UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. AUGUSTIN DANTE EZEQUIEL ARCE, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 20-4557
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
September 8, 2022
PUBLISHED. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda L. Wright Allen, District Judge. (2:18-cr-00121-AWA-LRL-1)
Before AGEE and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
ARGUED: James R. Theuer, JAMES R. THEUER, PLLC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Daniel Patrick Shean, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Raj Parekh, Acting United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
After confessing and consenting to the search of his cellphone, Augustin Arce was convicted at a bench trial of receiving and possessing child pornography found on his phone.1 He appeals, making six arguments.
He first argues that his confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights because he was in custody when questioned. Second, he argues that introducing a report detailing items downloaded from his phone violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses because the report included testimonial statements that certain images were likely child pornography. Third, he argues that evidence of other child-pornography downloads associated with him—and testimony about this evidence—should not have been admitted as improper character evidence. Fourth, he argues that testimony from Detective Simpson offered improper lay-opinion testimony matching thumbnail photos to videos. Fifth, he claims that the district court wrongly ordered restitution to a child-pornography victim. And finally, he claims that the district court erroneously imposed certain supervised release conditions, including a lifetime ban on internet and computer usage.
I. Background
In 2017–18, Ed Simpson, a Virginia Beach Police Department detective, was working undercover for a Homeland Security Investigations task force where he connected to a peer-to-peer file-sharing network to monitor the flow of child pornography.2 He observed various Internet Protocol addresses sharing child-pornography files. One IP
In May 2018, police served a warrant on the Lord George residence. Two agents wearing bullet-resistant police vests knocked on the door. Arce answered and the officers noted that they had a warrant. Arce, who was house-sitting for his sister at the time, asked to put his dogs in the backyard, which an agent watched him do. The officers then brought in four other search-team members. Arce‘s friend, Christina Farmer, was upstairs when the officers entered. The officers asked her to come downstairs into the kitchen. Once Arce and Farmer were in the kitchen, the house was cleared, and the remaining search-team members came in. The armed officers never drew their guns.
The officers testified they asked Arce and Farmer to sit at the kitchen table, to avoid impeding the search. The officers denied that they ordered Arce and Farmer to do so, which Arce and Farmer disputed. All agreed that an officer remained with Arce and Farmer in the kitchen, and Arce and Farmer further claimed that they were always accompanied by an officer—whether in the bathroom or getting dressed. The officers said that Arce and Farmer were told they were “free to leave” the house, J.A. 345, but Arce and Farmer claimed they were told to remain seated at the table. Arce and Farmer also said that they were not allowed to speak with one another, although officers disputed that too.
After about 15 minutes, Detective Simpson and Agent Paul Wolpert asked Arce to speak in the police vehicle, for “privacy[‘s] sake.” J.A. 345. Detective Simpson sat in the front seat with Arce while Agent Wolpert sat in the back to take notes. Before any questioning, Detective Simpson again told Arce that “he was free to leave, [and] didn‘t
Detective Simpson then began questioning Arce about pornography in general and asked whether Arce “had ever seen anything that he probably shouldn‘t have,” J.A. 355, to which Arce responded yes. Detective Simpson eventually asked Arce if he had seen anything illegal. Arce responded yes, and Detective Simpson asked him about child pornography. After Arce admitted to viewing child pornography, Detective Simpson then Mirandized him. Arce denied this occurred. He claimed he was handcuffed and threatened several times.
And after agreeing to continue speaking with the agents, Arce again confessed to downloading child pornography. After Arce admitted that he viewed child pornography on a phone in his apartment at Caribe Place, Arce was told that either he could grant permission to search the apartment or officers could apply for a warrant. While Arce was told several times that he did not have to consent, Arce granted permission to search by signing a consent form. At the apartment, Arce used his key to open the door for the officers. The officers first located a ZTE cellphone, but Arce said that phone contained no child pornography. They then found an Alcatel Fierce cellphone under Arce‘s mattress, and Arce provided the security pattern to open the phone. Arce was then taken back to the Lord George residence, about 2 hours after the police initially arrived.
Before the trial, Arce sought to suppress the confession and seized evidence. After an extensive hearing, the court found the officers’ testimony credible, finding a “wide credibility gap between the parties’ testimony” and noting “serious doubt” about the “veracity of Mr. Arce‘s testimony.” J.A. 446. Under the “totality of the circumstances”
Arce asked for a bench trial, which he was given. At trial, the key issue was knowledge: Did Arce know he was receiving and possessing child pornography? The government, of course, emphasized Arce‘s confession. Detective Simpson testified at trial that he downloaded fifty child-pornography files from an IP address associated with the Lord George residence from February through October 2017.5 Another detective, Greg Miller, introduced child pornography that he downloaded from an IP address associated with Arce‘s Caribe Place apartment in April and May 2018.
