Donald URBAN and Susan Urban, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David GRASSER and Heritage Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Respondents, JOHN ALDEN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
No. 99-0933
Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Decided June 14, 2001
2001 WI 63 | 627 N.W.2d 511
(Also reported in 627 N.W.2d 511.)
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Arthur P. Simpson and Simpson & Deardorff, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Arthur P. Simpson.
¶ 1. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. Plaintiff Donald Urban (Urban) appeals a circuit court decision concluding that defendant David Grasser (David) was entitled to recreational immunity under
¶ 2. The issue is whether the facts of this case give rise to recreational immunity for David. We conclude that the facts entitle David to immunity and that no exceptions to immunity apply. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court‘s decision.
I
¶ 3. On July 19, 1997, Urban purchased a boat from Paul. The boat was docked at a boat slip on Paul‘s property. After Urban purchased the boat, he intended to dock the boat at another location. However, because Urban needed time to secure the other location, Paul аgreed that Urban could temporarily dock the boat on his property. Paul did not charge Urban for the use of the boat slip.
¶ 4. A description of the property is necessary to understand Urban‘s use of the property and the occurrence of his injury. The property at issue was a rectangular parcel of property that was divided into
¶ 5. To the north of both David and Paul‘s properties was a concrete driveway that was owned by a neighbor. The driveway declined from west to east while the property owned by David and Paul remained level. Consequently, from west to east, David and Paul‘s property was at a gradually higher level than the neighboring driveway. A retaining wall separated the driveway from David and Paul‘s properties. The top of this wall remained level with David and Paul‘s properties, but the bottom of the wall declined from west to east in the same manner as the driveway.
¶ 6. Prior to 1981, Paul owned all of the property at issue in this case. In 1981, however, David contracted with Paul to purchase the western portion of the property. The contraсt granted a perpetual easement to Paul over a portion of David‘s property and provided as follows:
The land [the property conveyed to David] shall be subject to a perpetual easement in favor of Vendor [Paul and his wife] over the south 10 feet of the west 110 feet as [sic] and for ingress and egress and to a perpetual easement over the entire parcel except the 110 west feet thereof and said easement for ingress and egress, said easement to allow Vendors free use of the easement area for themselves and
those to whom they shall lease boat slips in the city of Kenosha harbor and guests. Purchasers shall also have the right to use of the land covered by the west easement provided it does not interfere with the easemеnt rights of Vendors and their lessees.
The easement over David‘s property constituted the only legal means available for Paul, his guests, and lessees of the boat slips to access Paul‘s property and the boat slips.
¶ 7. On the day that he purchased the boat, Urban, along with members of his family, made several trips from his automobile to the boat slip, crossing David‘s property each time. Urban slept on the boat that night. The next day, July 20, 1997, he again accessed the boat several times by using the same route.
¶ 8. During the early evening of July 20, 1997, Urban was walking back from the boat slip when he noticed a dog on David‘s property. The dog, a boxer named Baby, was owned by David. The dog began growling and barking at Urban and then proceeded to chase him. Although the dog was chained to a tree on David‘s property, Urban did not nоtice the chain, and he began running to the north. Without stopping or looking back, Urban jumped from the property onto the concrete driveway. At the point where he jumped, the property was about ten feet higher than the driveway. The parties do not contest that Urban jumped from David‘s property. Urban seriously injured his heel when he landed.
¶ 9. Urban and his wife (plaintiffs) filed a complaint against David and his insurers, Heritage Mutual and John Alden Life Insurance Company. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged two causes of action. First, they alleged that, pursuant to
¶ 10. David and Heritage Mutual (defendants)2 moved for summary judgment, arguing that David was immune from liability pursuant to
II
¶ 11. We address only whether the facts of this case give rise to recreational immunity and entitle David to summary judgment. We deliberately state the issue differently than that posed by the court of appeals in its certification. The court of appeals presented the issue as follows: “This case asks whether a property owner, holding a servient property interest, may claim recreational immunity for injuries suffered by persons who used the easement to cross the property as the guest of the easement holder, the dominant property interest.”
