OPINION
Richard Urdíales, Jr. sued his former employer, appellee Concord Technologies Delaware, Inc., because his supervisor, Alfredo Cantu, assaulted him. The trial court granted summary judgment on his claims, apparently concluding that (1) they were barred by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act and (2) he was not engaged in a protected activity. We affirm for these same reasons and a few additional ones.
A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from Urd-íales’ petition. On March 28, 2000, Cantu struck Urdíales in the chest with a steel pipe during an argument started because Urdíales was late returning from lunch. Urdíales suffered chest pains and a contusion. Cantu was Urdíales’ supervisor at Concord. Cantu received a written warning from Concord, and eventually pleaded nolo contendere to criminal assault. Unhappy with Concord’s response to the incident, Urdíales filed suit against Concord and Cantu. Concord then fired Urdíales, allegedly because he filed the lawsuit.
*403 The lawsuit contained numerous causes of action against Concord, including violation of Texas Labor Code section 21.055, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent supervision and training, negligent entrustment, and liability based on respondeat superior. The lawsuit also contained claims against Cantu.
Concord moved for summary judgment, claiming it was entitled to it because all of Urdíales’ claims were either barred by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act or did not fall within an exception to the Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Concord on all of Urdíales’ claims against it and denied Urdíales’ partial no-evidence motion for summary judgment; she also denied a motion to reconsider. The trial court then severed the claims against Concord and entered a final judgment for Concord. After doing that, she recused herself. This appeal followed.
B. Issues on Appeal
On appeal, Urdíales contends the trial court erred in granting Concord’s motion for summary judgment and in denying Urdíales’ partial no-evidence motion for summary judgment for three reasons:
• his negligence claims were not barred by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act and were based on Concord’s responsibility for the employment of an unfit, dangerous, or unqualified employee;
• his intentional tort claims were viable under a respondeat superior theory; and
• his retaliation claim was based on his participation in a protected activity.
He also complains about two other actions of the trial court unrelated to the summary judgment. First he claims all of the trial court’s orders are void and unenforceable because the trial court recused herself after signing them. Then he argues that the trial court erred in severing the claims against Concord from the claims against Cantu.
C. The Teial Court’s Recusal
If Urdíales’ argument regarding recusal is correct, the judge would not have been authorized to sign the summary judgment orders. As a result we will address that issue first. Urdíales also contends that the trial judge’s orders granting Concord’s summary judgment and severance motions are void and unenforceable because she recused herself from the case on her own motion after signing the orders. He asserts that if the judge had reasons to recuse herself after granting the motions, those same reasons existed prior to granting them, and therefore fairness and equity demand that we reverse and remand for trial. We do not accept the premise of this argument, nor does the recusal rule incorporate this type of reasoning. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 18a. When a judge voluntarily recuses herself, the rule does not require that all prior orders must be set aside. In fact, the rule states that a judge who recuses herself “shall make no further orders and shall take no further action in the case except for good cause stated in the order in which such action is taken.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 18a(c) (emphasis added).
In addition, a more fundamental problem with Urdíales’ argument exists. He points to no evidence showing that the judge was biased or otherwise should be recused or that any prior rulings were tainted — other than to argue that they must have been tainted because the judge decided to recuse herself. The record does not reveal why the judge recused herself. In addition, as we explain later in the opinion, we have reviewed at least two rulings and held that they were appropri *404 ate. We cannot speculate on the reason for her voluntary recusal. Having nothing to show whether or why the judge met the grounds for recusal, we cannot conclude that all prior rulings must be set aside. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(2) (enumerating grounds for recusal). For these reasons, we overrule this issue.
D. The Summary Judgment Issues
1. The Negligence Claims and the Personal Animosity Exception.
We next turn to the summary judgment issues. Concord’s motion for summary judgment argued that Urdiales’ negligence claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act, which generally is the exclusive remedy when employees sustain certain injuries while working.