Detective Simpson also testified about a few other (uncharged) thumbnail photos found on the Alcatel phone. Those photos were introduced into evidence, and Detective Simpson explained that they matched videos (which were in evidence) that he downloaded from the Lord George Drive IP address in 2017. This matching was probative because it tied Arce to the pornography Detective Simpson downloaded from the Lake George Drive IP address, countering Arce‘s argument at trial that someone else was responsible for those
The government also called another agent, Montoya, as a lay witness to testify about examining the Alcatel phone and other electronics seized from Arce‘s apartment. Agent Montoya introduced the charged child-pornography images from the Alcatel phone.
Agent Montoya also described using two programs, Cellebrite and Griffeye, to extract files from the devices and analyze them. He used the Cellebrite software to extract files and data from the phone including internet search terms and image-and-video files on the phone. The extracted files were then fed into Griffeye, which uses a hashing algorithm to identify unique images and match them with known child-pornography images. A hashing algorithm generates for a given image an alphanumeric identifier, which, essentially, is unique to that image. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[A] hash value [is] a sort of digital fingerprint.“).6 It then compares that image‘s hash value to the hash values of database images that have been identified as child pornography by law enforcement analysts. Based on this comparison, Agent Montoya used Cellebrite to generate a report that classified certain images as child pornography. Montoya also testified about the Alcala phone‘s internet search history, which contained many searches for keywords associated with child pornography.
The court also imposed supervised-release conditions on Arce including a ban on “employment or volunteer services that allow him access to computer[s] or minors,” “any access to or possess[ion of] any pornographic material or pictures displaying nudity,” or “possess[ion] or use [of] a computer to access any online computer services at any location, including employment, without the prior approval of the probation officer.” J.A. 1002–03.
Arce timely appealed.
II. Discussion
A. Miranda Warning
The Fifth Amendment enshrines a right against self-incrimination. To protect this right, our jurisprudence requires a Miranda warning be provided to suspects in custody before an interrogation. United States v. Bernard, 927 F.3d 799, 805–06 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). This requirement does not apply to all questioning, only to interrogations that are “custodial.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Whether an individual is in custody is a fact-specific, objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2010). That inquiry asks whether a reasonable person would perceive his “freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.‘” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
The district court, having heard testimony from officers and Arce, found the officers credible and held that Arce was not in custody before being read his Miranda warnings. We find no clear error to overturn the court‘s factual findings and, based on those findings, affirm the district court‘s conclusion. Two officers knocked on the door where Arce was housesitting. Arce answered and let several officers in. Guns were never drawn, and Arce was never physically restrained. The officers displayed a calm demeanor throughout but kept Arce under observation during the house search, and the officers asked Arce to speak with them while sitting in a police car‘s front seat for less than an hour after telling Arce he was free to leave. And the officers not only let Arce go after this interaction but allowed him to turn himself in once they had a warrant for his arrest. Cf. United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777, 781 (4th Cir. 1997) (stressing that Braxton “was not taken into custody even after the interview” in finding his confession freely given). Based on the facts as found by the district court and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we agree with the district court‘s conclusion that Arce was not in custody.
These facts track other cases in which this court has affirmed a district court‘s finding that the suspect was not in custody. See, e.g., United States v. Azua-Rinconada, 914 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir. 2019); Hargrove, 625 F.3d at 179–83; United States v. Nielsen,
And this case can be distinguished from cases in which we have found questioning to be custodial. In United States v. Johnson, 734 F.3d 270, 275–76 (4th Cir. 2013), for example, the defendant was also questioned in a patrol car, but unlike Arce, Johnson was arrested and handcuffed first. And unlike the circumstances here, the officers in United States v. Hashime, 734 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2013), approached with a battering ram and banged on the entrance before being let in. They then entered the defendant‘s bedroom with guns drawn, woke the naked defendant, led him by the arm in his boxer shorts to the front lawn despite the cold weather, questioned him in a small basement storage room away from his family for three hours, while still not allowing him to have shoes or socks, and only read him his Miranda rights two hours into the interrogation. Id. at 280–81. In the midst of that display of police force and control, the police did tell Hashime he could leave
Arce‘s argument relies substantially on the fact that officers kept Arce under observation while he was in the house during the search. But considering the totality of the circumstances, that fact does little to establish that Arce‘s freedom of action would be reasonably perceived as curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Keeping an eye on Arce helped ensure the integrity of the search and safety of the officers. And if
B. Confrontation Clause
Agent Montoya, testifying as a lay witness, introduced several Cellebrite Reports that reflected information extracted from Arce‘s electronic devices. Arce does not challenge the admission of the charged child-pornography images. He instead argues that introducing the reports—which included all the information extracted from the phone, not just the charged images—violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment‘s Confrontation Clause. Though most of those reports contained only non-testimonial evidence that is not implicated by the Confrontation Clause, one report included testimonial statements categorizing images as likely child pornography. And that was improper. But in the context of this trial, we find that error harmless.
