*1 COMPANY, Appellant, The UPJOHN FREEMAN, Freeman,
William R. Martha
Individually and as Next Friend and Perry Freeman,
Guardian of Sean a Mi Child, Freeman,
nor Suzanne E. as Next
Friend and Guardian of Leah Suzanne Freeman,
Freeman and William Lance Children,
Minor and Lori Yvonne Free
man, Appellees.
No. 05-93-00468-CV. Appeals
Court of
Dallas.
Aug.
Rehearing Denied Oct.
Stеphen E. Scheve and Robert H. McCul- ly, City, MO, Josephson, Kansas Richard L. Houston, Lynn Earl B. Austin and S. Swit- zer, Dallas, appellant. for Coyd Kaplan, Randal Johnson and Jeff Watler, Dallas, Lowy, Martin Paul C. for appellees. BAKER,
Before and THOMAS BURNETT, JJ.
OPINION BURNETT, Justice. family R. Freeman
William and his sued Upjohn Company The for and products liability injuries resulting for from Halcion, prescription Freeman’s use of sleeping pill.1 alleged taking Freeman psychotic, paranoid, Halcion caused him to be delusional; memory resulted in and and loss suicides; attempted him to kill and caused sought Donnie Hazelwood. dam- injuries, ages Family for these and the sued support. for loss of consortium and loss of evidence, At the close the trial court take-nothing instructed a verdict in favor Upjohn wages on Freeman’s claims for lost earning capacity. jury diminished Upjohn grossly negligent dispensing found marketing Halcion with a defect. The Freeman, Family, collectively, 1. We will refer to William R. individu- refer to Freeman as ally, as We will Freeman. refer to Freeman's the Freemans. Family. necessary, When we will Family Upjohn awarded zero to Freeman and maintains that did not estab- exemplary damages awarded actual and lish that Freeman’s cause of action accrued Family. awarded years more than two before suit was filed. Martha, Sean, Leah, loss consortium to Family continuing-tort contends and Lori Freeman. The awarded loss- applies resulting rule from the use Martha, Sean, Leah, of-support damages to prescription medication. The fur- Lance. With award legal ther asserts that the disabili- children’s support, for loss of the trial court entered ty minority precludes applying limitations take-nothing judgment notwithstanding the to their claims. Upjohn. verdict in favor of recognizes Texas law a cause of Upjohn appeals verdict, asserting spousal parental action for the loss of general points six of error. *4 contends (i) Reagan Vaughn, consortium. v. 804 S.W.2d the statute of limitations bars the 463, (Tex.1990), (ii) claims; reh’g, Family’s 466 on 804 exempla- thе actual and clarified Miller, (1991); ry Whittlesey S.W.2d at 467 damage v. awards are not sustainable as a (iii) (Tex.1978). law; 665, However, of 572 667 support- matter and S.W.2d evidence extinguished by such a cause of action is findings legally causation and fac- tually expiration of the statute of Upjohn insufficient. limitations on the further contends (i) injured family personal-injury that the trial court member’s submitting erred (ii) 466; charge jury, Reagan, claim. See 804 at admitting certain S.W.2d tes- Duval, (Tex. (iii) 351, timony evidence, and exhibits into Work 809 S.W.2d 354 and writ). 1991, calculating damage App. [14th Dist.] no award. —Houston parties agree applicable The that the statute Family appeals The judg- the trial court’s of limitations for the member a ment, asserting cross-points two of error. personal-injury ease based on and Family contends that the trial court products liability years. strict is two (i) entering judgment erred in a n.o.v. re- 16.003(a) Tex.Civ.PRAc. Ann. <&Rem.Code garding support award for loss of (Vernon 1986). Therefore, Family must (ii) applying settlement credits because brought have for suit loss of consortium not settling of defendants. years later than after two the date that Family We conclude that pleaded suffi- Freeman’s cause of action accrued. put cient facts to the continuing-tort rule in issue; therefore, Upjohn conclusively did not Because the statute of limitations is an establish that Freeman’s cause of action ac- defense, Upjohn affirmative bore the initial crued statutory period. outside the pleading proving plea burden of its of found that Freeman did not suffer an limitations. Tex.R.Civ.P. Woods v. Wil Upjohn’s negligence because of product. Mercer, Inc., 515, M. liam 769 S.W.2d 517 Consequently, jury’s finding precludes (Tex.1988); Corp. Metal Structures v. Plains Family’s (Tex.Civ. cause of action Textiles, Inc., for loss of con- 93, 470 99 S.W.2d Finally, sortium as a matter of n.r.e.). law. we hold 1971, App. Up writ refd —Amarillo recovery no loss-of-support there is for john pleaded limitations. At the close of personal-injury in a claim as a mat- evidence, Upjohn moved for a directed ver ter of law. dict, We reverse the trial court’s asserting a limitations defense. The judgment and render a take-nothing judg- pre trial court denied motion. To Upjohn. ment for appeal, Upjohn vail on demonstrate must conclusively proves, that the record evidence STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS law, Family’s as a matter of causes one, point Upjohn In years error contends of action than accrued more two before that the statute of bars limitations the Fami- suit was filed. Sterner v. Marathon Oil ly’s 686, Upjohn According causes of action. asserts 767 S.W.2d 690 ly, did not file suit within the statu- must establish the date on which tory period jury findings and did not secure Freeman’s cause action accrued and the Intermedies, discovery sufficient to invoke the rule. The date on which suit was filed. 542 842, Grady, concept injury originat-
Inc. v.