See
Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 408.001 (Vernon 1996);
Walls Reg’l Hosp. v. Bomar,
On appeal, Urdiales does not dispute that he was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act or that he was acting in the course and scope of his employment. But, he claims an exception applies to his negligence claims so that they are exempt from the Act. He claims his injuries “arose out of an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of a personal reason and not directed at the employee as an employee or because of the employment.” Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 406.032 (Vernon 1996). So, Urdiales argues that Cantu did not assault him because of work; Cantu assaulted him because of personal animosity unrelated to work. As we discuss below, the record does not support Urdíales’ claim. But before we consider the evidence, we will review what the Texas Supreme Court has said about the personal animosity exception.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Walls Regional Hospital v. Bomar,
The Worker’s Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for employees’ injuries sustained in the course of their employment, at least if the injuries are compensable under the Act. Some injuries are not compensable, among them one that “arose out of an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of a personal reason and not directed at the employee as an employee or because of the employment”— the so-called “personal animosity exception.” We explained in Nasser v. Security Insurance Co. that
the purpose of the “personal animosity” exception is to exclude from coverage of the Act those injuries resulting from a dispute which has been transported into the place of employment from the injured employee’s private or domestic life, at least where the animosity is not exacerbated by the employment. Whenever conditions attached to the place of employment or otherwise incident to the employment are factors in a catastrophic combination, the consequent injury arises out of the employment.
Id. at 806-07 (citations omitted).
Nasser
and
Bomar
are both good examples of how narrow the personal animosity exception is. In
Nasser,
a restaurant manager was stabbed by a customer’s jealous boyfriend. The personal animosity exception did not apply, and thus the manager was entitled to compensation benefits, because his duties included interaction with the customers.
Nasser v. Sec. Ins. Co.,
Like the nurses in Bomar, Urdíales identifies no personal dispute or animosity that motivated Cantu to assault him. He also does not dispute that the fight with Cantu occurred after Cantu confronted him about being late from his lunch break. In fact, he alleges this fact throughout his first amended petition and in his affidavit in response to Concord’s motion for summary judgment. He also does not challenge the sworn statement of a Concord representative that when Cantu hit Urd-íales, Urdíales “had just returned from lunch and was having a conversation with Alfredo Cantu regarding his tardy return. ...” In short, as in Bomar, nothing in the record shows that Cantu attacked him because of an event or a relationship outside of work.
We find Concord demonstrated as a matter of law that Cantu’s dispute with Urdíales was directed to Urdíales as an employee and arose from his employment. 1 Therefore, the personal animosity exception to the Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply, and we overrule Urdíales’ complaint that it does apply.
Having found that the “personal animosity” exception to the Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply here, all of Urd-íales’ negligence claims are barred; the Workers’ Compensation Act is Urdíales’ exclusive remedy for them. We also overrule his contention that summary judgment was improper because the gravamen of the negligence claims was Concord’s negligence in hiring, training, entrustment, retention, and supervision of Cantu. This was addressed in
Bomar
where the Court held that the Act barred these negligence-based claims.
Bomar,
2. The Intentional Tort Claims and Respondeat Superior.
Urdíales also asserts that summary judgment was improper on his intentional tort claims because Cantu’s intentional acts should be imputed to Concord under a theory of respondeat superior. We assume he is arguing that, if Concord is liable under respondeat superior law, Concord must pay, even though Urdíales did not opt out of worker’s compensation coverage. 2 Earlier we discussed one ex *406 ception to the Act’s coverage — the “personal animosity” exception. This issue implicates another exception, the “intentional tort” exception. 3 Under that exception, an employer can, under certain circumstances, be sued at common law for its own intentional torts, even though it provides insurance under the Act.
Again, as with the personal animosity exception, we have guidance from the Texas Supreme Court on this issue. In
Medina v. Hemra,
the Court discussed the intentional tort exception and discussed when an employer can be held liable for its employee’s intentional act.
See Medina v. Herrera,
It cited to a court of appeals opinion and to a workers’ compensation treatise, both of which concluded that the intentional tort exception to the workers’ compensation statute
should apply to corporate employers only when the “assailant is, by virtue of control or ownership, in effect the alter ego of the corporation,” or where the corporate employer specifically authorizes the assault. 2A Larson, the law of WORKMEN’S compensation, § 68.00, 68.21 (1990). The mere fact that an employer may be liable for conduct under a theory of respondeat superior, according to Professor Larson, should not impute the conduct itself to the employer so as to trigger the exception from workers’ compensation coverage. Id. Likewise, the mere fact that the tortfeasor holds a supervisory position over the claimant should not trigger the exception. Id. § 68.22.