When statements are introduced against the defendant at a criminal trial, the defendant has a right to confront the witness, but this right “is only implicated in the context of testimonial statements.” United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218, 230 (4th Cir. 2020); see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). In contrast, a non-testimonial statement, “while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006)).
To understand whether a Cellebrite report contains testimonial statements, we must understand how Cellebrite works. First, the officer downloads all the information from a phone. Cellebrite then lumps the downloaded information into different categories like texts, browser history, and videos and images. Those files are then viewable in a report or on a computer.
Often this is the extent of a Cellebrite report. And a Cellebrite report that stopped at downloading the files would not typically implicate the Confrontation Clause. But often in child-pornography cases, as in this case, officers use a hashing algorithm to create a hash value—a unique digital fingerprint—for each image or video file. The resulting hash value
The hash value of a file standing alone does little; it too is just raw data. But if two hash values match, that is excellent evidence that two images are identical. So the significance of a file‘s hash value arises when the value is compared to a database containing “known” child-pornography images. Here, Agent Montoya compared the hash values of images from Arce‘s phone to a database of “known” child-pornography images that Griffeye created using input from law enforcement officers. Those officers categorize images as child pornography and then provide those images to Griffeye so their hash values may be placed in its known-child-pornography database. If a file‘s hash value matches with one in the Griffeye set, then the Cellebrite report reflects that the file is likely child pornography.
In the Cellebrite report at issue here, one column reflected, based on hash value, which images or videos are “Child Abuse Material (CAM)” or “Child Exploitation Material (non-CAM)/Age Difficult.” In the excerpt below—with the thumbnail redacted—the first file is not identified as a match, the second is identified as “Child Exploitation Material (non-CAM)/Age Difficult” and the third is identified as “Child Abuse Material (CAM).”
Each of these statements that a given image is Child Exploitation Material or Child Abuse Material depends on two premises. First, that the images in the Griffeye database are really child exploitation or abuse material. This conclusion derives from unknown law enforcement officers’ judgments that certain images qualify. The second premise is that the hash value of one of the known images matches that of an image found in the Cellebrite download.
It is the first of these premises that creates a Confrontation Clause problem. The second premise—the hash values match—may just be the kind of machine-generated data from a common technological process that is non-testimonial. See Washington, 498 F.3d at 230 & n.2. But the first premise—a given image in the Griffeye database is child exploitation or abuse material—is classic testimonial evidence. That conclusion depends on the judgment of law enforcement that a given image is child pornography. And that judgment is made for the purpose—or at least the foreseeable result—of identifying and prosecuting criminal cases. So the statements in the Cellebrite report identifying a given
This error is subject to harmless-error analysis. When an evidentiary issue is also a constitutional issue, as here, we can only affirm if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational fact finder would have found the defendant guilty absent the error. United States v. Moriello, 980 F.3d 924, 937 (4th Cir. 2020). Admitting the offending portion of the Cellebrite report—the connection between the images and the Griffeye database—was harmless. It was duplicative of the actual evidence—graphic images of prepubescent victims, who the court described as being “between the ages of probably 4 and 6.” J.A. 912; see also J.A. 629. And Agent Montoya permissibly offered lay-opinion testimony that he viewed these images and found them to be child pornography.
The overwhelming evidence established that the charged images were child pornography. It is thus clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge would have found Arce guilty without the report‘s statements that a given image was Child Exploitation Material or Child Abuse Material. The error was therefore harmless.
