until suen act shall oe passed, the court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject. . Congress appears to have understood this article as it is understood, by the court.
By the act of the 8th of May 1822, 7th vol. Laws U. S. 104, sec. 4 and 5, concerning claims and titles to land within the territory of Florida, persons claiming title under any patent, gram, concession, or order of survey, dated previous to the 24th day of January 1818, whieh were valid under the Spanish government, or by the law of nations, and which are not-rejected by the treaty ceding the territory, are required to file such claim with the commissioners; and power is given to the commissioners to inquire into the justice and validity of such claims. No patent or grant is exempt from such inquiry: and if they are absolutely confirmed by the treaty, how could the justice and validity of them be subject to the examination of the commissioners?' And the same principle runs through all the laws in relation to these claims. See acts of 1828, p. 60. 7th vol. Laws U. S. 300.
It appears to me,.therefore, that the plain letter of the eighth article of the treaty, the clear and manifest intention of the negotiation, the uniform understanding of congress, and the opinion .f this court, all concur in the construction, that grants, made prior to the 24th of January 1818 are required to be ratified and confirmed to persons in the actual possession of the lands at the date of the treaty, and to be held valid to the same extent only that they would have been binding on the king of Spain; giving to bona fide grantees in such actual possession, and having commenced settlements, but who had been prevented by the late circumstances of the Spanish nation and the revolutions in Europe from fulfilling all the conditions of their grants^ time to complete them.
If, by the true construction of the treaty, the party claiming the benefit of this article must show an actual possession of. the land at the date of the treaty, it becomes necessary -to inquire what that date is. It was co ícluded and signed on the 22d of February 1819, ratified by the king of Spain on the 24th of October 1820, and by the United States on the 19th of February 1821; and the question is, which of these periods is to be taken as the date of the treaty? I think the time the treaty
The true rule on this subject is laid down by Mr Justice Washington, in the case of Hylton v. Brown, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 312; that the treaty, when ratified, relates back to the time of signing. The ratification is nothing more than evidence of the authority under which the minister acted. A government is bound to perform and observe a treaty made by its minister, unless it can be made to appear that he has exceeded his authority. • But a ratification is an acknowledgement that he was authorised to make the treaty; and if so, the nation is bound from the time the treaty is made and signed: and it is worthy of notice, that in all the acts of congress in relation to this treaty it is referred to as of the date of 22d February 1819, the time it was signed; thereby showing the understanding of our own government on .the subject. If this then is to be taken as the date of the treaty, there is no pretence that at that time, or even when ratified by. the king of Spain, any settlement had been made or possession taken of any part of this tract. It is, therefore, in my opinion, a case not coming within the saying provision in the eighth article of the treaty.
But if the time of ratification is assumed as the date of the treaty, no possession of the land had then been taken, within any reasonable construction of the treaty. William H. Hall
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the judgment of the court ought to be reversed.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the superior court for the eastern district of Florida, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion that there is no error in so much of the said decree as determines that the claim is ~ralid and ought to be confirmed; and this Court doth affirm so much thereof, and doth decree that the title of the claimants is valid according to the stipulations of the treaty between the United States and, Spain, dated the 22d day of February, Anno Domini 1819, the laws of the United States in relation thereto, the laws of nations, and of Spain. Arid this Court pro