183 Iowa 39 | Iowa | 1918
The answer was a general denial. Subsequently, an amendment in two divisions was filed. In the first division:
“The defendant specifically denies that, from and after the 5th day of June, 1912, he was ever indebted to said plaintiff, M. L. Urdange-n, and denies that, in the month of March, 1914, a settlement and accounting was had between himself and the plaintiff. He further denies that, at Mason City, Iowa, or at any other time or place, he ever agreed that he was indebted to said plaintiff in the sum of $1,0-00 or any other sum, but avers the facts to be that, in a settlement and accounting had by .and between himself, A. N. Fryer, M. L. Urdangen, and Ida TJrdangen at Rock Island, 111., on or about the 5th day of June, 1912, it was there and then orally agreed by and between all of said parties that all claims and indebtedness owing from one to the other should be adjusted and settled, and that, in pursuance of said oral agreement to account and adjust their various claims, the said indebtedness then owing by this defendant unto said plaintiff was agreed to as fully paid.”
That part from “but avers” to the end was stricken on motion, as constituting no defense and as incompetent and immaterial to any issue' in the case. Segregated from the
“A mere false claim, a sham, one set up without any colorable pretense or plausible foundation, might not come within the terms or definition of a compromise, and might not sustain it. Characterized by bad faith, the preferring of such a claim would itself be a fraud, and concessions made or rights yielded on the strength of it would not be lost, nor the settlement be a bar.'’ Kerchaval v. Doty, 31 Wis. 476, 485.
Even though there may have been no indebtedness of defendant subsequent to the 1912 settlement, as alleged, this
The argument is general, and not on specific rulings, and for these reasons may not be revieAved. — Affirmed.