C. Character Evidence
The Government also introduced evidence of child pornography distributed by the Lord George Drive IP address. That is the evidence that provided the basis for the search warrant. In 2017, Detective Simpson acted undercover to observe the sharing of child
This evidence was admissible under
Arce does not disagree, instead arguing that the Government failed to provide notice of its intent to introduce the evidence under Rule 414 fifteen days before trial. See
D. Lay-Opinion Testimony
Arce also objected to Detective Simpson‘s lay-opinion testimony that several uncharged thumbnail images on Arce‘s cellphone appeared to come from the two videos the detective downloaded from the Lord George Drive IP address in 2017. This would show that Detective Simpson had downloaded those videos from Arce, making it more likely that Arce was aware of the nature of other videos and images on his phone.
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits lay-opinion testimony where the opinion is “(a) rationally based on the witness‘s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness‘s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” that would qualify as expert testimony within
Detective Simpson‘s opinion was based on his personal experience, as he had viewed the two videos and compared them to the thumbnails. But Arce argues that the testimony was not actually “helpful to a clear understanding,” because Detective Simpson was no better able to make the comparisons than the judge sitting as trier-of-fact. See
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing this testimony, given that this was a bench trial and the government offered it—or at least conceded it should only be offered—to point out specific points of comparison, within a sea of other evidence, for the judge sitting as trier-of-fact.10
E. Restitution
The court ordered restitution to “Violet,” a pseudonym for a known child pornography victim who was portrayed in an illegal image in Arce‘s possession. Based on a pediatrician‘s report, a psychologist‘s report, and other evidence, the district court awarded $5,000 of restitution.
“We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2020). Fashioning appropriate restitution remedies for child pornography victims is not “a precise mathematical inquiry and involves the use of discretion.” Paroline, 572 U.S. at 459 (2014). Courts “might, as a starting point, determine the amount of the victim‘s losses [and] then set an award of restitution in consideration of factors that bear on the relative causal significance of the defendant‘s conduct in producing those losses.” Id. at 460. And even though Paroline laid out a list of factors that a district court might consider, “the guideposts the Supreme Court articulated were suggestions rather than prerequisites.” United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 161 (4th Cir. 2018).
F. Supervised-Release Conditions
Arce challenges five supervised release conditions, which amount to a lifetime ban on internet and computer use (Special Conditions 7, 13, and 15), a lifetime ban on access to pictures of nudity (Special Condition 8), and a lifetime ban on contact with minors (Special Conditions 7 and 9). We reverse the conditions implementing a ban on internet and computer use, uphold the condition establishing a ban on images of nudity, and clarify that the conditions banning contact with minors does not include unintentional contact.
Supervised release conditions must be “(1) ‘reasonably related’ to the nature and circumstances of the offense, . . . and the statutory goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation; (2) ‘no greater [a] deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
Accordingly, a complete internet ban is almost always excessive for “non-contact child pornography activity, or similar conduct” where there was no actual contact with the victim. See United States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d 413, 421–22 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ellis, 984 F.3d at 1105). This case did not involve contact with children, so we reverse the conditions implementing the internet ban and remand to the district court. The district court may still set other computer restrictions that are more appropriately tailored to this case. See Ellis, 984 F.3d at 1104 (suggesting less-restrictive examples); United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Various forms of monitored Internet use might provide a middle ground between the need to ensure that [the defendant] never again uses the Worldwide Web for illegal purposes and the need to allow him to function in the modern world.“). But it cannot impose a total ban absent exceptional circumstances the district court must explain in detail.
A ban on access to pornography is acceptable where “restriction on sexually stimulating material [is] necessary to treat [the defendant]‘s addiction and to deter him from future crimes.” United States v. Van Donk, 961 F.3d 314, 323 (4th Cir. 2020). And
Finally, given the increasing extremity of the material he viewed, and his own admission that sexual abuse runs in his family, the conditions implementing a prohibition on unapproved contact with minors are reasonable to protect the public. See Hamilton, 986 F.3d at 423. But on remand, the district court should make clear that this restriction does not include incidental or unintentional contact. See United States v. Whitten, 846 F. App‘x 177, 177 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished). And the district court should also clarify the meaning of “access” for employment contained in Special Condition 7—for instance, if Arce works at a fast-food restaurant, that incidental contact with a minor at the order counter would not be prohibited.
* * *
Looking at the totality of the circumstances of his interview, Arce‘s Miranda rights were not violated because he was not in custody. While the inclusion of the Cellebrite report violated his Confrontation Clause rights, the error was harmless. We cannot say that the district court acted unreasonably in convicting based on the evidence, nor can we say allowing Detective Simpson‘s testimony or allowing prior-act evidence constituted reversible error. The court also did not abuse its discretion in its restitution order. But the
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
