406 A.2d 11 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1979
The plaintiff landlord brings this action in summary process seeking possession for the termination of a lease. The defendant tenant filed the present motion charging that "the plaintiff did not serve the defendant with a notice to quit as required by Connecticut General Statutes, Section
The defendant does not propose that the plaintiff's predecessor in title should have issued the complaint; rather, she suggests an innovative and quaint theory which finds no basis in law, namely, that the designated plaintiff is required to commence the summary process proceedings anew. This court does not agree. The defendant's brief is bereft of any citations in support of that contention. Although the court agrees with the general principles she recites, those principles are not in accord with the facts at hand.
The flaw in the defendant's case is disclosed in the contention in her brief that "in order for a lease to be terminated, the plaintiff-lessor must prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship." This is no longer the law in Connecticut and is at variance with §
No leasehold interest is required for dispossession under §
Section
The defendant seeks further to encumber a summary process proceeding by reading into the statute the requirement that, in order to dispossess a tenant properly, the owner of the premises at the time of the issuance of the notice to quit must remain the owner at the time of the issuance of the complaint. It is to be supposed that the defendant would argue, reductio ad absurdum, that the original owner ought to remain the owner during the pleadings, the trial and throughout the appeal stage, if any. The consequences would be both bizarre and humorous. In effect, the election by a landlord of a statutory right, according to the defendant, should act as a bar to the alienation of his property.
The defendant tenant is represented by competent counsel. The filing of this motion was, however, an attempt to joust at windmills. The court will review for counsel the basic principles of summary process law.
It is settled law in this state that a summary process action is to be limited to a few simple issues.Rosa v. Cristina,
Summary process is also aimed at deciding the simple question of "who is entitled to possession?" See Rosa v. Cristina, supra, and the following cases mentioned above. That is the sole issue for summary process.
The court acknowledges that statutory modifications of Connecticut common law have resulted in the creation of new rights and remedies. Tenants may plead by special defense a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. General Statutes §
Unless the tenant can prove payment of rent, the existence of a lease, the special defenses referred to hereinabove or superior title in and to the subject premises, then he must yield possession, willingly or unwillingly.
The defendant's claim that she cannot be dispossessed because she objects to the change of ownership is rejected. The contention has no recognition in Connecticut law.
Accordingly, for the reasons cited hereinabove, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.