683
845
of continuous
S.W.2d
trespass-to-land
App.
[1st
writ ref
ed in
and nuisance cases
Dist.]
d
—Houston
n.r.e.).
expanded
false-imprison-
has been
include
ment cases. See
Ranch &
Creswell
Cattle
Generally, a cause of aсtion accrues
Scoggins,
Tex.Civ.App.
Co.
S.W.
wrongful
injury,
when the
act effects
re
(1897); Adler,
gardless
plaintiff
of when the
learns of the
Adler,
period
In
this Court
the entire
viewed
Weaver,
injury. Robinson v.
continuing
one
for
of detention as
tort
which
(Tex.1977). If
the act itself constitutes an
single
cause of
accrues when the
action
plaintiffs legally protected
invasion
Adler,
imprisonment ceases.
594 S.W.2d at
interest,
right or
the cause of action
then
day
imprison-
154. We reasoned that each
accrues when the
But
act occurred.
may
separate
be
to create a
ment
understood
legal transgression,
act was not a
then the
Therefore,
action.
avoid
cause of
multi-
when
claim arises
an actual
results.
suits, plicity cause of action for false
Crosland,
Atkins v.
imprisonment
complete
does
not
(Tex.1967); see 50
Limitation
TEX.JuR.3d
Adler,
until
accrue
the detention ends.
§ 58
Actions
Accordingly,
at 155.
Here, Upjohn’s sale of Halcion was a may
single
bring
wait and
suit
legal
lawful act because it
did not constitute
Adler,
period
imprisonment.
whole
*5
is, an
injury,
injury giving
that
rise to a
156;
at
see
Limitations
S.W.2d
54 C.J.S.
of
cause of action due
an invasion of
to
some
Actions
177
Akins,
right
Freeman.
417
S.W.2d at
See
Therefore,
case,
wrongful
present
In the
personal-injury
resulting
in
negligent
claim
from
of Halcion
conduct is the
sale of Halcion
a
his use
arose
wrongful
only
damages.
Upjohn’s
he
defective condition.
con
when
sustained
See At
kins,
Cherry
417
at
duct became
when Freeman used
S.W.2d
see also
v.
actionable
Chustz,
742,
(Tex.App.
injury.
Halcion in a manner that caused him
715 S.W.2d
745
—Dal
writ)
(unaware
1986,
(claims
long
no
on
As
as Freeman
conse
las
based
strict
Halcion,
liability
injury).
Upjohn’s
products
quences)
using
continued
arise on date
respect
continued
to Freeman.
conduct
with
Typically,
period
the limitations
be
However,
not
a continuous tort involves
or,
gins
run
as
to
when the claim accrues
in
conduct,
continuing wrongful
continuing
but
case,
damages
this
when
are sustained.
Adler,
injury
594 S.W.2d at
as well. See
Inc.,
Murray
Agency,
v. San
800
Jacinto
155-57; Twyman
Twyman, 790
S.W.2d
826,
(Tex.1990);
S.W.2d
829
see Parker v.
819,
1990),
(Tex.App.
rev’d on
821
—Austin
Yen,
359,
(Tex.App.