Id. at 601.
This conclusion makes sense. Setting aside the specific issue here for a moment, generally, the intentional injury exception has always been narrowly construed.
See Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin,
The
Copelin
court explained that a narrow interpretation was appropriate.
See Copelin,
The Act established a system of liability without fault. In exchange, the employee had to give up certain elements of damage recoverable under common law negligence. The system balances the advantage to employers of immunity from negligence and potentially larger recovery in common law actions against the advantage to employees of relatively swift and certain compensation without proof of fault.... The continued effectiveness of the worker’s compensation scheme depends on the continued ability to spread the risk of such losses. If employers are required to provide not only worker’s compensation but also to defend and pay for accidental injuries, their ability to spread the risk through reasonable insurance premiums is toeatened, and the balance of advantage and detriment would be significantly disturbed.
Id.
Although the court was referring to negligence claims, even willful negligence claims, the same reasoning applies to an intentional tort as we have here. It would disturb the balance the Workers’ Compensation Act achieved if we allowed an employee, injured by the intentional tort of a co-employee, to sue and recover from their employer simply because the tort was committed (1) at work (2) by an employee of the company. Something more must be present to bring the case within the intentional injury exception.
See Medina,
3. Participation in a Protected Activity.
We now turn to Urdíales’ complaint that the trial court erred in granting Concord’s motion for summary judgment and in denying his partial no-evidence summary judgment motion on his retaliation claim, which was based on his allegation that he participated in a protected activity under Texas Labor Code section 21.055. Specifically, he contends that Concord terminated his employment in violation of the Code when it fired him for filing this lawsuit against it. Moreover, Urdíales contends that Concord’s invocation of the “at-will” doctrine is a pretext for the unlawful retaliation. However, Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code authorizes a cause of action for retaliation only when the employer retaliates or discriminates on the basis of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age.
See
Tex. Lab.Code Ann. §§ 21.051, 21.055;
see also
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.001 (general purposes of chapter). Nothing in Chapter 21 authorizes Urdíales to assert a retaliation claim under section 21.55 based on the conduct alleged — filing a lawsuit against Concord. Additionally, Urdíales does not dispute that he was an at-will employee. In the absence of an applicable statutory or judicially-created exception, an at-will employee may be terminated for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason.
See Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co.,
E. The SeveRance of Concord’s Claims
Finally, Urdíales contends the trial court erred in severing his claims. Rule 41 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that “[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.” This rule grants the trial court broad discretion in the matter of severance and consolidation of causes.
Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co.,
In support of this issue, Urdíales merely states in a conclusory fashion that the claims should not have been severed because they involve the same underlying factual allegations and evidence. This is not enough to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. The trial court granted summary judgment on all of Urdíales’ claims against Concord; therefore, there was no reason for Concord to remain in the suit. Severance and final judgment for Concord in this circumstance was appropriate.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. As additional support, Urdíales points to (1) a statement by Thompson that "[w]e had told Richard no [sic] to say anything to anyone” and (2) Concord's failure to present evidence that it notified the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission or its insurance agent of Urdíales’ injury in accordance with section 409.005 of the Act. However, we disagree that the statement raises a fact issue on personal animosity outside of work, and Urdíales does not explain why section 409.005 is relevant or even applies here. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 409.005(a) ("An employer shall report to the employee's insurance carrier if: (1) an injury results in the absence of an employee of that employer from work for more than one day; or (2) an employee of the employer notifies that employer of an occupational disease under Section 409.001.”).
. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 406.034 (an employee who desires to retain common-law right of action against employer must notify employer within five days of employment or within five days of receiving notice that employer has obtained workers’ compensation *406 coverage); id. § 408.001 (recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance coverage).
. Urdiales has cited two respondeat superior cases in support of this claim.
See Houston Transit Co. v. Felder,