¶ 12. Although the court of appeals correctly framed the issue, we conclude that our statement of the
¶ 13. We conclude that we can do little more than repeat what has been stated continually in prior cases, that is, that each case requires an examination of all the circumstances surrounding the activity, keeping in mind the legislative purpose. We have identified a number of those aspects: the intrinsic nature of the activity, the purpose of the activity, the consequences of the activity, and the intent of the user. See Sievert v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 623, 631, 528 N.W.2d 413 (1995); Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 716, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994). An examination of prior cases interpreting
¶ 14. The naturе of the property can give us insight into the nature of the activity. See Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 717; Nelson v. Schreiner, 161 Wis. 2d 798, 802, 469 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1991) (“Actions whose intrinsic nature are recreational and are conducted at a public facility or service dedicated to exercise, relaxation or pleasure may be recreational activities without
¶ 15. None of the factors enumerated above, viewed in isolation, are determinative. In any given case, one or more factors may have greater weight, but all should be looked at in their totality.
III
¶ 16. We review a grant of summary judgment using the same methodology as the circuit court. Meyer v. Sch. Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
¶ 17.
¶ 18. We must first determine whether David is an “owner” under the statute.
¶ 19. We next determine whether Urban was “engaging in a recreational activity on [David‘s] property.” This determination requires application of the statutory definition of “recreational activity” to Urban‘s activity. This definition states:
“Recreational activity” means any outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure, including practice or instruction in any
such activity. “Recreational activity” includes, but is not limited to, hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, bicycling, horseback riding, bird-watching, motorcycling, operating an all-terrain vehicle, ballooning, hang gliding, hiking, tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing, skating, water sports, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal training, harvesting the products of nature and any other outdoor sport, game or educational activity, but does not include any organized team sport activity sponsored by the owner of the property on which the activity takes place.
¶ 20. However, before we can apply this definition, we must first resolve a dispute between the parties concerning the scope of Urban‘s activity. The issue is whether Urban‘s activity on Paul‘s property should be factored into our determination. The plaintiffs argue that any activity undertaken by Urban on Paul‘s property is immaterial to our determination. They assert that we must only examine Urban‘s activity on David‘s property, and in this respect, we must conclude that Urban‘s mere act of walking, without more, cannot support a finding of recreational activity. In contrast, the defendants argue that Urban‘s activity on David‘s property must be considered in light of his activity on Paul‘s property, and when considering the activity in this manner, it must be regarded as walking to access his boat. We agree with the defendants.
¶ 21. Our examination looks at Urban‘s activities on both properties because the activities are “inextricably connected.” This connection is evidenced, in the first instance, by the fact that Urban had to cross David‘s property because it was the only legal means
¶ 22. The connection between the walk and the use of the boat is also evidenced by the fact that Urban‘s use of David‘s property to access his boat resulted from permission from Paul. Paul held a dominant interest in an easement over David‘s рroperty, and he exercised his rights under the terms of the easement agreement by granting permission to Urban. Urban then utilized David‘s property within the terms of the easement agreement. These facts provide additional support for our conclusion that the walk was inextricably connected to the activity on Paul‘s property. As a result, we will consider Urban‘s activity on Paul‘s property in our determination.
¶ 23. It is important to note that we do not conclude that every walk and its related activity must be
¶ 24. We now turn to the question of whether the facts of this case give rise to the conclusion that Urban‘s walk on David‘s property was “recreational aсtivity” within the meaning of the statute.
¶ 25. The definition of “recreational activity” contains three parts:
(1) a broad definition stating that a recreational activity is “any outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure,” (2) a list of 28 specific activities denominated as recreational, and (3) a second broad definition, directing that a recreational activity can be “any other outdoor sport, game or educational activity.”
¶ 26. As stated in Minnesota Fire, 2001 WI 64, ¶ 10, “we must construe the first part‘s broad definition in light of the second part‘s list of 28 specific recreational activities, and the third part‘s broad definition providing that a recreational activity is ‘any other outdoor sport, game or educational activity.‘” (citation omitted).
¶ 27. The sole purpose of Urban‘s wаlk over David‘s property was to gain access to his boat to use
¶ 28. We recognize that Urban‘s walking is not immediately identifiable as one of the 28 listed activities. However, an activity does not need to fall within the direct terms of the definition to be characterized as a “recreational activity.” See Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 629-30. Instead, as noted in Sievert, the legislature expressly stated that this definition is “intended merely to provide examples of activities constituting recreational activities and that ‘where substantially similar circumstances or activities exist’ the legislation should be construed liberally to protect the property owner.” Id. at 630 (citing 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1). As enumerated in Sievert, we adopted the following test in Linville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, to determine whether an activity is “substantially similar“:
[T]he test “considers the purpose and nature of the activity in addition to the [property] user‘s intent.” “The test requires examination of all aspects of the activity. The intrinsic nature, purpose and consequence of the activity are relevant. While the injured person‘s subjective assessment of the activity is relevant, it is not controlling. Thus, whether the injured person intended to recreate is not dispositive, . . .but why [the person] was on the property is pertinent.”
Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 631 (quoting Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 716) (second and third alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
¶ 29. We conclude that, under this test, Urban‘s activity on David‘s property is substantially similar to the activities listed under the definition. After his purchase of the boat was completed, Urban continued to walk across David‘s property to access his boat, and the consequence of his crossing the property was the use of his boat for recreation. Urban stated that he purchased the boat solely for recreation and that he had to cross David‘s property to carry out this goal. Indeed, while on David‘s property, Urban was not exercising or throwing a ball or engaging in activities of this nature. However, our examination looks at all aspects of the activity, including the reason the person was on the property. In this case, Urban‘s acts and statements indicate that his only reason for being on David‘s property was to access his boat for recreation.
¶ 30. We also note that extending immunity to David in this instance would fulfill the legislative purpose behind the recreational immunity statute. This legislative purpose seeks “to encourage property owners to allow use of their lands for recreational activities by removing the potential for liability arising out of
¶ 31. In addition, the intent of the landowner with respect to the use of his property is helpful. David‘s easement to Paul provided an “easement to allow Vendors [and guests of the vendors] free use of the easement area for themselves and those they shall lease boat slips in the city of Kenosha harbor and guests.” This easement evinces at the very least no intent to restrict the use of the property to non-recreational activities. In light of the broadness of the language, it appears to anticipate that recreational activity could occur.
¶ 32. In light of all of the above, we conclude that Urban‘s walking on David‘s property was “recreational activity,” which gives rise to recreational immunity.
IV
¶ 33. We now examine whether any exceptions to recreational immunity apply. In this case, the plaintiffs first argue that immunity should not apply because Urban was Paul‘s “social guest,” and therefore, the exception under
The death or injury occurs on property owned by a private property owner to a social guest who has been expressly and individually invited by the pri-
vate property owner for the specific occasion during which the death or injury occurs, if the death or injury occurs on any of the following: . . . 2. Residential property.
¶ 34. This social guest exception was enacted in 1984 as part of 1983 Wisconsin Act 418. This exception came about after this court‘s decision in LePoidevin v. Wilson, 111 Wis. 2d 116, 330 N.W.2d 555 (1983). In LePoidevin, a property owner sought immunity under
¶ 35. The legislative history of 1983 Wisconsin Act 418 indicates that this social guest exception was included to ensure that a property owner does not gain
¶ 36. Finally, we address whether the “profit” exception under
Subsection (2) does not limit the liability of a private property owner . . .whose property is used for a
recreational activity if any of the following conditions exist:
(a) The private property owner collects money, goods or services in payment for the use of the owner‘s property for the recreational activity during which the death or injury occurs, and the aggregate value of all payments received by the owner for the use of the owner‘s property for recreational activities during the year in which the death or injury occurs exceeds $2,000.
¶ 37. In Douglas, the court of appeals recognized that the legislature specifically adopted a pеcuniary-benefit approach, which places duties and obligations upon owners of property when the owners receive a pecuniary benefit from users of their property. Id. at 461. The court also noted that the legislature‘s intent to adopt this approach was indicated in 1983 Wis. Act 418, which stated that the act intended to limit the liability of property owners ” ‘under circumstances in which the owner does not derive more than a minimal pecuniary benefit.’ ” Id. (quoting 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1). These benefits must be actual, not merely potential. Id. All indirect pecuniary benefits, as well as direct pecuniary benefits, received by the property owner for the use of the property must be considered. Id. at 462.
¶ 39. The record does not provide any evidence to show that Paul‘s permission to use the boat slip helped to secure the sale of the boat or had any effect on the overall cost of the boat. Indeed, Urban suggested that the cost of the slip was included in the boat sale, but he also stated that Paul told him “no problem” and did not charge him directly for the use of the slip. Regardless, even if Paul had received such a benefit in the sale of his boat, the benefit gained for the use of the boat slip would have been only a minimal pecuniary gain. Further, there are no facts in the record to suggest that David received any benefit. David is entitled to immunity.
¶ 40. In summary, we conclude that the facts of this case give rise to recreational immunity for David. The circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants.
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 41. JON P. WILCOX, J. (concurring). I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that
¶ 42. Section 895.52 is plain on its face. It provides that “no owner and no officer, employe or agent of an owner is liable for the death of, any injury to, or any death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner‘s property.”