823 S.W.2d
365
—Dallas
grounds, 855
other
S.W.2d
writ).
1991,
However,
exception
no
to
case,
wrongful
continuing-tort
con
In a
continuing
this rule is found with
torts. See
injury
to
continues
effect additional
to
duct
153,
Beverly
Hosp.,
Adler
Hills
594 S.W.2d
stops.
plaintiff until
conduct
Ar
writ).
1980,
(Tex.Civ.App.
no
A
—Dallas
(Tex.
Hancock,
627, 629
quette v.
continuing
tort does
cause of action
a
not
n.r.e.);
Antonio
writ refd
App.—San
act
until the
tortious
ceas
accrue
defendant’s
Adler,
at 155.
Realty
Lloyd’s
Tectonic
v. CNA
es.
Inv. Co.
Ins.
Tex.
S.W.2d
a con
Upjohn’s
If
conduct caused
denied).
App.
writ
—Dallas
tinuing injury that
not end until Freeman
did
taking
drug,
continuing-
then the
allege
stopped
their
The Freemans
may
use of an
injury
apply.
tort rule
Continued
ongoing
claims are based on the
may be a con
injury-producing medication
due to
use of Hal-
Freeman
his continued
Perna,
Gatling v.
tinuing
the limita
tort. See
urge
cion. The Freemans
writ
begin
to run until Free
S.W.2d
period
tions
did
—Dallas
denied).
long
contin
As
conduct
stopped taking
drug becausе he
man
Freeman,
injury
effecting
each
“prisoner”
of the side-effects
ued
remained
separate
may
create a
be understood to
Halcion.
action; therefore,
13, 1987,
predictable
cause of
April
Freeman’s cause
behavior. On
damages
complete
of action for
taking
mg
was not
after he had been
the 1.0
dose
wrongful
month,
not accrue until
approximately
did
conduct
of Halcion for
one
Consequently,
may bring
proximate
ended.
and as a
cause of the effects of
Halcion,
single
period
suit for the
of time he sustained
W.R. Freeman killed his best
Adler,
shooting
from his use of Halcion.
friend
him the head. W.R.
cion caused his debilitated mental state. The several before the murder he knew sup Freemans adduced at trial to evidence Altman was addicted Halcion. testified port alleged Freeman’s mental condition. stop drinking that when he told Freeman to drinking problem, he had a special peti- exception Without a causing responded that alcohol not his was inju- alleged tion’s factual recitation to Hal- problems but that he was addicted ries, hold, this Court as a matter of cannot Testimony cion. that Freeman knew of an law, petition alleges specific, two conclusively to Halcion not addiction does injuries occurring identifiable outside the Halcion prove that he understood that was statutory period that the basis or constitute Moreover, affecting his mental condition. subject present the con- lawsuit. On petition alleges, the Freemans’ and the evi trary, petition alleges that Freeman con- supports, dence adduced trial Freeman’s tinued to use Halcion its effect on unaware of ignorance of him.2 Halcion’s effect on Con him and that his use of Halcion resulted conclusively sequently, Upjohn litany tragic consequences. The factual did not estab lish, law, allegations continuing injury assert a result- a matter of that Freeman as had ing from the Halcion. continued use of discovered nature of his its statutory period. cause outside petition of the al- states the nature give Up- leged sufficient detail to Upjohn did demonstrate that rec- john fair notice of nature of the claimed law, conclusively proves, a matter of ord specially ex- tort. Because did not accrued, Freeman’s cause of action cept pleading, Upjohn Freemans’ commenced, period years the limitations two any complaint sufficiency. its waived about brought before the Freemans suit. See plead- See Tex.R.Civ.P. The Freemans’ Adler, 594 S.W.2d at see also Dick Poe continuing of a our satisfies liberal Motors, 739, 744- Dickey, Inc. v. pleading. Accordingly, rule of we consider denied); writ Paso —El continuing-tort appeal. rule on Because Intermedies, 688 at 845. Conse- pleaded to.put facts the Freemans sufficient quently, denying the trial not err in court did issue, continuing-tort the Free- rule Upjohn’s motion for verdict on the a directed show, petition affirmatively does not mans’ point of basis of limitations.3 overrule We face, on its cause of action error one. years more than suit was accrued two before filed. *7 AND EXEMPLARY ACTUAL DAMAGES Next, Upjohn Free contends that two, point Upjohn In of error contends of Halcion
man’s awareness the effects of exempla- that the actual and awards of precludes of application the murder before ry damages Family to the are not sustainable continuing-tort If Freeman had the rule. Upjohn Specifically, of as matter law. cause, his the ratio discovered and its recovery Family’s for loss of asserts that continuing-tort for the rule would no nale cannot consortium stand because longer apply, and com the statute would injury. Up- that Freeman no found suffered point. mence to run at that See Atha argues of john further an award exem- that Polsky, n. 10 n.r.e.); damages absent actual plary cannot stand Tecton App. writ ref d —Austin ic, Perdue, Family damages. The contends at The Jim M. equates damages” for erroneously “zero Malpractice: Law Texas Medical Limita tions, Family “no ex- injury.” At with Freeman Hous.L.Rev. trial, damages an is not plains Phil Altman that Freeman award of zero testified that, year about a If the defendant does not establish limitations 2. Martha testified law, conviction, seek a matter of defendant can they that Halcion after the learned Intermedies, findings on the defense. affirmative responsible been for Freeman’s men- could have S.W,2d Up- denied at 845. The trial court program a television tal condition request john's a statute-of-limitations submit the side effects about of Halcion. subject jury, is the to the which point appellant’s third of error. automatically plaintiff may damages linked to the issue of whether recover present. injuries an was con- for those caused the event jury may properly cludes that a find that an Morgan, made the basis of the suit. compensate Therefore, occurred but still refuse to if 5.W.2d at 732. has not injured plaintiff. been asked consider causal nexus be- upon plaintiffs tween the event sued and the
Applicable Law
submission,
injuries in a broad-form
then this
damages ques-
in the
issue will be subsumed
case,
In
personal-injury
plain
Consequently, “proof’
tion.5
will
typically alleges
tiff
con
defendant’s
parts:
consist of two
duct
caused
event and that
this event
plaintiff
caused the
tо suffer
1)
upon
Proof that the event sued
caused
Thus,
compensation
paid.
which
should be
injuries;
plaintiffs
plaintiff
at trial the
must establish two causal
2)
Evidence about the amount of
recovery:
nexuses to be entitled to
plaintiff may
recover.
1) A causal nexus between the defendant’s
Morgan,
plaintiff
conduct
upon;
and the event sued
Answer a opposite parties question? in each of the listed below. cause the occurrence percent The total should or zero. be or “No.” Answer “Yes”
ANSWER
Yes.
ANSWER:
Therefore,
jury
the trial court asked the
to
a) Plaintiff William R. Free-
upon
Upjohn’s
rule
the causal nexus between
man
50%
b)
Upjohn
marketing
the occurrence in
Defendants The
of Halcion and
Company
20% question
ingestion of Halcion.
—Freeman’s
Landy
Dr. Aaron
30%
Morgan,
jury
8. The asked the what loss or diminution occa- amount money, any, compensate Woodyard would of another. Freeman for sioned fault Hunt, damages proximately Upjohn's his caused ac- —Houston writ). Damages ordinary meaning [1st Dist.] tions. has an no *10 Next, jury finding marketing Family argues
A
that a
the
the
clearly
ingestion of
found that
the
Halcion
producing
is the
occur
defect
cause of the
deranged
caused
mental
condition
in
is not
to a
rence
tantamount
because the
awarded Freeman’s wife
marketing
finding
pro
that the
defect is the
damages
loss of
children
for
consortium.
ducing
alleged injury.
cause of the
The use
Family
The
first
suggests
part
of
of
in
injury
produets-
is recommended
strict
plaintiffs
prove injury
the
burden to
to Free-
plaintiff
liability cases where a
re
is not
jury’s positive
man can
in the
an-
be found
quired
to first establish
nexus between the
to
the
swer
the
issue for
wife
defendant’s conduct and the occurrence in
However, question
children.10
no. 4 asks
question. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft
only if the wife and children
dam-
suffered
(Tex.1984);
Corp.,
ages
Upjohn’s
of
a result
actions. The
Op
Jury
Texas,
State Bae
Texas Pattern
injury
family
must find an
to the
mem-
¿ven
Charges
(1991). However,
PJC 71.01
determining
ber
the consortium dam-
before
cases,
produets-liability
in strict
it remains
age
Reagan,
issue.