¶ 43. Until recently, this court recognized as much:
The unambiguous language of the recreational use statute sets the following precondition for immunity—that the injury be to or caused by “a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner‘s property. . . .”
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b) . There is no language [in§ 895.52 ] that conditions immunity upon affirmative acts on the part of the owner to grant permission or otherwise “open” land.
The legislature hаs made it clear that previous decisions by Wisconsin courts that are more restrictive, implying a requirement that lands be “open,” are overruled.
Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 634-35, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996). Therefore, this court traditionally has held that
¶ 44. Nonetheless, the majority posits that the scope of
¶ 45. To be sure, the majority frames these limits as a list of factors courts must consider in examining the nature of an activity, rather than as restrictions on
¶ 46. As I explained in my dissent to Minnesota Fire, I will not join the majority in ignoring the clear lеgislative directive in
¶ 47. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting). Today‘s decision extends immunity for recreational activity on one owner‘s property to the owner of adjacent property that the injured plaintiff walked across in order to get to his automobile after leaving the land upon which he engaged in recreational activity. Because I conclude that this extension of immunity is not justified under
¶ 48. The facts of this case show that the plaintiff, Donald Urban, was injured while walking on the property of defendant David Grasser. The plaintiff walked across David Grasser‘s land to get back to the plaintiff‘s automobile after having worked on his boat. The plaintiff‘s boat activities, which occurred on property owned by Paul Grasser, are “recreational activities” on Paul Grasser‘s land within
¶ 50. The statute does not, however, extend recreational immunity to David Grasser, the owner of the servient estate, the property subject to the easement.1 The statute grants an owner immunity from liability only for an injury to “a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner‘s property.”
¶ 51. The majority opinion has rewritten
¶ 52. Applying the statute as rewritten, the majority opinion concludes that David Grasser is entitled to share Paul Grasser‘s recreational immunity because the plaintiff‘s walking on David Grasser‘s property is “inextricably connected” to the recreatiоnal activity of boating that had occurred on Paul Grasser‘s property. This nebulous concept of “inextricably connected” that extends recreational immunity to a second property owner as a result of a recreational activity that occurs on adjacent property has no basis in the recreational immunity statute.
¶ 53. In reading the statute the way it does, the majority opinion suggests that it is fulfilling the purpose of the statute to encourage property owners to open their property for recreational activity.2 I disagree.
¶ 54. First, whether the purpose of the recreation immunity statute is to open land for recreation is open to question. The “opening the land” purpose is no longer expressed in the statute. The 1983 amendments to the recreational immunity statute аpply to the present case and contain no references to opening the land or giving or granting permission to enter the land as had earlier statutes. The purpose of the 1983 statute was to limit the liability of property owners toward others who use the property for recreational activities. The 1983 amended statute does not purport to grant
¶ 55. One of the purposes of the 1983 amendments as evidenced in the legislative history was to do away with the great uncertainty in the recreational immunity law produced in this court‘s decisions.4 Yet the majority opinion creates new uncertainty. Requiring an intensely fact-driven inquiry into whether a plaintiff‘s presence on one property is “inextricably connectеd” to recreational activity on a second property creates uncertainty.
¶ 56. This sort of intensive fact-driven inquiry fundamentally changes the “open the land” purpose of the recreational immunity statute that the majority opinion is striving to achieve: If property owners’ immunity from suit depends on a court‘s fact-driven inquiry rather than on the plain language of the statute, property owners have less incentive to open their property for recreational activities. I do not think the legislature intended that
¶ 57. The new and nebulous judicially created concept of “inextricably connected” threatens to extend recreational immunity far beyond the plain language of the statute. Fоr example, the plaintiff in this case was walking across David Grasser‘s property to get his automobile, which was parked on the street. Is the
¶ 58. Because I see no logical stopping point for the majority‘s new theory, and because I do not think the legislature intended that the statute would provide such broad immunity for defendants in personal injury cases, I conclude that this case represents the stopping point for recreational immunity.
¶ 59. David Grasser is not the owner of property on which a recreationаl activity occurred. Accordingly, under the plain language of
¶ 60. This court should await clear guidance from the legislature before extending recreational immunity to adjacent property owners whose property the injured person walks across en route to or from a
¶ 61. Finally, I join the chorus of voices on this court expressing frustration with trying to apply the current version of the recreational immunity stаtute clearly and consistently in the myriad fact situations that have arisen.5 More cases are in the pipeline. I join the chorus requesting clarification from the legislature regarding the intended scope and application of the
¶ 62. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 63. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.