467-68.
plaintiffs
to
burden
establish a causal
Question no. 4 does not ask the threshold
product
between the defective
and the
nexus
serious,
issue of whether Freeman suffered a
alleged injury.9
permanent,
disabling injury as
a result
Upjohn’s
of
prod-
or its defective
may
plaintiff
A
recover
467; Whittlesey,
uct. Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at
injury
product.
caused
See
defective
the family
THE FREEMANS’ CROSS- not err in Consequently, the trial court did POINTS OF ERROR judgment entering take-nothing n.o.v. on one, cross-point In of error loss-of-support damages. We the claim for in refus- Family’s cross-point contends that the trial court erred of error overrule the judgment jury’s appeal, to enter on award of this disposition one. Due to the n Martha, Sean, Leah, and support Family’s loss of second we need not address the Tex.RApp.P. 90(a). n.o.v. and judgment Lance. In its motion for cross-point. See loss-of-sup- appeal, Upjohn on contends that judgment and the trial court’s We reverse per- in port damages are not recoverable take-nothing judgment in favor of render a sonal-injury claim and that the evidence Upjohn. support legally insufficient award. Justice, McGARRY, concurring and dissenting. recognizes the recov
Texas law damages wrongful- ery loss-of-support Although panel serve on the I did not Lillebo, 722 this I ease, actions. Moore v. Tex. respectfully death dissent. grant of appeal court's Free- Freemans do not the trial moved for a directed verdict on earning capacity Freeman's claim for lost an instructed verdict on man’s claim for loss of future legally evidence. The economic benefit. on the basis of insufficient R.AppP. 90(e); imately question; O’Connor v. First CouH caused the occurrence Appeals, money and the amount of that would com- injuries, any, resulting pensate for from in this case found question. Morgan, the occurrence in proximate was a cause of the “oc- However, neither of these S.W.2d at 732. question.” currence in also found authorities tells us what the “event sued *13 proximately that conduct caused upon” question” or the “occurrence in refers companion- the Freeman to lose the any given in case. ship support and emotional R. William compensate Freeman. The chose not to pattern The Court also cites the current Fi’eeman, Mr. who is a convicted murderer authority jury charge proposition as for the serving penitentia- in a life sentence the state in that both causal nexuses identified Mor- ry. gan single can into a be combined broad jury charge in this case does not suggests in a question, form but footnote question.” define the term “occurrence in only accomplished by using this can be Presumably, had an idea about what phrase term or the occumnce or question it meant when it answered the in Maj. injury.1 op. (citing at n. 3 3 State judge, the affirmative. The tidal who submit- Jury Charges Texas, BAR of Pattern Texas charge judgment ted and entered on the (1991)). However, pat- PJC 80.03 even verdict, presumed must also be to have had jury charge slavishly tern does insist on an idea about what the verdict meant. How- question using “injury” the term in all cases. ever, upon this Court has taken it itself to definition, fact, impose a after the that effec- contrary, pattern jury To the the current tively frustrates the clear intent of both charge quite makes it clear that a choice jury and the trial court. “injury” impor- between “occurrence” and is plain- tant of the when there is evidence The Court defines the “occurrence” as Mr. “injury-causing” tiffs is or ingestion Maj. op. of Halcion. “injury-enhancing” but not “occurrence-caus- only support 547. The offered for this 2 Jury ing.” Texas, legal definition is a Morgan citation to State Bar Of Pattern Charge § Compugraphic Corp., PJC 4.01, 4-6, (1987); pp. 4-7 (Tex.1984). Jury Charge appears The Court thus treat Bar Pattern State the definition an abstract p. law such PJC Absent (1990). 71.01, 71-3 that must be answered reference to case evidence, Jury Charge the Pattern Commit- authority legal commentary. and Such an acknowledged tee that there real is no dis- believe, analysis, I misguided is in from its occurrence-causing tinction in- between ception. liability, jury-causing and that both are ac- ceptable Russell modes submission. See Morgan correctly typical observed that the McMains, Indemnity H. Contribution personal-injury requires proof ease of two Multi-Party Litigation, Problems in Texas causal nexuses: between the defendant’s con- Mary’s L.J. That is upon; duct and the event sued St. and between why jury charge pattern offers the alter- injury. plaintiffs event sued and the [injury] natives of “[occurrence] [occurrence Morgan, Morgan at 732. illus- injury]” or in its form submission. It is not trated this distinction reference to the old pattern jury “injury” magic Mor- charge, ques- is a word under which asked two gan. prox- tions: whether defendant’s conduct reasoning, using ligence, following 1. Under the Court’s doctor’s orders occwrence such as not disjunctive ought or in the to be inade- resulting aggravation during recovery, quate jury may as well: the have found causation prior pat- sustained in a accident. The injury. of an occurrence without causation of jury charge plaintiff’s tern also refers to the mis- product to miti- use of a defective failure Examples given plaintiff’s preacci- include the damages, citing gate or avoid Duncan Cessna negligence, gasoline carrying dent unprotected quent such as in an Aircraft explodes container that in a subse- crash, plaintiffs postaccident neg- and the of their interpretation “psychiatric side effects” as basis
Even under the Court’s verdict, important point mean- suit. The is that the jury charge Mr. Freeman question” as it is used causing fifty percent of of “occurrence responsible was unclear, jury charge in the and the Court appears There to be no the “occurrence.” proper analysis in apply Freeman caused an has failed evidence Mr. Thus, determining meaning. causing an ac- its without “occurrence.” cording commentary pattern in the for determin There áre two cardinal rules jury charge, either “oc- the decision to use First, ing meaning jury finding.3 of a jury charge “injury” currence” or in the interpret finding so reviewing court must entirely inconsequential under the facts of jury’s verdict as a as to reconcile it with the this case. whole, light reasonably possible evidence, and the manner of important pleadings
More
is the observation
*14
Transp.
Pac.
opinion in Mor-
submission. Luna v. Southern
supreme
neither the
court’s
388,
(Tex.1987);
Co.,
Bender
gan
pattern jury charge and its
384
nor the
Co.,
Transp.
accompanying commentary
any guid- v. Southern Pac.
offer
257,
(Tex.1980);
Ins.
in
260
Martin v.
ance on what constitutes the “occurrence”
Gulf
376,
(Tex.App.
Morgan appears
equate Group, 788
any given case.
S.W.2d
—Dal
Wood,
1989,
n.r.e.); Archer v.
question”
in
“the
las
writ ref'd
“оccurrence
with
event
1989,
(Tex.App.
Morgan,
upon.”
sued
the trial court that the causal nexus between P. Willis TURNER Willie inju- Turner, such an occurrence and Mr. Freeman’s Appellants, E.
ry undisputed sepa- was and should not be rately “injury” submitted. The omitted issue sup- would be deemed found court INDEPENDENT RICHARDSON port judgment. Al- Tex.R.Civ.P. 279. DISTRICT, SCHOOL ternatively, interpret- “occurrence” should be Appellee. finding ed to mean or include a No. 05-93-01608-CV. necessary support because that Jackson, judgment. 412. 689 S.W.2d at Appeals of Court of uphold I would award of dam Dallas. ages loss consortium because the found that the defendants caused Mr. Free Aug. injuries, psy
man’s and because Freeman’s Rehearing Denied Oct. resulting imprisonment chosis and life are serious, permanent disabling physical in
juries Browning- as a matter of law. See Indus., Lieck,
Ferris
Inc. v.
the award because properly predicated
are on this award damages.
actual
I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the properly
trial court judg refused to enter
ment on the award support for loss of Martha,
to Sean and Lance Freeman. The
family members’ loss of claim support is sub
sumed within Mr. claim Freeman’s for loss of earning capacity.4
future Suber Ohio Prods., Inc.,
Medical [14th writ Dist.] —Houston
denied) (Ellis, dissenting). plaintiffs’ J. challenge
failure the trial court’s directed precludes
verdict on Mr. claim support.5
award for loss of n.r.e.). Judge say support Ellis' dissent did not that the two Austin writ ref'd If loss however, "duplicative," they are claims "duplicative” earning capaci- of loss of future many are not. There are instances in which a ty, majority suggests, as the then the trial court spouse’s earning capacity future would not be way. able submit it If the should be either solely provide support family. used for the merely overlapping dupli- two claims are cative, but not contend, plaintiffs I and the trial join Appeals questioning I the Third Court of court should be free to submit the narrower loss why support wrong- loss of claims are limited claim, earning support rather than the broader Bennight ful death actions. See v. Western Auto claim, capacity personal injury action. Supply (Tex.App.—
